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SUMMARY OF THESIS 
Africa has always aspired for the economic integration of its markets. This endeavour is evident 
right from the 1960s clamour for independence and shortly thereafter, as newly independent states. 
During this period African countries under the umbrella of the OAU underscored economic 
cooperation as the basis for intra-African relations. However, it was not until the year 1991, with 
the conclusion of the AEC Treaty, that the continent formally adopted a framework and roadmap 
towards continental economic integration. 
The 40-year roadmap towards a continental economic community was premised upon the two 
principles of harmonisation and devolution. Moreover, the six-stage integration process set out in 
Article 6 of the AEC Treaty identifies the eight RECs in Africa as the building blocks for the 
continent’s proposed single market and economic union. It also underpinned the economic 
integration of the continent on the harmonious co-existence of the RECs. 
A step-wise ambitious integration model was adopted under Article 6 of the AEC Treaty. The 
model envisaged the creation of a Free Trade Area (FTA), followed by a Customs Union, a 
Common Market and ultimately a fully-fledged Economic Union. As a first step towards the 
continental integration, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was unveiled in 2018. 
Cross border, intra-African trade, is bound to lead to a rise in investment and commercial 
transactions on the continent. This, in turn, will inevitably lead to disputes which require 
resolution. The economic integration of the continent is fast evolving under the aegis of the AU; 
whose dispute settlement system is currently also under review. Significantly, the AU has 
consolidated its dispute settlement mechanism, following the merger in 2008 of the ACJ and 
ACH&PR, into a single AU court, known as the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(ACJ&HR).  
 It is within the context of the merged AU single court that this thesis grounds itself. It seeks to 
interrogate the adequacy of the continental trade and investment dispute settlement system and 
examines its viability within the consolidated AU dispute settlement system. While the AU led 
continental economic integration gains pace, the dispute settlement system, critical for the 
integration, is either lagging behind or is not receiving adequate attention. As a result, the dispute 
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settlement systems created under the AEC and AfCFTA are incongruent with the principles of 
harmonisation and devolution, which underpin the continent’s economic integration goals. 
The recommendations proffered, align with the philosophy of harmonising and devolving the 
continental trade and investment dispute settlement system. The research proposes to locate the 
continental trade and investment dispute settlement within the AU single court system. The 
principal recommendation is not only to expand the Court’s jurisdiction in order to accommodate 
the trade and investment mandate, but also to use sub-regional REC judicial organs as courts of 
first instance for the ACJ&HR. A hierarchical order of the continental court system, with the single 
AU Court at the apex, is also proposed in this study as the supreme overarching supranational 
judicial organ. 
 
KEY WORDS: African Union (AU); Regionalism; Regional Economic Communities (RECs); 
Supranationalism; African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJ&HR); and the African 
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). 
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My country tis of thee, 
Late land of slavery, 
         Of thee I sing. 
Land where my father’s pride 
Slept where my mother died, 
From every mountain side 
         Let freedom ring! 
 
My native country thee 
Land of the slave set free, 
         Thy fame I love. 
I love thy rocks and rills 
And o’er thy hate which chills, 
My heart with purpose thrills, 
         To rise above. 
 
Let laments swell the breeze 
And wring from all the trees 
          Sweet freedom’s song. 
Let laggard tongues awake, 
Let all who hear partake, 
Let Southern silence quake, 
         The sound prolong. 
 
Our fathers’ God to thee 
Author of Liberty, 
         To thee we sing 
Soon may our land be bright, 
With Freedom’s happy light 
Protect us by Thy might, 
         Great God our King. 
W. E. B. Du Bois, “My Country ’Tis of Thee” from Creative Writings by W. E. B Du Bois 
(Kraus Thomson Organization Limited, 1985) 
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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The 40-year plan set out by the Abuja Treaty, which established the African Economic Community 
(AEC), marked the formal beginning of the implementation of the economic integration of the 
African continent, which it projects to be completed by the year 2030. All Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) in Africa are expected to merge into the AEC, a homogenous entity that 
encompasses the economies of all African states. This research seeks to interrogate the 
preparedness of the African Union (AU) member states, which are also members of the AEC 
Treaty, in order to establish whether there has been effective economic integration of the continent, 
twenty-five years after the coming into force of the AEC Treaty, and eleven years to the date of its 
expected full implementation. To this end, this research focuses on the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights (ACJ&HR), the single AU court, its evolution, its structure, its jurisdiction; 
and its viability in resolving trade and investment disputes that are inevitably bound to increase 
with the economic integration of Africa. The research, therefore, takes trade and investment 
dispute resolution as the focal point for assessing the efficacy and the contribution of the court in 
the continental economic integration process. 
 
Additionally, the research asserts that an effective, impartial and independent trade and 
investment dispute resolution mechanism is a critical component for achieving effective economic 
integration in Africa. As Qureshi correctly observes, the central role of international law, in 
shaping global trade policy, is hinged on the assumption that free trade requires the clarity and 
predictability of an orderly system, imperative for greater cross-border trade and globalisation, as 
well as for the calls for a supranational regime that would foster cooperation, order and 
harmonisation in international economic relations.1 
 
The issues explored in this research are of particular relevance because of the current efforts 
towards the economic integration of Africa and the manner in which the process has gained 
                                                          
1 AH Qureshi, International Economic Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1999) 230. 
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significant strides towards the fast approaching AEC. These efforts are largely informed by recent 
activities unfolding on the continent. Accordingly, the African Continental Free Trade Area 
(AfCFTA) has been unveiled and the merger of RECs, in the Eastern and the Southern Africa sub-
regions, into one REC, through the Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement (TFTA), had earlier 
been concluded in June 2015. This followed significant earlier efforts aimed at integrating the 
continent. For example, the OAU-era Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development of Africa 
(LPA) of 1980 served as a blueprint on economic development whereby a declaration on collective 
self-reliant international economic order, for Africa, was agreed upon by the OAU member states.2 
Another important blueprint is seen in the AU Agenda 2063, an ambitious economic prosperity 
programme for the continent, which sets development and integration milestones of up to 100 
years after the OAU’s formation.3 A more recent effort is found in the New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD)4 whose principal objective is accelerating the economic development of 
the African continent through home grown, African, solutions. These solutions comprise the 
development of human capital, industrialisation, regional integration, natural resources 
governance and food security.5 Additionally, NEPAD seeks to harmonise national and regional 
policies on infrastructure, market development and trade on regional integration.6 
 
                                                          
2Africa Union Commission, (2015) Agenda 2063- The Africa We Want, Available at 
https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf  accessed on 31st January 2018, 
1-4.  Luke notes that the AfCFTA is an AU Agenda 2063 flagship project whose cumulative effect “is to contribute 
to the achievement of the 2030 Agenda, in particular, to the Sustainable Development Goals, from targets for decent 
work and economic growth (Goal 8) and the promotion of industry (Goal 9), to food security (Goal 2) and affordable 
access to health services (Goal 3)”. See, D Luke, Making the Case for the African Continental Free Trade Area (2018)   
<http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/01/12/making-the-case-for-the-african-continental-free-trade-area-2/>  
accessed on 30th September 2019 para. 20. 
3ibid 4-5.  
4 NEPAD <https://www.nepad.org/our-focus> accessed on 30th February 2018.The NEPAD Agency, under the AU 
has since 2010 replaced the NEPAD Secretariat. This is in an effort to integrate NEPAD into the AU structure. The 
NEPAD Agency has coordinating offices in 53 African countries.  
5ibid. 
6ibid.  
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More recent policy declarations and plans championed by the AU have been promulgated.  
Adopted in 2012, during the 18th ordinary session of the AU Summit, the Programme for 
Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), details the 51 cross-border programmes covering 
the four sectors of transport, energy, Information and Communication Technology (ICT), as well 
as trans-boundary water resources.7 The Action Plan for Boosting Intra Africa Trade (BIAT) was 
also adopted by the AU summit in 2011, and aims at establishing strategies meant to enhance intra- 
African trade.8 
 
It should be noted that the golden thread that runs through the corpus of the afore-cited AU 
instruments and blueprints is the proposal to employ existing and future Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) as vehicles towards deepening trade integration and the ultimate creation of 
the African Economic Community (AEC).9 Therefore, pursuant to this objective, the Constitutive 
Act of the Africa Union (AU Act) is particularly instructive.10 
 
With the opening of borders, comes the relatively free movement of capital and labour, 
which are two key factors of production. This will further lead to the rise in trade and investment 
disputes. Disputes in at least four categories are bound to arise during and after the implementation 
of the AEC Treaty. Firstly, there are disputes which occur on the interpretation and implementation 
of the AfCFTA and the subsequent AEC. These disputes will usually pit member states against 
each other and are largely trade disputes on the interpretation of trade treaties, protocols and tariff 
regulation.  The second category involves disputes between employees or members of the organs 
                                                          
7 “PIDA History” PIDA <https://www.au-pida.org/pida-history/> accessed on 30th February 2018. D Luke, (2018), 
notes that less-industrialized countries can benefit from the implementation of the PIDA through AfCFTA. See, Luke, 
(n) 2 [19].  
8 “BIAT – Boosting Intra-African Trade” African Union <https://au.int/en/ti/biat/about> accessed on 30th February 
2018. Luke D, (n) 2 [17], observes that BIAT “is the principal accompanying measure for the AfCFTA”.  
9 See also, the preamble o the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) and the 
communique of the third COMESA, EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit page 2 thereof 
https://www.tralac.org/resources/by-region/comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite-fta.html accessed on 31st January 2018. 
10Article 31 of the Constitutive Act of the AU sets out one of the core objectives of the AU as being to “accelerate the 
political and social economic integration of the continent and to coordinate and harmonise policies between the 
existing and future RECs for the gradual attainment of the union.” 
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of the AEC and the AEC itself. The third form relates to disputes between citizens of the AEC 
member states inter se. This category is invariably based on commercial or investment transactions 
whose performance transcend national boundaries in order to acquire a transnational character. 
These are disputes with a locale that cuts across state members’ borders. The fourth category of 
disputes involve intra-African investor-member state disputes arising out of the AfCFTA and the 
AEC Treaty free trade area arrangements. Additionally, commercial disputes may involve the 
interpretation or application of contractual rights, by third parties or citizens of such third party 
countries, against state members of the AfCFTA and AEC.  
 
The research situates the continental trade and investment dispute settlement system within 
the general AU integration framework. In doing so, this research traces the evolution of the AU 
single court, from the creation of the AEC Court of Justice, in the year 1991, to the establishment 
of a unified court of the AU. This is traced through the Constitutive Act of the African Union in 
2000 (AU Treaty), to the 2003 Protocol on the African Court of Justice and the subsequent merger 
of the two Courts into the African Court of Justice and Human Rights pursuant to the 2008 
ACJ&HR Protocol.  
 
The Protocol fused the erstwhile Court of Justice, established under the Constitutive Act 
of the AU, with the African Human and Peoples Rights (AH&PR) Court established under the 
Court’s 1998 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the establishment 
of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights. The objective was to merge the ACH&PR with 
the Court of Justice, which was created under the Constitutive Act of the AU. This was done with 
the objective of creating one continental court for the AU.11 However, the ACJ&HR Protocol is 
yet to come into force. Amendments expanding the jurisdiction and modifying the structure of the 
ACJ&HR, through an Amendment Protocol concluded in 2014, are also contextually discussed in 
the research. 
 
                                                          
11See the Preamble to the Protocol <https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36396-treaty-0035_-
_protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights_e.pdf> accessed on 30th January 
2018. 
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Moreover, this research is an analysis of the current model of the ACJ&HR, as the 
envisaged AU single court, its structure and jurisdiction with regard to trade and investment 
dispute settlement, under the AU continental integration framework. The research establishes that 
the focus of the court and indeed emphasis of its protocols and statute afore-cited, is largely based 
on the human rights and international criminal law jurisdiction of the Court with little, if any, 
reference to economic, trade and investment disputes. The net effect of which is trade and 
investment disputes and their resolution/settlement are either peripherally dealt with or ignored all 
together. 
 
Furthermore, this research seeks to address the lacunae identified by suggesting a holistic 
dispute settlement system under the AEC Treaty that encompasses methods of resolving the four 
types of disputes identified above.  
 
This research establishes that the 34-year plan laid out in the AEC Treaty, provides that the 
AEC will be achieved by merging RECs in Africa. However, no effort to merge or assimilate 
judicial and dispute resolution structures created and developed by RECs in Africa, has been given 
effect by the various protocols that establish or attend the ACJ&HR. The jurisdiction and structure 
of the ACJ&HR court with respect to trade and investment disputes also seems to be absent. There 
is, however, an apparent disconnect in the development of a unified continental AU dispute 
resolution mechanism with the economic integration plan under the AEC Treaty. Therefore, as the 
economic integration of the continent gains pace, a concomitant development of trade and 
investments disputes resolution mechanism to attend to this development is yet to be prioritised 
by the AU. Instead, the AU is only keen on developing a judicial system that focuses largely on 
human rights and international criminal law. 
 
It is argued in this research, that for the AEC to be successfully realised, the continent’s 
economic integration process must be supported by a well-structured, resourced and all-
encompassing dispute resolution system. It is, therefore, proposed in this research, that far reaching 
amendments, to the ACJ&HR Protocol and Statute, provide for an expanded mandate of the Court, 
through the creation of a special unit/section or chamber to deal with trade and investment disputes. 
Furthermore, the research proposes that the jurisdiction of this chamber should be formulated to 
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deal with member state trade disputes, AEC organs of member state disputes, state investor 
disputes, and transnational investment disputes within the AEC. The jurisdiction of the court 
should, therefore, also be expanded to include non-state parties and individuals, natural or 
corporate, by enforcing treaties, protocols or contractual rights within the AEC context. 
1.2 Research Questions 
The research fundamentally seeks to answer these questions: 
 
(i) What is the role of the ACJ&HR as the unified single AU court in the resolution of 
trade and investment disputes and the realisation of the continental economic 
community?  
 
(ii) Is the dispute resolution mechanism comprised in the ACJ&HR adequate in 
addressing the potential trade and investment disputes that may arise under the AEC?  
 
(iii) Is there a need for a special chamber/section and an expanded spectrum of dispute 
resolution mechanisms to involve arbitration, mediation and conciliation, under the 
court? 
 
(iv) If so, what would be the nature, functions and structure of such special 
chamber/section? 
1.3 Significance and Objectives of the Research 
The research sets out to achieve the following: 
 
(i) To examine the dispute resolution mechanism availed through the AU single court, and to 
establish whether the same addresses the resolution of potential trade and investment disputes 
under the AEC treaty.  
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(ii) To assess the viability of expansion of the jurisdiction of the AU single court to include the 
settlement of trade and investment disputes envisaged under the AEC treaty.  
 
(iii) To advance the case for a special chamber/section and an expanded spectrum of dispute 
resolution mechanisms to involve arbitration, mediation and conciliation, under the court.  
 
(iv) To use comparative law to model an appropriate structure of an expanded and devolved trade 
and investment chamber of the ACJ&HR. 
 
An examination of the jurisdiction and remit of the ACJ&HR will form the substratum of the 
first part of this research. An interrogation of Article 28 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR will, 
therefore, be necessary. Moreover, an expanded jurisdictional mandate of the AU single court to 
include resolution of trade and investment disputes will be justified. 
 
Firstly, this research will underscore that trade and investment operate most effectively within 
jurisdictions with predictable, independent, impartial and efficient dispute resolution mechanisms. 
An effective and holistic mechanism for the settlement of trade and investment disputes is critical 
for the deepening of the integration process. Fair, efficient, expeditious, reliable and competent 
dispute resolution methods, assure state parties, investors, third states and trading citizens of 
member states, of the reliability of the AfCFTA and AEC. Confidence is therefore infused in the 
AEC rules of engagement, tariffs and tax regimes. In addition, foreign direct and intra-community 
trade and investments shall follow. Accordingly, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Guidelines 
on Regional Integration recognise that an effective and efficient dispute resolution system is 
imperative for the proper functioning of a REC.12  
 
The second aspect of this thesis delves into a consideration of the instruments available to the 
ACJ&HR; and whether the same underwrite trade and investment dispute settlement under the 
AEC. The point of commencement is the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and the AU Treaty, 
                                                          
12 Article XXIV 1994 GATTS/WTO Agreement 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_art24_e.htm> accessed on 28th February, 2018. 
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which underscore the commitment of member states to settling disputes by peaceful means.13 
These include trade and investment disputes. On the international plane, international 
tribunals/courts, mediation, conciliation and arbitration are the primary methods of settling 
disputes among states, third parties and investors inter se.14 The thesis will therefore seek to justify 
an expanded array or spectrum of dispute resolution mechanisms which are deemed useful to the 
resolution of trade and investment disputes in an integrated Africa. 
 
Coupled with the aforementioned objectives, this research will highlight how international 
economic law has over time developed a body of law complete with its own unique dispute 
resolution mechanisms, with international commercial arbitration as its significant feature.15  
Arbitration has been found to be most suitable for investment disputes between states and investors 
with regards to private international contracts/transactions, treaty based transactions/contracts and 
disputes related thereto.16  
 
Mediation, negotiation and conciliation, on the other hand, have found use mostly in political 
disputes including trade disputes pitting states and more particularly on interpretation, application, 
observance and implementation of treaty obligations.17 Mediation, negotiation and conciliation are 
preferred over adversarial court or arbitral tribunal proceedings. These non-adversarial methods of 
dispute resolution are useful in resolving or managing trade disputes between states. This is largely 
because they involve negotiations with the facilitation of neutral experts and often ensure 
relationships endure the dispute, rather than fracturing or completely severing relations between 
states. 
                                                          
13 Article 2(1) and 33 of the Charter of the UN; Article 4 (e) of the AU Act. 
14 MF Hollering, “Alternative Dispute Resolution and International Trade” (1986) 14 N.Y.U Rev. L. & Soc. Change 
785. Also see Article 33 of the Charter of the UN, available at <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/pacific-
settlement-disputes-chapter-vi-un-charter> accessed on 30th January 2019. 
15 AS Sweet, “The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance” (2000) 13 Journal of European Public Policy 
627-646. MF Hoellering MF, [n14] 785. 
16 Ibid 628-630. See also, H Booysen, “International Law as a Legal System; the Quest for a Private Law Leg” (1996) 
21 SAYIL 60.  
17 ibid. 
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Further, the thesis will analyse the structure of the dispute resolution mechanism availed by 
the ACJ&HR to determine its efficacy in the settlement of trade and investment disputes.  The first 
section of the thesis will recommend an inbuilt appellate mechanism in the court’s structure. As it 
is, the ACJ&HR is a centralised court without branches or without presence in the regions of 
Africa. It will be proposed that the structures of existing RECs be maintained at the sub-regional 
level with the objective of devolving the functions of the ACJ&HR. This will not only ensure a 
harmonised approach, but will also ensure effective, expedient disposal of disputes. It will also 
allow the court to leverage on the existing structures developed by RECs instead of winding them 
up. This will allow for the benefits of the continental economic integration to be seen and felt in 
all corners of the continent. It will also allow for an overall avoidance of waste of physical 
infrastructure, as well as human resource capacity, built by RECs, throughout the last six decades, 
as part of sub-regional integration efforts by independent African states.  
 
The research also addresses the decentralisation and devolution of the ACJ&HR as a means of 
achieving access to trade and investment justice in the context of the AEC. The 40-year journey 
towards the AEC is meant to benefit from vital lessons drawn from experiences of the RECs, which 
the AU intends to eventually consolidate and collapse into the AEC. These experiences invariably 
include attempts at establishing both supranational and inter-governmental institutions at sub-
regional levels on the African continent. African RECs have established, at the sub-regional level, 
courts, tribunals, arbitration and mediation centres as part of their own integration process. The 
East African Community (EAC) has created the East African Court of Justice (EACJ). The 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) has established a tribunal. ECOWAS has 
established a Court of Justice. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
has established a court of Justice with jurisdiction to employ arbitration. The Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Development (IGAD) has an arbitration centre, which also focuses on mediation in 
peace and conflict management. The thesis will, therefore, draw from the experiences gained by 
these sub-regional RECs, in dispute resolution, which include the establishment of permanent and 
ad hoc courts, tribunals and other dispute settlement bodies. 
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It is also intended, through this research, to develop a multi-door, multifaceted dispute 
resolution mechanism. This mechanism proposed is to offer litigation in the traditional court set 
up, international commercial arbitration, as well as in mediation and conciliation; each being suited 
for a specific nature of dispute, all under the aegis of the ACJ&HR. For instance, mediation and 
conciliation, which are useful for resolving state-state, or state-community disputes, based on 
obligations under the AEC Treaty, are proposed. International commercial arbitration, which is 
most suitable for resolution of commercial and investment disputes, based on treaty rights and 
cross border transactions between member states’ citizens and which, therefore, cannot be the 
subject of national courts, is also proposed. The research will, therefore, gravitate towards an 
expanded dispute resolution spectrum, beyond what is currently offered by the ACJ&HR. 
 
The conclusions drawn and the propositions proffered, in answer to the research questions 
posed, bear economic and social justifications. In 2018, Africa’s combined Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) stood at US Dollars 2.5 trillion with a potential market of 1.2 billion people.18 Intra-
Africa trade currently accounts for between 17%-23% of the trade on the continent.19 It is estimated 
that inter-Africa trade, under the AfCFTA, will account for an increase by up to 52.3% of all the 
trade in Africa by 2022.20 Intra Africa trade in industrial goods is projected to grow by US $60 
billion annually.21 In 2018, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Africa rose to US Dollars 46 
billion in 2018 representing an 11% increase from the previous year.22 Foreign direct investors and 
traders are attracted to regions with an efficient and effective dispute resolution infrastructure. One 
of the core objectives of integration and indeed the drivers of the economic integration of Africa, 
                                                          
18 African Export-Import Bank (2018) African Trade Report, <https://s3-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/demo2.opus.ee/afrexim/African-Trade-Report-2018.pdf> accessed on 14th August 2019, 78. 
19 Africa Trade Statistics Yearbook 2018 <https://www.uneca.org/publications/african-statistical-yearbook-2018> 
accessed on 14th August 2019. See also, similar statistics by the World Trade Statistical Review 2018, 
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2018_e/wts18_toc_e.htm> accessed on 14th August 2019. UNECA 
Economic Report on Africa 2019 <https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/era2019_eng_fin.pdf> 
accessed on 14th August 2019. 
20 African Export-Import Bank, (n)18, 80. 
21 ibid. 
22United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report (2019) 
<https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2019_en.pdf> accessed on 14th August 201, 1 
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includes the quest for larger FDI and the deepening of intra–African trade. This is only possible 
with the assurance or guarantee that comes with a reliable and efficacious dispute resolution 
mechanism. 
 
This research breaks new ground and ventures into the nascent area of continental economic 
integration of Africa. It addresses the economic integration of the African continent under the AEC 
Treaty and AfCFTA Agreement, in the limited context of dispute resolution. The research and the 
proposals emanating therefrom are aimed at enhancing the African integration process through 
proposing an effective, broad-based, devolved and effective dispute resolution mechanism that can 
spur intra-African trade and foreign investment. 
1.4 Methodology 
The research shall primarily entail reviewed literature and desktop internet research. This will 
include books, journals, and peer reviewed articles, data collected and analysed by such bodies as 
the AU, COMESA, EAC, ECOWAS, UNECA, EU and the WTO. Comparative perspectives 
offered from continental integration efforts, such as the European Union (EU), will also be 
employed. Although statistics and empirical data are cited in support of prepositions made, the 
research is largely theoretical. A socio-legal approach is adopted. 
1.5 Hypotheses 
(i) That the ACJ&HR is the principal dispute resolution mechanism established as the 
single AU court and is charged with the mandate of determining disputes between 
member states inter se, citizens of member states to the establishing protocol and the 
AU organs; with respect to the AU Act, charters, treaties, protocols and decisions of its 
organs. 
 
(ii)  That the dispute resolution mechanism comprised in the single AU court is inadequate 
in dealing with trade and investments disputes anticipated in the AEC treaty in general, 
and Africa’s economic integration in particular. 
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(iii) That an expansion of the ACJ&HR to incorporate international commercial arbitration, 
mediation and conciliation will deepen continental regional integration by providing a 
holistic and effective system that resolves both trade and investment disputes.  
 
(iv) That a devolved continental dispute resolution system will not only ensure the 
structures developed by sub-regional RECs in Africa are put to good use after the full 
realisation of the AEC, but will also ensure access to justice by all Africans in every 
corner of the continent.   
 
1.6. Literature Review 
This thesis is in essence a study of African continental economic regionalism and dispute 
resolution. A review of key literature in respect to these concepts is, therefore, briefly undertaken 
in this part.   
 
Bachinger and Hough advance that the concept of “New Regionalism” is a new 
phenomenon or trend that has since gained currency in Africa in place of the hitherto 
“Regionalism”.23 They observe that this phenomenon came to the fore in the 1990s and is 
principally characterised by an overlapping or duplicity in membership of regional organisations 
by African states.24 They identify reasons for the “New Regionalism” as globalisation and political 
objectives within the context of geo-economic politics.25 They further note that the phenomenon 
of “New Regionalism” is not unique to Africa but can also be seen to feature in Eastern and Central 
Europe, and states of the former Soviet Union.26 They argue that though undesirable, the 
proliferation of RECs is not entirely in disharmony with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs (GATTs 1994) prescriptions on regional integration.27 
                                                          
23 K Bachinger and J Hough, “New Regionalism in Africa; Waves of Integration” (2009) 32(2) Africa Insight 43-59 
[43]. 
24ibid, 44 
25ibid, 46. 
26ibid, 44.  
27ibid, 46. 
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They categorise the 1960s proliferation of Regional Integration Arrangements/Agreements (RIAs) 
as the “first wave of Regional Integration”.28 The second wave emerged in the mid-1990s and was 
known as the “New Regionalism”.29  They conclude that the latest “wave towards numerous 
trade blocs”, from the year 2000, has resulted in confusion and that this phenomenon is one 
of the barriers to effective regional integration.30 
 
The views expressed by Bachinger and Hough are accurate in so far as they analyse the 
concept of regionalism and how it manifested itself in the two eras/epochs in the post-colonial 
Africa. They paint a grim picture of regionalism as having failed to advance Africa’s integration 
goals due to economic and political reasons.31 Trade fragmentation is, therefore, seen as 
antithetical to development. By advancing that a multiplicity of RECs in Africa, poor 
infrastructure, high poverty levels and low GDP levels hinder the continent from harvesting the 
fruits of integration, the authors seem to covertly make a case for the consolidation of markets into 
larger, more viable entities such as the AEC, which subject forms the substratum of this research. 
Bachinger and Hough’s views are, therefore, useful in aiding in the appreciating and appraising of 
the concepts of “Regionalism” and “New Regionalism” in the context of Africa’s integration, 
concepts that are germane to this thesis.   
 
Fagbayibo conducts an analysis of the various attempts at the creation of supranational 
institutions in Africa either through regional economic blocs or federated unions.32 He describes 
supranationalism as the existence of an organisation capable of exercising authoritative powers 
over its member states.33 He sees elements of supranationalism in the integration efforts in Africa 
such as the EAC, the ECOWAS and the OHADA.34 He also illuminates the factors bedevilling the 
                                                          
28ibid, 47. 
29ibid, 51. 
30ibid 47. 
31ibid 48-49. 
32 B Fagbayibo, “Common Problems Affecting Supranational Attempts in Africa: An Analytical Overview” (2013) 
16 1 PER/PELJ 32-69. 
33ibid 33. 
34ibid 35-47. 
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attempts at supranationalism in Africa. These include: weak institutional machinery, the non-
implementation of key integration initiatives, crowded integration landscape, skewed distribution 
of benefits, hegemonic threats, political instability and democratic deficit.35 There is convergence 
between Fagbayibo, and Bachinger and Hough that weak institutional mechanisms, monitoring 
and enforcement of integration objective have limited the effectiveness of RECs in Africa.36 
 
The problems identified by Fagbayibo are the possible ones that might affect the integration 
process under the AEC. Fagbayibo’s article is useful in setting the theoretical context of the 
research, particularly on the supranational approach to regionalism in Africa and the successes and 
failures recorded. The solutions he suggests provide useful insights into the possible ways to 
surmount such problems.  
 
Draper explores the models of regional economic integration and dispute resolution applied 
in Africa and concludes that most take after or are inspired by the European Union model with a 
supranational approach.37 The author revisits the unique circumstances attending African markets 
and the economics of integration of African states.38 He concludes that a home grown inter-
governmental approach to regional integration as opposed to a supranational approach is most 
suited to surmount the various challenges that afflict the African continent.39 Draper proposes a sui 
generis dispute settlement system that is inspired by experiences drawn from African RECs over 
the last 60 years.40 He shines light on the pitfalls that have attended the “imported” European 
integration model adopted in Africa.41 These, he identifies as including fundamental ideological, 
cultural, social and economic differences between Africa and Europe explain why the 
                                                          
35ibid 47-58. 
36 See, K Bachinger and J Hough (n) 23 49. 
37 P Draper, “A Home-grown Approach to Regional Economic Integration in Africa: Thinking outside the European 
Box” (2011) 10(4) Trade Negotiations Insight <https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/trade-negotiations-
insights/news/a-home-grown-approach-to-regional-economic-integration> accessed on 14th August 2019 1. Similar 
views are expressed by K Bachinger and J Hough, (23) 49. 
38ibid. 
39ibid 5.  
40ibid. 
41ibid, 4-5.  
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supranational EU model has not been entirely successful in Africa.42 He, therefore, suggests an 
intergovernmental approach based on the unique African dispute settlement culture as a viable 
preposition to avoid the challenges posed by the cut-and –paste of the EU dispute settlement 
approach that has been prevalent on the continent for decades.43 
 
While Draper recommends the use of an inter-governmental other than supranational 
approach to integration in Africa, this thesis will advance that a hybrid of both will suffice for 
Africa. For dispute resolution, the research will propound that a coercive mandate of the 
continental court is crucial for its efficacy and observance of the its decisions by parties who fall 
under its jurisdiction. It is underscored that to leave the observance of decisions of courts to 
individuals’, organs of the REC or state parties’ whims will ultimately undermine the authority 
and independence of the system, and effectively lead to non-observance of treaty and other legal 
obligations. This factor can quicken the failure of the entire AEC project. 
 
Frimpong argues that African regional courts remain largely under-studied from an 
academic perspective.44 He attributes this factor to courts’ low contribution to the jurisprudence of 
international law in general, international human rights law and regional integration law.45 He also 
observes that the regional courts face concerns over their legitimacy or their right to adjudicate 
over disputes.46 He sees the legitimacy of the courts as being affected by the manner of their 
creation (mostly through multilateral agreements between states); the perception that regional 
courts encroach on the member states’ exercise of sovereignty; limited access by juristic and 
natural persons to the courts; transparency of their processes; the extent or limits of their 
jurisdiction; and their rules of procedure.47 
 
                                                          
42ibid. 
43ibid. 
44RO Frimpong, “Legitimacy of Regional Economic Integration Courts in Africa” (2014) 7 African Journal of Legal 
Studies 61-85, also 62-63. 
45ibid, 62-63. 
46ibid, 63-64. 
47ibid, 64-84. 
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This thesis addresses the propriety of a continental trade and investment dispute settlement 
system within the AU single court system. The challenges of legitimacy identified by Frimpong 
form some of the weaknesses that attend the current system and for which an appropriate 
supranational system should be fashioned. 
 
Cofelice notes that AfCFTA’s success will largely depend on the establishment of 
appropriate governance structures which promote harmonisation, consistency and predictability of 
its goals.48 He acknowledges the role of an effective dispute settlement framework in the eventual 
success of the AfCFTA project.49 He, therefore, suggests that the AfCFTA’s institutional 
architecture should adopt a “multi-level” character, and be supported by sub-regional and national 
institutions.50 He observes that the AfCFTA’s principal challenge will be its ability to rationalise 
and harmonise the different, and sometimes conflicting, regimes of African RECs within the time 
lines set in the AfCFTA Agreement.51 
 
Cofelice appreciates that the current dispute settlement model adopted by the AfCFTA is 
exclusively intergovernmental. He, therefore, proposes a dispute resolution framework which is 
mandatory and binding on member states.52 The framework, he suggests, should also explicitly 
recognise the possibility of individuals to assert their rights under the Agreement.53 He proposes 
that the complaints process should include appeals from national courts and RECs, with the 
ACJ&HR as the apex court of last resort.54 He further proposes the establishment of a trade 
chamber of the ACJ&HR “with a view to creating positive synergies between trade law and human 
rights.”55 
 
                                                          
48A Cofelice, “African Continental Free Trade Area: Opportunities and Challenges” (2018)3 The Federalist Debate 
(Walter De Gruyter, Berlin) 32-35, also 33. 
49ibid. 
50ibid, 34. 
51ibid, 33. 
52ibid, 34. 
53ibid. 
54ibid. 
55ibid. 
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Cofelice’s work illustrates the importance of a structurally sound, accessible continental 
trade and investment dispute resolution system in achieving the free trade area envisaged. It will, 
therefore, be useful in modelling an appropriate system under the African single court. 
 
Onyema and Nyombi advocate for the creation of an African Commercial Court (ACC) 
and a Pan African Investment Court (PIC), respectively.56 They both base their prepositions on 
what they perceive as being the weaknesses of the current commercial and investor-state 
arbitration. Chiefly, they see the system as lopsided against African states and investors.57 They 
also observe that despite significant contribution to the international arbitration case-load, the 
current international arbitration system still largely excludes African arbitrators and practitioners, 
hence stunting the growth of African arbitrators, and arbitration in general.58  
 
While their sentiments may sound attractive in general terms, they fall short on merit when 
viewed objectively. Firstly, the proposals do not anchor the proposed courts on any multilateral 
treaty or protocol framework, not even within the AU system. This omission does not take into 
account the normative position and conceptual reality that continental economic integration is only 
capable of being achieved under the AU framework. As a result, ready acceptance of the proposals 
by African governments becomes doubtful. Secondly, the proposals do not explain the fate, status 
or relationship between the proposed courts and the existing continental, regional, and even 
domestic courts in terms of both normative and hierarchical supremacy order. These are important 
matters which must be addressed if the proposals are to have any meaningful effect. The proposals 
also fall short of addressing other critical elements such as: the manner of appointment of judges 
                                                          
56 See, C Nyombi, “A Case for a Regional Investment Court in Africa” (2018) 43(1) North Carolina Journal of 
International law 67-96. E Onyema, “Reimaging the Framework for resolving Intra-African Commercial Disputes in 
the Context of the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement” (2010) World Trade Review 1-23. See also, 
similar views in C Nyombi, and T Mortimer, “Rebalancing International Investment Agreements in favour of Host 
States:  Towards a World Investment Court” (2019) 3 Journal of Business Law 200-222. C Nyombi, “Towards a New 
World Economic Order: Proposal for a Pan-African Investment Court?” as referenced in Emilia Onyema (ed), 
“Rethinking the Role of African National Courts in Arbitration” (2018) Kluwer Law International 
ISBN:9789041190420. 
57Onyema (n)56, 16. Nyombi (n) 56, 87-90. 
58ibid. 
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to the courts, financing and enforcement of decisions of the proposed courts. Thirdly, both 
proposals address only one aspect of economic integration: investment disputes. Yet, trade and 
investment disputes go hand in hand, and at times may overlap. While both may be separate 
normatively they enjoy significant overlaps which make it rational for a single AU court to 
undertake jurisdiction for both of them. 
 
Alter, Gathii and Helfer explore the pattern of backlashes towards regional courts by 
member states in the three prominent sub-regional RECs of the EAC, SADC and ECOWAS.59 
They observe that the backlash takes three forms: the restriction of the jurisdiction of the court, 
attempts at abolishing the courts and removal of the judges of the courts.60 Other forms of backlash 
include administrative or even treaty amendments to circumvent the effect of the courts’ decision, 
or outright defiance of the decisions of the courts. Some states have purported to withdraw from 
protocols establishing the courts. They note that the trend of backlashes through extra-judicial 
political influences, pose an existential threat to the sub-regional courts.61 Despite this hostility, 
they note that sub-regional courts, such as the EACJ, remain “stubbornly independent”.62 
 
The creation of truly independent regional courts is critical to the envisaged continental 
integration of Africa. The experiences highlighted by Alter, Gathii and Helfer form the substratum 
of the discourse in this thesis. The work, therefore, offers invaluable insights into the possible 
                                                          
59 K Alter, J Gathii, and L Helfer, “Backlash Against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes 
and Consequences” (2016) 27 European Journal of International Law 293-328. 
60 In West Africa, the Court of Justice, of the ECOWAS upheld allegations of torture, by opposition journalists, in 
Gambia whereby the country’s political leaders sought to restrict the Court’s power to review human rights complaints. 
Other member states ultimately defeated Gambia’s proposal. In East Africa, Kenya failed in its efforts to abolish the 
East African Court of Justice (EACJ) or to remove some of its judges after a decision challenging an election to the 
sub-regional legislature. However, member states agreed to restructure the EACJ in ways that has significantly 
affected the Court’s subsequent trajectory. In Southern Africa, after the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) Tribunal ruled in favour of white farmers, in disputes over land seizures, Zimbabwe prevailed upon other 
SADC member states to suspend the Tribunal and strip its power to review complaints from private litigants. See 
Alter, J Gathii, and L Helfer, (n) 59, 293-314. 
61ibid, 328. 
62ibid, 328. 
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politico-legal challenges that may afflict the continental trade and investment system under review. 
It is the objective of this research to fashion a continental trade and investment dispute settlement 
system that is insulated from political, extra-judicial and extra-legal bureaucratic/ administrative 
interferences.  
 
This thesis ultimately advances the case for economic integration through the law, 
anchored in an overarching supranational continental court system. Comparative law and literature 
therefore offers invaluable insights in this regard. Cappelleti, Seccombe and Weiler conclude, in 
the context of the development of EU community law, that “integration is fundamentally a political 
process” and law is but one of the many instruments” that are harnessed to achieve the objectives 
of integration.63 The three writers conceived what is now referred to as the “integration through 
law project”.64 The project has acquired an enduring significance and played a pivotal role in 
shaping the contours of European law as an academic discipline.65 In this regard, law is seen as 
both an object and an agent of integration.66  While law is a product of the polity, the polity is also, 
to some extent, acknowledged to be a creature of the law.67 As Hallstein observes, what makes the 
                                                          
63Cappelleti M, et.al, “Integration Through Law: Europe and the America Federal Experience” (1986) (1)1, in 
Cappelleti M, et.al (eds), Integration Through Law (Walter de Gruyter Inc., Berlin) 3-4. 
64 The integration through law project refers to the ensuing body of scholarly work inspired by the pioneering work of 
M Cappelleti et.al, aforementioned, which addresses the various perspectives of the role of the law and legal systems 
in integration. Other prominent writings in this area include: J Hunt and J Shaw, “Fairy Tale of Luxembourg? 
Reflections on the Law and Legal Scholarship in European Integration” (2009) in D Phinnemore and Warleigh A (eds), 
Reflections on European Integration: 50 Years of the Treaty of Rome 93; M Selmayr, “The Foundation of a European 
Law Institute: The Planting of a Little ‘Apple Tree’ for a European Legal Culture” (2011) <https://www.europeanlaw 
institute.eu/file admin/user_upload/p_eli/_3_Martin_Selmayr.pdf.> accessed on 2nd August 2019; D Augenstein, 
Integration through the Law” Revisited. The Making of the European Polity (Ashgate Farnham 2012); and A Grimmel, 
“The Uniting of Europe by Transclusion:  Understanding the Contextual Conditions of Integration Through Law” 
(2014) 36 (6) Journal of European Integration 1. 
65 D Augenstein, “Integration Through Law” Encyclopaedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (Springer 
Science+Business Media B.V Berlin 2017) 1-5 [1]. 
66ibid. See also, R Delhousse, and JHH Weiler, “The Legal Dimension”, The Dynamics of European Integration (W. 
Wallace ed. London 1990) 242-260 [243]. 
67ibid. 
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European Community a remarkable legal phenomenon is that it is a creation of law; it is a source 
of law; and it is a legal system.68 
 
The law is incomplete without a legal system through which it exerts its influence on the 
integration unit and its membership. Supranational courts play this critical role. They 
assure observance, interpretation and enforcement of international norms and shared 
values. However, to do so they must be fitted with the necessary accessories. For example, 
the CJEU’s supremacy over national law and its direct effect have been identified as the 
critical elements that ensure the standardisation and elimination of differential treatment 
with the effect of deepening integration in the EU.69 Augenstein underscores the CJEU’s 
contribution and role in the integration of the EU as constitutionalising European law by 
endowing it with a claim to supremacy and direct effect.70 As a result, EU law is supreme 
in relation to conflicting norms of national (constitutional law) and can be directly invoked 
by private parties in legal proceedings before national courts.71The CJEU has, therefore, 
laid the foundations of a supranational legal order that transcended the state-based 
constitutional international law divide and challenged traditional assumptions about the 
derivative relationship between positive law and the state.72 
 
According to Cappelleti, Seccombe and Weiler, the true measure of the success of legal 
integration is not whether the integrated legal system is technically sound and functional, but 
whether the system actually promotes the achievement of the integrational objectives.73 
 
Therefore, the true test of the effectiveness of the proposed African continental trade and 
investment legal system is not necessarily in the technical soundness of the system but on whether 
it will promote the achievement of the objectives of the desired continental economic integration. 
                                                          
68 W Hallstein, Europe in the Making (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1972) 30. 
69 D Augenstein, (n) 65, 1-2. 
70 D Augenstein D, (n) 65, 2. 
71 ibid. 
72 Ibid, 2. See also Dickson J, and Eleftheriadis P (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2012) 25-40. 
73 Cappelleti, Seccombe M, and Weiler JHH, (n) 63, 42. 
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1.7 Outline of Thesis 
This thesis comprises of six chapters. The first chapter contains the background to the research 
problem, the research questions, and objectives of the study, the methodology, hypothesis, a 
literature review and an outline of the chapters of the thesis. 
 
Chapter two provides the conceptual framework of the study. The concepts germane to the 
study, their frontiers and contours are defined, so as to give the research both form and focus. 
Regional economic integration in the African context through the three historical epochs of 
integration from the 1960s to date are delineated. The first, second and third waves of integration, 
their motivation, challenges and achievements are discussed.  Political, economic, social and 
cultural rationales for regional integration in the African context are also addressed. Chapter two 
of the thesis also briefly illuminates the four approaches to regional economic integration as 
applied in the African context, salient features thereof and the challenges and prospects attending 
the four approaches. The four approaches to be discussed include intergovernmental, 
supranational, functionalism and neo-functionalism. The chapter concludes by narrowing the 
discussion, at a theoretical level, to the interplay between continental economic integration and 
dispute resolution. 
 
Chapter three develops the discourse to specific aspects of regional economic integration 
in Africa and addresses the various efforts by African states in economic integration. The 
architecture, scope, mandate and objects of the various continental and sub-regional efforts at 
economic integration, with particular reference to trade and investment integration, such as the 
AEC, AfCFTA, TFTA, COMESA, ECOWAS and SADC, are addressed in this chapter of the 
thesis. 
 
Chapter four narrows down the focus of the research to dispute resolution under the AEC. 
The chapter begins by setting out the structure and jurisdiction of the envisaged ACJ&HR before 
tracing the evolution and development of the AU single court from the ACJ through the ACH&PR 
to the ACJ&HR.  The dispute resolution mechanism setup in the AfCFTA and other African sub-
regional economic integration arrangements such as the TFTA, COMESA Court of Justice, 
OHADA CCJA, EACJ, ECOWAS Court of Justice, SADC Tribunal, and the IGAD tribunal are 
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also illuminated. African regional arbitration and mediation centres are as well given attention as 
efforts for investment disputes resolution at the sub-regional level. 
 
Chapter five of the thesis advances a case for the expansion of the jurisdiction of the 
ACJ&HR. To this end, in this chapter, the research will make a case for the creation of the 
chamber/section of the Court specific for resolution of trade and investment disputes. The chapter 
will also dedicate a section thereof to justifying the inclusion of arbitration, mediation and 
conciliation in the breath of instruments available to the proposed chamber of the court for 
settlement of trade and investment disputes. The chapter will also focus on the jurisdiction and 
structure of the proposed chamber of the court dedicated to trade and investment disputes. A 
proposal will be advanced to devolve the functions of the ACJ&HR to the sub regions occupied 
by the RECs so as to ensure access to trade and investment justice throughout the continent. This 
is in line with Article 6 of the AEC, which requires the AEC to build on the structures and 
experiences of sub regional RECs in the achievement of the AEC.  An appellate mechanism inbuilt 
in the court system will also be suggested for purpose of efficiency, judicial review and final 
recourse.  
 
Chapter six will highlight, collate and consolidate the conclusions drawn from the various 
chapters of the thesis with recommendations ultimately postulated. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND TO REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction 
Although the objectives of free trade are patently and largely economic, its pillars are latently 
political.74 Free trade, of necessity, involves the giving up of some sovereign authority exercised 
by states over their territories. However, the proponents of free trade and economic integration, 
particularly of markets, opine that the loss of some sovereign authority by states is well 
compensated by the benefits that accrue to the state because of integration.75 In essence, the 
benefits of integrated economies compensate for the loss of some sovereignty by the integrating 
states. Put differently, sovereignty is not lost by integration but is shared and possibly even 
expanded in an integrated system. The political good-will of sovereigns and governments who 
wield state power, therefore, forms a cardinal enabler of integration, be it economic or political. 
 
This chapter sets a basis for the thesis by defining the fundamental concepts employed in 
this work. The chapter will offer an understanding of regional economic integration as a concept. 
Its objectives, rationale and classification of integration efforts, are all navigated through, at a 
theoretical level. Additionally, this chapter forms the foundation for discussing regional economic 
integration efforts in Africa, and, therefore, the evolution of the ACJ&HR as the AU single court, 
which is the substance of the chapter three of this thesis. 
 
This chapter consists of five substantive parts. The first section attempts a definition of 
economic regionalism through its fundamental elements and salient objectives. The second section 
identifies the main theories for regional economic integration as applied in Africa. The third 
section addresses the various forms of international dispute resolution preferred in resolving trade 
                                                          
74HCAW Schulze, International Tax Free Zones and Free Ports (Butterworths, Durban 1997) 1.  
75 See, for example, P De Lombaerde and L Van Langenhove, “Regional Integration: Poverty and Social Policy” 
(2003) 7(3) Global Social Policy 377-383; H Van Ginkel, and L Van Langenhove, “Introduction and context” (2007) 
in H Van Ginkel, J Court and L Van Langenhove (eds), Integrating Africa; Perspectives on Regional Integration and 
Development, UNU Press 1-9. 
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and investment disputes. Most importantly, it addresses the factors that affect the choice of dispute 
resolution within the African context. The fourth section examines economic regionalism in Africa 
and how it manifests, both at the continental/regional and sub-regional levels. Finally, the fifth 
section summarises the discussions set out in the chapter.  
2.2 The Concept of Economic Regionalism  
Although the Charter of the United Nations (UN) does not specifically define regional integration, 
it, however, provides for international cooperation in solving, among others; economic, social, 
cultural and humanitarian problems as one of its key objectives.76 Article 52(1) of the Charter of 
the UN makes the most direct reference to regional arrangements. It is worded in permissive terms 
and provides that:  
 
[n]othing in the Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or 
agencies for dealing with such matters relating to maintenance of international 
peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such 
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations.77 
 
Hass defines regional integration as: 
 
the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to 
shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states; the result of 
which is a new political community, superimposed over pre-existing ones.78 
 
                                                          
76Article 1(3). The full text of the Charter of the UN is available at <https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/.> 
accessed on 12th September 2018. 
77 ibid. 
78 E B Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces (Stanford University Press, Stanford 
1958) 16. 
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Van Ginkel and Van Langenhove give the term a more contemporary definition. They 
define regional integration as “the process by which states within a particular region increase their 
level of interaction with regard to economic, security, political or social and cultural issues”.79 
 
According to Balassa, economic integration encompasses measures designed to abolish 
discrimination between economic units belonging to different nation states.80 The fundamental 
attributes of economic integration are defined with reference to mobility of goods, services, factors 
of production and variable capacities for shared or supranational decision making and 
implementation.81 
 
The objectives of integration are, primarily, twofold: economic and political.82 Other 
motivations for integration have also emerged, albeit at a less prominent level. These include: 
social, cultural, technical and environmental and human rights objectives.83 Integration, therefore, 
invariably attempts to answer to the integrating nations’ general economic welfare; and in the 
ultimate, global welfare.84   
 
Conventional regional integration theory identifies at least six approaches to integration.85 
These include functionalism, neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, supranationalism, 
                                                          
79 H Van Ginkel and L Van Langenhove, (n) 75 9. 
80 B Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London 1961) 1. 
81M Forere, “Is a Discussion of the “United States of Africa” Premature? Analysis of ECOWAS and SADC Integration 
Efforts” (2012) Journal of African Law 29-54 [33]. 
82 T Cottier and M Foltea, “Constitution and Function of the WTO and Regional Trade Agreements” in L Bartles, 
(2006) Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford University Press, Oxford (2012) [1]: See also, 
C Phillipe. A Schmitler, “A Revised Theory of Regional Integration: Theory and Research” (1970) 24(4) 836-868. 
83 J Gathii, “Mission Creeper for Relevance: The East Africa Court of Justice’s Human Rights Strategy” (2013) 24 
Duke Journal of Corporate and International Law 249-280, at 249. S Balton and R Balton (2007), observe that there 
is a direct co-relation between the observance of human rights and the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment; S 
Balton and R Balton, “What attracts Foreign Investors? An Examination of Human Rights and Foreign Direct 
Investment” (2007) 96(1) Journal of Politics 96 (1) 143-155 [1]. 
84 Schulze (n) 74. 
85 For a discussion of these theories; see, C Basak, International Law for International Relations. (OUP. Oxford, 
New York 2010) chapter 2. 
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liberalism and realism. For purposes of this thesis, and as far as it relates to economic integration 
of the African continent, a discussion of the three theories of intergovernmentalism, functionalism 
and supranationalism shall suffice in giving context to the study. 
 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) has classified integration models into at least six 
categories: Preferential Trade Areas (PTAs), Free Trade Areas (FTAs), Customs Unions, Common 
Markets, Monetary Unions, Economic Unions, and Political Unions.86 The classification of 
integration models is based on the characteristics and objectives that typify them.87 This step-wise 
classification is, therefore, informed by the objects of the particular integration effort. Some 
terminate after achieving their objectives, at the FTA level, some end at customs unions or 
common market, while others evolve to economic blocs or federated semi-autonomous political 
unions.88 The stepwise or progressive evolution of integration units from PTAs or FTAs to political 
or economic unions is the most preferred approach applied in African economic and political 
integration processes.  In terms of economic integration, this model is also called the linear market 
progression paradigm.89 
 
2.3 Theories and Rationales of Regional Economic Integration in Africa 
A theoretical understanding of the approaches to regional economic integration in Africa is critical 
in setting context to the discourse on continental trade and investment dispute resolution. This 
section engages in, but is not limited to, a discussion on intergovernmentalism, functionalism and 
                                                          
86Article XXIV of the WTO (GATT) 1994 which generally follows the models defined by Balassa, note 80 above. 
These theories have a multidisciplinary application cutting across international relations, international organisation, 
political science, and law. Mbori contends that the structure adopted for the AfCFTA makes it inevitable that it should 
comply with Article XXIV of GATT and Article V of GATS. See H Mbori, “Existing in the Eternal Twilight Zone of 
WTO Consistency: The Case of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement” (2019) [7] 
http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/01/25/existing-in-the-eternal-twilight-zone-of-wto-consistency-the-case-of-the-
africa-continental-free-trade-agreement/ accessed on 30th September 2019. 
87 Balassa (n)80 [2]. 
88UO Uzodike, “The Role of Regional Economic Communities in Africa’s Economic Integration, Prospects and 
Constraints” (2009) 39(2) Africa Insight 26-42 [5]. 
89 T Hartzenberg, “Regional Integration in Africa” (2011) Trade Centre for Southern Africa-WTO Working Paper [5]. 
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supranationalism, which are the three principal approaches to integration in Africa. While other 
theories exist, these three are of primary concern to this discourse since they are predominantly 
manifested in economic integration efforts in Africa necessitating their importance in this 
discussion. 
2.3.1 Theories of Regional Economic Integration in Africa 
2.3.1.1 Intergovernmentalism 
The emergence of intergovernmentalism as a theory can be traced back to the intellectual discourse 
on integration of the 1960s advanced by Hoffman.90 It is essentially a critique of the neo-
functionalism theory attributed to Haas.91 Rosamond summarises the essence of 
intergovernmentalism by foregrounding how the theory is underpinned by the assertion that the 
state is the primary actor in international relations.92 The state, therefore, consciously relinquishes 
a portion of its sovereign authority, in the interest of commonly shared objectives, with regards to 
the integration process.93 However, the state still retains its place as the principal entity in the 
integration process.94 
 
                                                          
90 S Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-state and the Case of Western Europe” (1966) 95(3) 
Daedalus 862-915. 
91 The neo-functional theory is elaborated in two of Haas’ works, EB Haas “International Integration; the European 
and Universal Process” (1961) 15(3) International Organisation 366-392; and EB Haas, “The Study of Regional 
Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorising” (1970) 24(4) International Organisation, 606-646. 
92B Rosamond, “Conceptualising the EU Model of Governance in World Politics” (2005) [7] 
<http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1098/1/WRAP_Rosamond_9570885-150709-rosamond_efar_05.pdf.> accessed on 15th 
December 2018. See also B Rosamond, “The Uniting of Europe and the foundation of EU studies: Revisiting the neo-
functionalism of Ernst Haas” (2005) 12(20) Journal of European Public Policy 291-309.  
93B Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire 2000) 51-52. See also, S Hoffman, 
“Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today” (1982) 20(1-2) Journal of Common Market Studies 20 
21-37. 
94ibid. 
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Intergovernmentalists argue that the state does not become obsolete because of integration 
but rather remains a primary actor in the integration process through negotiation and direction.95 
Therefore, the state is not weakened through delegating a portion of its powers to the integrated 
unit but, to the contrary, is strengthened in the process by expanding its sphere of influence beyond 
its territory.96  
 
A contemporary version of intergovernmentalism has since emerged, with its main 
proponents described by Andrew Moravcsik as liberal intergovernmentalists.97 The fundamentals 
of the theory remain the same as with classical intergovernmentalism, with states prevailing as the 
central actors in integration. However, it should be highlighted that, liberal intergovernmentalism 
incorporates the liberal model of integration into traditional notions of intergovernmentalism. This 
model underscores the role of the state in asserting its preferences and pursing them through its 
bargaining powers.98 In contrast to neo-functionalists, liberal intergovernmentalists consider 
institutions to be of limited importance in the integration process.99 Moravcsik posits that liberal 
intergovernmentalism fundamentally takes a two–stage approach. In the first stage, national 
preferences are primarily determined by constraints and opportunities imposed by economic 
interdependence, while in the second stage intergovernmental integration negotiations largely 
depend on the state’s bargaining power and desire to control the domestic agenda.100 
 
Moravcsik goes on to expound liberal intergovernmentalism as exhibiting three essential 
elements: the assumption of rational behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference formation 
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and an analysis of inter-state negotiation.101 The assumption of rational state behaviour provides a 
general framework for the analysis, describing the cost and benefits of economic interdependence 
as the primary determinants of national preferences.102 
 
However, intergovernmentalism is not without criticism. Intergovernmentalism has been 
faulted for understating the role of supranational institutions in integration by emphasising the 
state-centric approach.103 The effect of this has been to diminish or minimise the influence and 
ultimate independence of integration institutions, therefore slowing the deepening of the 
integration process.104  
 
Further criticism is laid on the intergovernmentalists’ view of the limited importance of 
supranational institutions. The liberal intergovernmentalists’ view of limited importance of 
supranational organs has been disproved by the development of strong and effective supranational 
organs of the EU, which is the context in which the approach bases its fundamental theories. An 
illustration is found in the jurisdictional and competence tensions between the EU and national 
organs. For instance, Siegfried Bross, a German Judge, has called for a separate court to preside 
over disputes which overlap in competencies or jurisdictional questions of the ECJ and national 
courts of member states. This court would preside particularly over questions of national 
constitutional law.105 In fact, in Bross’ opinion, the ECJ cannot make decisions on national 
constitutional law. Similarly, national courts are disempowered because they cannot rule on the 
interpretation of EU law.106 Additionally, the principle of subsidiarity offers no relief for the 
competence or confusion despite the fact that the EU should only act if the goal cannot be 
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successfully achieved by its member states.107 This, Bross observes, is primarily because of the 
fact that when the EU member states transfer powers to the supranational level, they implicitly 
acknowledge that a decision is better made at the EU level and cannot, therefore, invoke the 
subsidiarity principle at a later stage.108  
  
The intergovernmental approach to integration is common place in the African integration 
process. Most RECs in Africa are intergovernmental units with some exhibiting limited 
supranational features or organs.109 Most integration efforts in Africa are spearheaded by states 
which wield influence over the organs created in the integration efforts. In essence, African 
integration efforts are intergovernmental and state-centric. Intergovernmentalism, therefore, seems 
to find favour on the African continent, largely because of its assurance of the state’s retention of 
its sovereign authority with little, if any, of it ceded to the integration organs. 
 
On the other hand, commentators such as Senghor and Forere prefer to view and discuss 
Africa’s integration through the lenses of functionalism and neo functionalism, and for good 
reason.110 African states want to protect their sovereignty while fostering international co-
operation and incrementally, through the establishment of regional organisations to promote 
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economic development.111 This, according to Forere, resonates well with the functionalist and neo-
functionalist approaches in which common interest is seen as a key motivation for integration.112  
 
However, there is also compelling evidence which points to Africa’s integration efforts as 
something which strongly gravitates towards intergovernmentalism. Ibrahim, Ogbeid and 
Adams113 advance that the AU is itself an intergovernmental body although, as Fagbayibo 
observes, the original idea was to create organs with supranational authority under the 
intergovernmental AU.114 Senghor and Forere conclude that since the principal decisions made by 
the AU are taken by member states, these states control the integration process according to their 
own interest, and that African states are unlikely to surrender their hard earned sovereignty for an 
uncertain union of African states.115 
 
Maluwa cites pan-Africanism as one of the factors which triggered the birth of the AU and 
its predecessor, the OAU.116 Ibrahim, Ogbeid and Adams define pan-Africanism as a “[r]acial 
universal or Afro-continental feeling of solidarity and shared ancestry among Africans”.117 
Maluwa envisions the collective ambition of Africans immortalised in the pan-African spirit as a 
rallying call towards the continent’s political and economic integration.118 W.E.B Dubois is 
regarded as the founding father of pan-Africanism or the pan-African movement, which, from 
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conception, sought to fight against the western domination of Africa, and to restore dignity, self-
determination, and unity within Africa and its diaspora.119 
 
It has been observed that Africa’s integration has always been advanced by strong 
charismatic leaders who ride on the pan-African philosophy.120 The formation of the OAU was 
spearheaded by the then Presidents of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser and 
Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah.121 Similarly, the transformation of the OAU into the AU, and reform 
of the latter’s structures, had Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Thabo Mbeki of South 
Africa and Mummar Al-Ghaddafi of Libya as prime movers.122 The common theme running 
through both eras of Africa’s integration is the strong leaning towards an intergovernmental 
approach and the ideology of pan-Africanism as a rallying call. 
 
Despite its popularity on the continent, intergovernmentalism has still endured criticism. 
Ibrahim, Ogbeid and Adams advance that much of the OAU’s failure can be attributed to its policy 
of non-interference in member states’ internal affairs.123 This, they observe, weakened the OAU’s 
ability to prevent and manage conflicts, civil wars and even colonialism.124 This was partly because 
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of the intergovernmental approach adopted which caused the AU’s predecessor, the OAU, to shy 
away from establishing organs with an overarching supranational authority to ensure peace and 
security on the continent.125 However, the policy of non-intervention in internal affairs of partner 
states always stood in the way. Notwithstanding, it appears that the Constitutive Act of the AU has 
reversed the policy on non-interference in internal affairs of member states. Article 4(h) of the 
Constitutive Act of the AU provides for “the right of the Union to intervene in respect of grave 
circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” 126 
 
At the sub-regional level, the intergovernmental approach of “integrating for self- interest” 
has been exhibited by African states resulting in their forming a multiplicity of RECs, and the 
undesirable “spaghetti bowl effect” in integration.127Other examples of intergovernmental self-
interest moves, at sub regional REC levels in Africa, were seen in the 1989 move by Mauritania 
to pull out of the Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS and become a founding 
member of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).128 Morocco unilaterally withdrew its membership of 
the then OAU in 1984 when the continental body took a decision that was perceived to be inimical 
to its national interest by recognising the disputatious Sahrawi Arab Democratic as an independent 
state.129 However, Morocco was re-admitted to the AU in January 2017. 
2.3.1.2 Functionalism  
Functionalism as a theory of integration can be traced back to the inter-war period between the 
end of First World War and the beginning of Second World War. The theory is credited to David 
Mitrany, who is regarded as the father of functionalism in international relations. Writing on the 
brink of the Second World War and following the collapse of the League of Nations, Mitrany’s 
appreciation of international relations was largely influenced by the geopolitics of the inter-war 
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period whereby the state’s power, sovereignty and territorialism over-shadowed cooperation and 
integration efforts.130 Mitrany suggests that for a supranational authority to succeed, it should be 
established based on the functions and needs, which require scientific knowledge, expertise and 
technology.131 In essence, Mitrany, and functionalism theorists trust that global integration will 
only be achieved through specialised institutions.132 
 
Neo-functionalism as a theory emerged after the Second World War.  With the end of the 
Second World War came the economic renewal of Europe and a reconstruction of the battered 
economies of the continent.  It is in this environment that the functionalists’ theorists locate their 
perspective on integration. Neo-functionalism is grounded in the work of its earliest proponent, 
Ernst B Haas.133 Haas sees integration as being “the ability of states to persuade others to shift 
their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre whose institutions possess 
or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.”134 
 
The difference between functionalism and neo-functionalism is on their various approaches 
to integration, and more specifically, the role played by the state in integration. Neo-functionalists 
take the bottom-up approach while functionalists take the top-bottom approach.135 According to 
Hamad, the bottom-up approach means that economic integration should start from the bottom-
line and, through time and trust, member states should proceed towards political integration.136 He 
notes that the bottom-up approach places a major emphasis on the role of non-state actors, is people 
or market driven and also takes care of social interests as dynamic forces of integration.137 
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On the other hand, the top-bottom approach advanced by Hass and functionalist theorists 
is based on the “spill over” theory. Rosamond describes the “spill over” phenomenon as “a 
situation whereby the cooperation in one field or some policy areas such as currency exchange 
rates, taxation, and wages necessitates cooperation in another.”138 Lindberg captures the essence 
of the spill-over theory most succinctly, as follows: 
 
Spill-over refers to a situation in which a given action related to a specific goal, 
creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further 
condition and a need for more action, and so forth.139 
 
According to the neo-functionalists, there are two kinds of spill-over: functional/economic 
and political.140 Functional or economic spill-over is the interconnection of various economic 
sectors and would create automatic integration in various policy areas.141 Political spill-over is the 
creation of supranational governance models which may require political good-will from member 
states of the integration effort.142 
 
Functional integration in areas such as river basins, transportation links and meteorology 
has been useful on the continent, particularly since most African economies are small, with a 
substantial number of which are landlocked and cannot thrive or function in isolation.143 Various 
forms of functional regionalism have been successful on the continent. For instance, the Southern 
Africa Power Pool (SAPP)144, the Senegal River Basin Multi-Purpose Water Resources 
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Development Project145 and the ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency.146 The World Bank notes that functional integration projects are always visible and of 
immediate impact.147 
2.3.1.3 Supranationalism 
A supranational union or institution is an entity whose authority transcends the sovereignty of the 
member states and their respective territorial boundaries.148 Unlike states in a federal union, 
member states retain ultimate sovereignty, although some sovereignty is exercised by, shared with, 
or added to the supranational body.149 Since it is an agreement between sovereign states, it is 
usually based on treaties or agreements.150  
 
Joseph Weiler, a foremost supranationalism theorist, classifies supranationalism into two 
categories:  the juridical/ normative approach and the political/ decisional approach.151 A more 
contemporary view, in the context of the EU integration is, according to Weiler, characterised by 
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different levels of supranationalisation and integration.152 The 1958-1968 period is, for instance, 
distinguished from the current EU supranationalism model. The current period is characterised by 
the institutional domain, monetary domain and geographical extension of the common market.153 
 
Normative supranationalism addresses three main principles: the doctrines of direct effect, 
supremacy and the pre-emption.154 The doctrine of direct effect relates to the vesting of authority 
in main autonomous institutions, such as was done in the early days of European integration 
through the ECSC, in order to adopt self-executing member state law.155 The doctrine of 
supremacy means that there is a hierarchy of norms with the integration organ law being superior 
to the member state law.156 The pre-emption principle, on the other hand, means that the integration 
unit has policy making competence where state members are precluded from enacting legislation 
contradictory to the integration unit’s law and are pre-empted from taking such action at all. 157  
 
The EU is often cited as the foremost example of supranationalism. This is primarily 
because its institutions exercise authority over member states and may supplant national organs.  
The EU parliament passes laws that apply to the entire membership overriding national laws or 
legislation.158  The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of 
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Human Rights (ECHR) have original jurisdiction in matters regarding the interpretation of the 
constituting treaty, treaties entered into by the state parties, trade and investment claims and 
violations of human rights.159 The Courts’ jurisdiction applies across the entire EU membership.160 
State members cannot extricate themselves from the coercive force of the EU organs.  EU treaties, 
decisions of the EU Commission, Parliament, Courts and other organs must be complied with by 
member states and their organs.161   
 
The principles of direct effect of EU law, supremacy of the CJEU over national courts and 
the overriding effect of its decisions were first demonstrated in the 1963 case of Van Gend en Loos 
v Nederlandse Administraitie der Belastingen162 in which the court held that provisions of the EC 
treaty have direct effect in the community bestowing enforceable rights as between individuals 
and the member states.163 
 
In yet another decision, Commission v Council,164 discussed whether the competence to 
negotiate and conclude an international agreement, in the transport field, vested powers in the 
member states or in the community. The CJEU ruled that a matter already regulated by the EU 
institutions could not be dealt with internationally without community participation, precisely 
because it is regulated by an EU institution.165 
 
The cases above demonstrate Weiler’s aforementioned doctrines of supranationalism in 
practice. The Van Gend en Loos case underscores the doctrine’s direct effect by emphasising the 
application and availability of the EU parliament’s legislation towards individuals working against 
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the EU states.166 This is achieved by granting aggrieved individuals direct access to the CJEU and 
the ECHR, specifically on questions regarding the interpretation and enforcement of rights and 
obligations created by EU and national laws. Moreover, the case highlights how the doctrine is 
further achieved by the CJUE and the ECHR exercising original jurisdiction in such matters, so as 
to override national state courts, which would otherwise have jurisdiction. 
 
The Commission case also brings to the fore the pre-emption principle by emphasising the 
overriding effect or supremacy of EU legislation and law over national laws of state members. The 
effect thereof being that any national laws which contradict EU laws and which regulate certain 
questions stand voidable. The case, therefore, also underlines the direct effect of EU law over the 
member states.  
 
Africa has had its own experiences and experiments with supranationalism, both at the 
regional and sub-regional levels.167 This has mainly been at the sub-regional level, with both 
success and failure in equal measure.168 These will be highlighted in the next chapter of this thesis, 
particularly within the context of dispute resolution.  
2.4 International Trade and Investment Dispute Resolution in Africa  
Dispute resolution clauses in international agreements are often referred to as “midnight” clauses 
and for good reason.169 As a general rule, after lengthy negotiations on the substance of an 
agreement, diplomats or their technical persons tend to cut and paste dispute settlement procedures 
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from previous treaties without much thought about what would happen if these procedures actually 
needed to be used.170 
 
Dispute settlement is to international law what pathology is to medicine.171 It is about the 
worst case scenario in the event the consensus which made it possible for the treaty or its rules to 
be created, no longer exists or when allegations of violation are being traded.172 The purpose for 
treating dispute resolution clauses in a casual manner lies with the negotiating parties hope that 
the procedures may never be used.173 Discussing dispute settlement whilst celebrating the 
conclusion of difficult and sometimes fragile agreements is tantamount to discussing the 
possibility of divorce at a wedding reception. 
 
The overarching canonical normative principle on the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes is found in Article 33 of the UN Charter. The provision underscores the members’ 
commitment to the peaceful settlement of international disputes by means of their own choice.  
The provision reads that: 
 
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance 
to international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful measures of their own choice. 
 
The Charter of the UN, therefore, recognises peaceful settlement of disputes to include 
both judicial (adjudicative) and “diplomatic” or non-judicial methods.  A similar provision is found 
in the Constitutive Act of the AU and in the AEC Treaty, with particular reference to economic 
regionalism.174 The judicial (adjudicative) methods of settlement of disputes include arbitration, 
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courts and tribunals.175 Non-judicial or diplomatic methods include; negotiations, enquiry, 
mediation and conciliation.176 The most significant difference between adjudicative and 
diplomatic dispute resolution procedures is that adjudicative methods offer legally binding 
outcomes, while diplomatic ones rely on the goodwill of the parties to embrace and enforce their 
outcomes.177   
 
The type of disputes anticipated and its actors are the two elements needed to determine 
the dispute resolution mechanism to be employed. By way of illustration, where disputes are 
largely between state parties, it is preferred that diplomatic channels are followed to mitigate an 
agreement before parties resort to taking the case to court.  On the other hand, parties to investor-
state disputes, which involve foreign third-party non-state actors, prefer to elect a dispute 
settlement system before which they have direct and unfettered access and standing. 
 
International dispute resolution has a two-pronged procedural approach.  It may either be 
by use of permanent bodies or ad hoc solutions. International judicial bodies or courts are often 
institutions established by treaty or agreement with permanent existence, while arbitration, 
mediation and conciliation are ad hoc processes that are activated to deal with disputes, as and 
when they arise. 
2.4.1 Trade and Investment Dispute Resolution in Africa 
The dispute settlement methods preferred in resolving trade and investment disputes in Africa 
range from the non- formal to formal systems. For trade disputes, which are usually between states, 
preference is mostly for non-formal methods such as negotiation, mediation and conciliation.178 
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Investment disputes, which include non-state entities, usually, incline towards formal rule-based 
and binding systems such as arbitration, tribunals and courts.179 A brief outline of these approaches 
will now follow. 
(a) Non-formal Methods: Negotiation, Mediation and Conciliation 
(i) Negotiation 
Negotiation is an informal process which involves the parties meeting and identifying their issues 
of dispute with a view to arriving at a mutually satisfying solution without the help of a third 
party.180 Negotiation is acknowledged as the most enduring method of conflict resolution with 
maximal control of the process by the disputants.181 
 
Negotiation is one of the most efficient methods of settlement of disputes. In negotiating, 
parties can also forge or fashion their own solution to fit their circumstances without the need for 
strict rule-based approaches.182 It is for these two reasons that negotiation is preferred by states in 
resolving their disputes.  However, because of its informal nature, negotiation is non-coercive and 
largely depends on the parties’ good will.183 The proceedings can, therefore, also endlessly stretch. 
In addition, power imbalances in negotiations can also affect the outcome.184 
 
In the international trade arena, negotiation is used in settling disputes informally using 
diplomacy between states.185 In international trade relations, negotiation is best exemplified by the 
dispute settlement system of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (“GATT”) as it existed 
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prior to the creation of the WTO, as well as the current form of Chapter 20 of the North America 
Free Trade Area (NAFTA).186  
(ii) Mediation 
Mediation is a voluntary, informal, consensual, strictly confidential and non-binding conflict 
management process, in which a neutral third party helps parties reach a negotiated settlement.187 
Mediation is largely a process of negotiation with the facilitation of a third party neutral.  
Mediation has also been referred to as a continuation of the negotiation process by a three-way 
process as opposed to a two-way process that typifies negotiation.188 
 
In essence, the mediator’s role is to act as an independent and impartial third party that has 
no stake in the outcome of the process but is mindful to clarify issues and helps parties explore 
solutions so that they reach their own peaceful settlement.189  A mediator must be acceptable by 
the parties, should the process stand a chance of achieving its goal.190 
 
Mediation takes two principal forms: mediation in a political process and mediation in a 
legal process.191 The difference between the two forms lies in the distinction between a dispute 
and a conflict.192 In the political process, mediation is aimed at resolution, as opposed to the 
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settlements of conflicts.193 Mediation in legal processes, such as trade disputes, is concern with 
settlement of disputes. According to Muigua, the difference between a dispute and a conflict lies 
in the causes of disagreement.194 Conflict is concerned with needs and values which are difficult 
to compromise, while disputes are concerned with interests and issues, on which disputants can 
compromise.195It is, therefore, easier to resolve disputes than it is to resolve conflicts. To resolve 
conflicts, the underlying issues which result in disagreements have to be addressed.196 Disputes 
can, however, be dealt with superficially to the mutual satisfaction of the parties.197 
 
Mediation is attractive because of its voluntariness, costs effectiveness, informality, 
freedom for the creativity in forging solutions, party autonomy and control, non-coerciveness and 
enduring outcomes.198  Mediation has been used in Africa since time immemorial. Disputes were 
resolved through a councils of elders who mediated between disputants with an aim of restoring 
and fostering relations.199 
 
The AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanisms, has inbuilt mediation frameworks for the 
resolution of disputes, between member states, in its Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the 
Settlement of Disputes.200 At the sub-regional level, mediation is mostly employed in resolving 
political disputes and not trade or investment disputes.201  
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Article 5 of the UN Charter acknowledges the role of regional organisations in conflict 
resolution and the need for such organisations to set up regional conflict resolution systems. 
Despite significant efforts by regional and sub-regional organs to this end, the record has not been 
satisfactory.202 Article XIX of the OAU Charter formally established the Commission on 
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. The League of Arab States and IGAD have similarly 
established mediation and conciliation efforts. These efforts have all struggled to fully constitute 
and operate.203 
 
Three reasons have been identified for the failure of sub-regional integration efforts in 
Africa in achieving successful mediation interventions in sub-regional conflicts.204 Firstly, there 
are the internal divisions amongst member states on whether or not to intervene in domestic 
political disputes of another member state.205 In some cases, member states would take sides in the 
conflict, therefore losing the neutrality required of a mediator.206 Two cases in point include the 
reluctance by some ECOWAS member states to intervene in the Liberian civil war in 1989;  and 
the Burundi political crisis of the 1990s and early 2000s.207 Secondly, there is the lack of formal 
institutional structures to see through the implementation of the lofty mediation and conciliation 
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blue prints engendered by the sub-regional bodies.208 As a result, most of these efforts remain 
romantic ideas without the financial or institutional capacity to translate into meaningful tangible 
results. Thirdly, there is the lack of enforcement capacity of the regional bodies to ensure the 
implementation of mediated settlement of conflicts.209 This leads to breaches of mediated 
agreements, without any consequences, either from the AU or sub-regional organs. 
(iii) Conciliation 
Conciliation is a process by which a third party known as a conciliator assists parties in restoring 
their damaged relationship, by clarifying perceptions and pointing out misconceptions, as well as 
proposing solutions.210 A conciliation agreement is final and binding on both parties. If either party 
fails to uphold the agreement, it can be converted into an award and enforced in court.211 
 
Conciliation is an extension of the negotiation process. Conciliation also goes hand in hand 
with reconciliation. While conciliation is concerned with finding peace and harmony, by putting 
an end to conflict, reconciliation seeks to re-establish relations.212  Reconciliation is, therefore, a 
restorative process which is desirable in enabling long lasting peace and ensuring that competing 
interests are balanced.213 
(iv) Critique of the Non-Formal Dispute Resolution Methods 
Due to their non-binding nature, informal dispute settlement mechanisms do not grant supremacy 
of the settlements reached over domestic laws of state parties. This is unless such decisions also 
result in change of law or a conclusion of a treaty that is considered international law under 
respective domestic laws.214 
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Governments may publicise negotiation agreements as a public relations strategy.  
However, negotiated agreements or settlements reached in trade disputes do not form precedent 
before any court or tribunal.215 As a result, negotiated settlements do not create predictability for 
individuals or states that may in future face similar disputes. Enforcement of non-formal settlement 
agreements is also left to the goodwill of the respective states. There is no oversight institution, 
and settlements may, therefore, collapse. Where non-formal agreements are not converted into 
treaties or protocols, their enforcement or implementation can be undermined.216 
 
Where mediation, conciliation or negotiations are made mandatory, the disputing parties 
are coerced into the arrangement with little, if any, choice. This makes the outcome less likely to 
hold or restore relations.217 The settlement becomes superficial, addressing the issue of the dispute 
or conflict only, and not the underlying causes of the conflict.218 Mutual ownership of the process 
and outcomes guarantees, to a large extent, the observance of the outcome and lasting or restoration 
of the relations. 
b) Formal Dispute Settlement Mechanisms  
International commercial arbitration and international Courts are, with respect to settlement of 
trade and investment disputes, the main features of formal dispute resolution on their international 
plane.  As observed above, the critical difference between formal and the non-formal dispute 
settlement systems discussed above, is the binding effect of the outcome of the formal systems and 
the non-binding effect of the non-formal system.219 
 
The prominence of international courts and arbitral tribunals has been on the rise. Decisions 
of international courts and tribunals have become the fourth source of international law.220 
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International treaties and international customary law are the traditional primary sources of 
international law.221 Increasingly, the decisions of international courts such as the CJEU, and other 
adjudicatory bodies such as the WTO and the ICSID arbitral tribunals, are becoming prominent in 
shaping the course of international law.222 While the pattern of judicial law-making grows in its 
effect, Schneider observes that international consensus on the force of this fourth source of 
international law is still lacking.223 
 
A brief discussion on the two principal formal dispute settlement systems will now follow. 
(i) International Commercial and Investment Arbitration 
Arbitration is a process, subject to statutory controls, whereby formal disputes are determined by 
a private tribunal of the parties’ choosing.224 This third party, known as an arbitrator, acts as a 
neutral impartial dispute resolver and applies the law to the facts or evidence so as to reach a 
binding and final determination. 
 
Arbitration is most popularly used in resolving investor-state or private party disputes. The 
investor-state arbitration regime arose out of the need to give both rights and remedies to private 
actors in the international commercial, trade and investment arena.225 The move to institutionalise 
investment arbitration began with the creation of the International Centre of the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) under the aegis of the World Bank.226 Ten years later, the UN 
Commission or International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) drafted rules for non-institutional (ad hoc) 
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arbitrations.227 The objective of international arbitration was to provide a forum in which non-state 
entities would have their disputes resolved by an impartial third party neutral, away from the 
influence of the state’s authority or sovereignty.228 It was a way to avoid national/domestic courts 
which in most developing states, were deemed to lack independence and were largely under the 
influence of the executive arm of the government.229 The expectation was that an international 
arbitration system would, therefore, spur economic development by encouraging foreign direct 
investment. The independence of international arbitral tribunals coupled with the impartiality of 
the process assures international foreign investors of their ability to access remedies, in the event 
of breaches and consequential losses.230 
 
International arbitration has become a popular method for resolving commercial disputes 
between private commercial disputants because of its perceived neutrality, fairness and 
expeditious disposal of disputes. This regime appeals to investors who are often concerned with 
the potential bias, inefficiency, or unfamiliarity of foreign courts.231 To this end, for example, 
ICSID has jurisdiction over any legal disputes arising out of an investment between a contracting 
state and a national of any other contracting state.232 
 
Many bilateral and multilateral investment agreements provide for arbitration as the means 
of dispute settlement.  Some make reference to the ICSID procedure while others refer to other 
arbitration centres around the world specifically established by international courts or ad hoc 
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arbitral panels.233 For example, the COMESA, EAC, OHADA and AfCFTA treaties and 
agreement all provide for international arbitration as a method of settling disputes under the 
respective RIAs.234 The treaties either establish arbitration centres or cloth their judicial 
/adjudicative organs with special arbitration jurisdiction. 
(ii) Critique of International Commercial and Investment Arbitration 
International arbitration has been criticised on at least three fronts. Firstly, is with regard to the 
scope of the institutional investment arbitration under the ICSID.  While the regime provides for 
rights against the host government, it does not provide direct effect of rights against another 
individual.235 In essence, a private actor has no recourse against another private actor under this 
regime.236 It appears that international investment arbitration is solely a right and remedy between 
a private investor and the host state.237  Nationals of a state cannot access this forum against their 
own state. This can be contrasted with other remedies such as the CJEU which gives direct access 
even to nationals of a state member against the state.238 
 
Secondly, most investment agreements or REC treaties provide private entities with such 
rights as national treatment239 or a minimum standard of treatment in the host state.240 However, 
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individuals were historically seen as nationals of the states and, on the international plane, could 
only be represented by their government.241  Additionally, suits against a government in domestic 
courts were also foreclosed due to the laws that limited the grounds upon which states could be 
sued.242 This meant that foreign investors had little recourse to the host state’s domestic legal 
system.243 Therefore, foreign investors could not bring actions against a foreign state in their home 
countries since most states have laws that provided for foreign sovereign immunity. The rise of 
investment arbitration was, therefore, timely in filling a very compelling gap for the benefit of 
foreign investors. 
 
Thirdly, arbitral awards generally provide for damages and declarations which may or may 
not affect domestic law. The process is, therefore, not normatively superior to domestic legal 
processes. In any event, arbitral awards rely on domestic courts for enforcement. In terms of 
transparency, arbitral awards are generally confidential and do not provide precedent.244 For 
example, the ICSID arbitration mechanism explicitly prohibits the publishing of awards without 
the consent of the parties.245 This hampers the predictability of the process for purposes of deterring 
future conduct and consistently applying legal principles. It is for this reason that some 
commentators have argued that decisions of international courts such as the ICJ are more credible 
than those of arbitral tribunals.246 
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The enforcement process provided in investment arbitration seems relatively effective but 
suffers the same general problems of observance and enforcement of international law. The 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) 
provides that all signatory states enforce arbitral awards in their domestic courts. 247 Therefore, if 
a state declines to voluntarily honour the arbitral awards, the investor can move for enforcement 
in the domestic court, in the offending state, or in any state where the offending state has 
commercial assets.248 The New York Convention offers a straight forward enforcement 
mechanism. However, this recourse is only available to member states to the New York 
Convention. 249 While most developed states have signed the New York Convention, a significant 
number of developing states, some in Africa, have not.250 
(iii) International Courts and Tribunals  
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is perhaps the most recognisable international court.  The 
ICJ evolved from its predecessors, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)251 and the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).252  However, there are other courts and tribunals spread 
across the globe, mostly in RECs and other integration efforts. On the African Continent, the 
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ACJ&HR, ECOWAS Court of Justice, EACJ, SADC Tribunal and the OHADA CCJA are some 
of the prominent regional and international courts. 253 There are also other adjudicative bodies 
whose mandate is similar to regional and international courts.  The WTO Disputes Understanding 
(WTO-DSU), 254 and the yet to be established AfCFTA Dispute Settlement Body (AfCFTA-DSB) 
are also adjudicative bodies with international jurisdiction.255 
 
International courts and tribunals are supranational organs although they are set up under 
intergovernmental organisations. Some international courts such as the COMESA Court of Justice, 
the EACJ, the ECOWAS Court of Justice and OHADA CCJ grant rights to private actors under 
their constitutive treaties to bring complaints to the supranational courts.256 Others, such as the 
ICJ, AfCFTA DSB and WTO DSU can only be accessed by the state members.257 The ACJ&HR 
and ECOWAS Court of Justice take a hybrid approach where limited access by individuals, mostly 
on questions relating to breaches of human rights, can be brought directly to the Court by 
individuals.258 
 
Under traditional adjudicative dispute resolution practice, private entities and individuals 
are neither granted rights directly by the treaty establishing the forum nor have they any right to 
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bring cases before the forum.259 Historically, therefore, individuals could only request their 
governments to render on their behalf claims before the ICJ or other international courts. The 
regime existed to resolve disputes between states, and therefore, individuals had no recourse to 
those courts. In some progressive states, private parties have the ability to petition their 
government to take action on their behalf.260 In the United States (US), for instance, the US Trade 
Representative makes the final decision on whether or not to bring a case on behalf of an individual 
US Citizen and there is no judicial review of his decision. 261 
 
Schneider argues that individuals’ involvement enriches the international dispute 
resolution system. 262 Individuals play the important function of private enforcement agents of 
international rights and obligations without relying on states, including their own, or oversight 
bodies. 263 This is particularly crucial where state actors or oversight bodies are conflicted or 
reluctant to do so, for political or other considerations. 264 
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One other advantage of international courts lies in its transparent process. Unlike 
arbitration, international courts and tribunals are open and publish their decisions which form 
precedent in similar disputes. 265 This helps to forewarn states and their legal advisors on the likely 
outcome of their conduct, making the dispute settlement system predicable. 266 It also makes 
application of legal norms consistent. 
(v) Criticism of Formal Adjudicative Processes (International Courts and Tribunals) 
There are two enduring areas of criticism levelled against international Courts and tribunals. These 
are about supremacy of their decisions over national courts and their enforcement. 
 
Depending on whether a state subscribes to monism or dualism, international Courts and 
their decisions either form part of the law of the state or have to be incorporated through statutory 
mechanisms. In a monist system, the decision would automatically become part of the domestic 
legal fabric. Under a dualist system, the international law must be incorporated into domestic law 
following procedures in domestic law. 267  
 
In systems which are monist in nature, decisions of international courts override domestic 
law. 268 Decisions of national courts can, therefore, be struck down for being incompatible with 
international law. 269  
 
Compliance with and enforcement of decisions of international tribunals are fairly 
controversial areas of international law.  International courts do not possess control of coercive 
instruments of power such as armies or police, therefore, many critics of the international system 
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points to the ineffectiveness of international law.270 Enforcement of international obligations, 
including decisions of international courts and tribunals, rely, first and foremost, on the voluntary 
compliance by the parties.271This is underscored in the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda. 272 
Moreover, several enforcement mechanisms are also availed. Firstly, an offending state may face 
enforcement proceedings under an escalated process within the enabling treaty. 273 Secondly, the 
state can be ordered to pay damages.274 Thirdly, the state may face sanctions including suspension 
from the organisation’s activities, costs, withdrawal of reciprocal rights; and, if necessary, trade 
embargos.275 However, underlying these options is the politico-legal question of whether sister 
member states are willing to invoke these options. The African experience, for example, has shown 
reluctance, on the part of states, to effect sanctions against other states who offend trade 
agreements.276   
 
Dispute Resolution is a continuum with the non-formal to formal dispute settlement 
methods on one end of the spectrum and formal systems on the other. With the formalisation of 
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dispute resolution, the parties control or autonomy is reduced and is ultimately lost when the 
processes become formal. The cost and time spent significantly increase as the process evolves 
into formal systems. As processes become formal and adjudicatory, rigid rules come into play and 
the third-party neutrals intervention becomes stronger as courts and tribunals impose their 
decisions on parties. There are also stronger requirements for transparency and consistency as 
decisions are rendered by courts and tribunals.  
c) Why the Preference for Formal International Adjudicative Processes? 
Preference of formal adjudicative over non-formal processes are essentially an exercise in the 
examination of the dispute resolution continuum described in the preceding part of this chapter. It 
is also an attempt at isolating the elements of a progressive, efficient and efficacious dispute 
settlement process forum from those identified above.  
 
The four main reasons for choice of adjudicative dispute settlement processes over other 
formal and informal dispute settlement processes are now considered. 
(i) Self-executing or Direct Effect of its Decisions 
Formal settlement of trade and investment disputes that offer “self-executing” or direct effect of 
rights to parties, particularly private entities and individuals, are attractive to foreign investors and 
states that are interested in attracting foreign direct investments.277 Modern day trade treaties have 
been designed to influence private actors to invest, to import, and to export. To encourage 
investment, governmental restraint from inequitable treatment has to be guaranteed by the 
agreement. 278 Private actors who wish to invest in a state make this critical decision based on the 
                                                          
277See, M Schaefer, “Are Private Remedies in Domestic Courts Essential for International Trade Agreements to 
Perform Constitutional Functions with respect to Federal Government?” (1996-97) 17 NW.J.INT’L. L & BUS 609. 
See also P Pescatore, “The Doctrine of ‘Direct effect’: An Infant Disease of Community Law” 8 EUR.L. REV  155. 
RA Brand, “Direct Effects of International Economic Law in the United States and the European Union”  
(1996-97) 17 NW.J.INT.L’L & BUS 556. 
278AK Schneider, (n) 179, 707. 
58 
 
rights provided in the treaties, be it bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral. 279 Such parties are, 
therefore, able to protect their rights, both at the international court level and also before domestic 
or national courts. 
(ii) Domestic Status of International Tribunals’ Decisions 
 A dispute resolution system that empowers the domestic judiciary to enforce international 
decisions is more attractive than one in which there exist doubts as to whether there is supremacy 
over domestic law. 280  
 
An international dispute settlement system which directly provides for international law as 
being part of or supreme to domestic law, or which provides a means by which the decisions of 
the international courts will be enforced, is most preferred.281A system of laws such as the OHADA 
Uniform Acts, which apply directly in member states without the need for domestication, or any 
domestic intervention, and which provides a dispute settlement forum (the OHADA CCJA), is 
assuring to investors.282  
(iii) Transparency of Processes of International Tribunals 
The transparency of a dispute resolution mechanism affects how it is perceived and used. The level 
of transparency of a dispute resolution regime takes three forms: publicity, precedent and 
predictability.283 Publicity describes the level of public knowledge about the dispute resolution 
regime. 284 For example, when the outcome is published, the process is clear, the decision explained 
and the parties are, therefore, more likely to comply with that decision. While the doctrine of stares 
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decisis is not used by international tribunals, the tribunals often cite previous decisions as 
persuasive. 285 Predictability of a dispute resolution system is also very important to its users 
because it creates confidence in the system. 286 Transparent rules and clear decisions are more 
likely than not to encourage states and/or private actors to become involved in a disputes resolution 
regime and increases the legitimacy of the regime. 287   
 
Transparency, overall, measures the legitimacy of the dispute resolution regime.288 Formal 
international tribunals are seen as providing transparent and predictable thorough rule-based 
systems that end with clear and determinate decisions. 
 
(iv) Observance and Enforcement of International Tribunals’ Decisions 
The lack of a global enforcement mechanism, for decisions of international courts and tribunals, 
is a long-standing critique of the international legal system.289A system of enforcement is 
nonetheless a critical element in the proper functioning of the international legal system. It is also 
important for promoting trade. 290 International courts and arbitral tribunals offer processes through 
which enforcement of their decisions can be effected, unlike the non-binding informal processes. 
For example, through recognition and enforcement, in domestic courts under the New York 
Convention, parties have options for enforcing decisions of international arbitral tribunal. The 
ECOWAS Court of Justice, for instance, has a monitoring and enforcement process which is 
unique. The ECOWAS Court of Justice Protocol has established a unit in its member states 
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specifically to monitor the implementation of its decisions. 291 Decisions of the OHADA CCJA are 
enforced by member states in the same manner as domestic courts’ decisions. 292   
d) Political and Economic factors that affect the Choice of an International Dispute 
Settlement System 
Sovereignty is defined by Lassa as “supreme authority or an authority which is independent of any 
other earthly authority.” 293 It is also defined as “the supreme absolute uncontrollable power by 
which any independent state is governed.”294 International law in relation to sovereignty is 
described by Allot as “the minimal law necessary to enable state-societies to act as closed systems 
internally and to act as territory owners in relation to each other.”295 
 
Hence, sovereignty, as a political science concept, does not have a universally accepted 
definition. However, there are at least two elements which are common to most attempts at a 
definition of the concept. The first is absoluteness. According to Nunez, the degree of absoluteness 
of authority is critical in the exercise of sovereignty.296 This absoluteness can, however be limited 
by a constitution, statute, custom or international law.297 Secondly, sovereignty denotes the 
monopoly in exercise of state power or authority. According to Kenneth, it is a community’s 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force. 298 It is, therefore, the right to exclusively exercise this 
force. 
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Sovereignty is exercised, either de jure or de facto. De jure, or legal, sovereignty is concern 
with the constitutionally recognised right or to exercise control over a territory.299 De facto, or 
actual, sovereignty is concern with whether control, in fact exists.300 
 
Sovereignty is important to dispute resolution in so far as it demarcates the precincts within 
which jurisdiction or judicial authority can be exercised. As already observed, in earlier parts of 
this chapter, when a state joins an integration organisation, there is, by effect, some relinquishment 
of sovereign power to the organisation. Some restrictions are placed, for example on the tariffs the 
state can charge or not charge; a dispute settlement process may also be prescribed which divests 
jurisdiction from the state’s domestic courts; or a monitoring or coordinating organisation may be 
created. 
 
Therefore, the question is: to what extent is a state joining an international organisation 
willing to limit its sovereignty? Alternatively, what type of international structure of administration 
are member states willing to create in order to assuage their concerns over sovereignty?  
 
According to Schneider, the sovereignty given up in formal dispute resolution methods 
such as international arbitration is minimal.301 The state retains sovereign authority over other 
aspects of the state which it still wields control over.302 However, states engaging on the 
international plane have legitimate concerns over the exercise of the shared or lost sovereign 
authority, their national interest versus global interests.303 
 
Among all dispute resolution methods available in the international legal system, the 
supranational court regime asks of members the greatest relinquishment of sovereignty. This is 
done in three principal ways. Firstly, member states give up their judicial or adjudicatory 
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sovereignty to a supranational court, with supremacy over domestic courts.304 Secondly, member 
states give up sovereignty from the executive branch, which previously controlled trade policy, to 
the judiciary, both domestic and international.305 Thirdly, member states relinquish their 
centralised power to its citizens by granting private actors access to international dispute resolution 
fora and remedies under intentional law.306 States, therefore, consider these forfeitures of 
sovereignty against the proposed dispute settlement systems.  This, they do through the following 
five lenses. 
(i) Functions of the Organisation 
The objectives of the integration effort also inform the dispute settlement regime to be adopted. 
Abbott and Snidal argue that an analysis of international regimes of dispute resolution can only be 
complete if there is an appreciation of the reason why states cooperate or integrate.307 The functions 
of international organisations have been categorised into two groups: facilitating, and producing 
organisations.308 
 
Facilitating organisations promote inter-state cooperation through four functions: the 
normative function, the consultative function, the supportive function and the initiative function.309 
The normative function sets forth principles, norms or rules of the organisation and does not 
require any structure.310 The consultative function requires very little structure. This involves 
integration through meetings, conference, and similar gatherings.311 The supportive function 
requires a formal support system since it involves research, information sharing, tracking and 
policy espousal.312 It may also involve disputes and dispute resolution. The initiative function 
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basically sets the agenda, in addition to conceiving and executing programmes of the 
organisation.313 It requires a sophisticated and detailed organisational structure, including a 
secretariat, as well as a decision and dispute settlement mechanism.314 The WTO decision and 
dispute resolution mechanisms is a practical example of the initiative function of international 
organisations. 
 
Producing organisation, on the other hand, provides gains in efficiency by pooling risks or 
assets, managing joint production between member states, and reducing transaction costs through 
the creation of coordination points-rules, standards and specifications.315 
 
The functions of an international organisation influence the choice of dispute resolution 
mechanism to be employed. The initial stages of normative function may consider non-binding 
methods such as negotiation while the more complex and much more involving initiative function 
stage may consider binding interventions such as arbitration or courts. 
(ii) Level of Economic Integration 
As observed in the preceding part of this thesis, there are at least five typologies/stages of political 
and economic integration: FTA, Customs Union, Common Market, Economic Union and Political 
Integration. 316 It has also been observed that the objectives of an integration effort determine the 
depth or extent of the scope of integration. 317 While some integration efforts aim at achieving full 
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economic or even political integration, some are satisfied with achieving Custom Union or 
Common Market status.318 
 
The levels of an economic or political integration effort already achieved or aspired 
invariably impacts the type of dispute resolution regime best suited for the organisation. The level 
of integration desired by integrating states depend on a variety of factors, but the primary factor in 
the integration efforts is the desire for economic growth and stability.319 FTAs may opt for non-
formal and non-binding dispute settlement procedures due to the relative independence of member 
states. Economic Unions or even Common Markets, which are advanced integration efforts with 
deeper interdependence, may require formal courts for resolution of disputes. 
 
(iii) Number of Member States 
The number of member states to an international organisation has a direct effect on the 
organisation’s processes including dispute resolution. Negotiation theorists have advanced that 
multiparty negotiations are more complex than bilateral negotiations.320 The structure of an 
international organisation must consider its negotiation complexities. An increased number of 
members affects how decisions are made, both in the creation of rules and in the resolution of 
disputes.321  
 
Economic gains are also affected by the number of states involved. Trachtman draws a 
distinction between economic gains and economies of scale.322 Economies of scale draw from 
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global business, global regulation or technological economies of scale.323 Economic gains and 
scale increase over time through increased frequency of transactions.  Both these benefits depend 
on the size of the potential economy concerned. 324  
 
The process of choice of an appropriate dispute resolution mechanism is incremental. In 
bilateral relations, where only two states are involved, the agreements are less complex and are 
often ad hoc, or a central oversight body suffices in dealing with disputes.325 Where several states 
are concerned, the organisation becomes more complex. The concern with monitoring, 
harmonisation and compliance will then lead some of these organisations to create oversight, and 
even judicial bodies. When the agreements are regional in territory, such as the EU, AU or 
NAFTA, their scope becomes even larger. Separate institutions of oversight, and even judicial 
bodies become necessary.326 Global agreements call for a more sophisticated approach to both 
their organisation and dispute resolution.  The WTO is perhaps the best example of a global 
multilateral trade and trade related dispute resolution system.327 At the global level, the number of 
potential disputes exponentially increases. The WTO dispute settlement system, despite it’s over 
20 years of use, is still work under discussion as to its efficacy, including whether non-state actors 
should be allowed direct access to its dispute settlement mechanism. 328 
 
 
                                                          
323 ibid, 494-5. 
324AK Schneider, (n) 178, 745. But see, J Trachtman, note 304 above, where he discusses the limitation of costs –
benefit analysis when applied to the conflict between trade values and other values. 
325TA Guzman, “Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties” 
(1998) 38 VA. J.  International L.L. 563. 
326J Trachtman, (n) 319, 495-498. 
327 The current membership of the WTO is 164 with its Dispute Settlement Understanding as its main feature of 
disputes settlement.  <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.> accessed on 13th December 
2018. 
328 See special Issue (1998) WTO Dispute Settlement system, 1 Journal of International Economic Law at p. 175; 
Symposium on the First Three years of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 32 Journal of International law at p. 
609.JH Jackson, “Dispute Settlement and the WTO - Emerging Problems” (1998) 1 Journal of International Economic 
Law 329. 
66 
 
 
(iv) Similarity in Domestic Economic and Social Levels 
The economic cost-benefit analysis of international organisations requires an examination of the 
economic and social development of the member states. In a costs-benefit analysis, states enter 
international organisations in order to reap an advantage.329 Comparative economic levels between 
member states impact the evaluation of these costs and benefits to be gained by trading.330 The 
notion of equality of states in international law is at best fallacious or utopian; in reality states’ 
economic power and social development cannot be ignored. 331  
 
Economic power affects the willingness of governments to leave differences open to 
negotiations. Negotiating for equal power is more comfortable for member states of approximately 
similar social and economic status.332 Negotiating imbalances occur where states with unequal 
economic or social development integrate.333 Furthermore, the type of dispute resolution 
mechanism preferred will most likely require a model in which parties have a semblance of parity 
of arms.334  Diplomatic methods such as negotiation are favoured by states that are economically 
more powerful than their trading partners.  This is because powerful states can leverage on and 
link a particular trade dispute to trade in general, economic aid and other economic incentives or 
pressures.335 
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(v) Type of Government and Legal Culture of Member States 
The system of government not only determines its ability to negotiate, but also its negotiation 
strategy.336  The logic is that international organisations would be more stable if they comprise of 
democratic states.337 Independence of domestic judiciaries also affect that state’s involvement in 
the international economy.338 
 
A democratic government which entrenches values of transparency and independence in 
its judiciary will ensure political interest groups continue pressurising the government to protect 
industry; give subsidies and generally influence trade and foreign policy.339 
 
Regarding dispute resolution, democracies will be more comfortable with a judicial system 
that mirrors their own.340 The respect for the rule of law and independent judiciaries are far more 
ingrained in integration efforts of states that already have those systems domestically. Non-
democratic states are more likely to be suspicious of any judicial system utilising a “western” or 
“foreign” idea.341 On the other hand, emerging democracies with controlled economies may fear a 
foreign body imposing change on the domestic economy too quickly. In totalitarian regimes 
without a voting public, leaders are less inclined to value the impact of economic interventions to 
the public.342 International dispute settlement systems that strengthen and increase the 
independence of the judiciary, both domestically and internationally, are alien to and may not be 
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embraced by totalitarian governments. Unlike democracies, totalitarian regimes find the loss of 
sovereignty to a supranational juridical organ threatening.343 
 
2.5 Summary 
This Chapter addressed the fundamental concepts and theories on which this thesis is built. It has been 
established that the three principal theories that generally inform integration arrangements in Africa 
are intergovernmentalism, functionalism and supranationalism. Most of the economic integration 
efforts in Africa prefer intergovernmentalism with limited experiments in establishing supranational 
organs within the intergovernmental integration organs’ super-structure. This approach has also been 
adopted in fashioning the dispute resolution systems crafted and employed by African economic 
integration arrangements. 
 
Furthermore, the chapter analysed, at a theoretical level, the various dispute resolution mechanisms 
used in resolving international trade and investment disputes at regional and sub-regional levels. 
Moreover, both formal and non-formal systems have been highlighted. The factors and reasons 
affecting choice of dispute settlement methods and the salient attributes of each method were also 
discussed. This discourse sets a conceptual foundation for a discussion on specific dispute settlement 
approaches taken in the African continental and sub-regional economic regionalism that now follows. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER ECONOMIC REGIONALISM IN AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction 
As observed in the aforementioned chapters, integration does not occur in a vacuum. It exists in 
social, economic and political contexts. Discussions on integration efforts in Africa often start with 
the post-independence era. While that may be true for economic integration efforts, the Pan-
African inspired integration of the continent preceded the independence period. It is for this reason 
that the discussion of integration of the African continent begins in the colonial era.  
 
Three periods of significant integration of the continent, also known as waves of 
regionalism, are identified and discussed in this chapter. The first one was experienced in the 1960s 
when most African states gained independence. The second wave came about after the end of the 
cold-war era. The third wave is associated with the period following the transformation of the 
OAU to the AU. Foregrounding of the historical evolution of integration on the continent will, 
therefore, offer a useful backdrop and context to the discussion to follow. 
 
The integration of the continent has primarily been at two levels: continental and at the 
sub-regional / REC levels. This chapter will also focus on the economic integration of the continent 
at these two levels. Particular attention will be paid to the role of dispute resolution systems set up 
by the various integration bodies and their contribution to the economic integration of the region 
or sub-region. Additionally, and of equal importance, will be to establish whether the dispute 
resolution or adjudicative organs engender intergovernmentalism or supranationalism as detailed 
in the foregoing part of this chapter. 
3.2 Historical background to Integration in Africa 
3.2.1 Pre-Independence Era 
According to Sougrynoma, there are three main turning points in the history of the African Union: 
the conception of the philosophy of pan-Africanism; the institutionalisation of pan-Africanism and 
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the creation of the African Union.344 Although these events span a period of over 40 years, they 
bear one common denominator: pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism runs through the entire edifice 
of the OAU/AU instruments and efforts. It is an enduring rallying call to African unity and 
cohesion, both in the political and economic spheres. 
 
In the colonial era, W.E.B Du Bois championed pan-Africanism or the pan-African 
movement.345 He defined pan-Africanism as a movement based on three fundamental ingredients: 
shared racial, historical and economic bonds; commitment to gaining economic and political self-
rule for the colonised; and symbolised in a worldwide union of people of colour.346 Egypt, Ghana, 
Nigeria, and Tanzania were some of the earliest African countries to gain independence. 347 After 
gaining independence in 1957, the then President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah became a prominent 
advocate of Pan-Africanism. He was of the view that for Africa to develop, prosper and forever 
deal with colonialism, it was imperative to form a united Africa.348 This view, coming in the 
twilight days of colonialism and at the height of independence movements in Africa, was very 
popular. Nkrumah was supported by then Tanzanian President Nyerere and Egypt’s Gamal Abdel 
Nasser.349 The idea of a united Africa birthed the OAU. 
 
In the early 1960s, two schools of thought took root on the approach towards the integration 
of the African continent. Nkrumah led a group of “radicals” christened “the Casablanca group” 
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who advanced a compelling argument for the way forward.350 Nkrumah envisioned an Africa in 
which: 
 
[t]he entire continent agreed to a common market, a single currency, an African Central 
Bank, a common foreign policy, a common defence system and a common citizenship 
amongst others. 351 
 
The other group, led by Nyerere, advocated for an approach that favoured a gradual 
integration of the continent through sub-regional bodies. Nyerere advanced that:  
 
Many of us in East Africa believe that our best path to Unity may be through a regional 
association. This would bring us some immediate strengthening of our economies at the 
same time as showing our people the benefits of unity. A federation of at least Kenya, 
Uganda, and Tanganyika should be comparatively easy to achieve. We already have a 
common market, and run many services through the Common Services Organisation - 
which has its own Legislative Assembly and an executive composed of the Prime Ministers 
of the three states.352 
3.2.2 Post-Independence Era: The First Wave of Economic Integration  
After most African states had gained self-rule, the rallying call for a united Africa substantially 
waned.353 The new African leaders had to grapple with internal strife, assassinations and 
upheavals, to the extent that the pre-colonial idea of a continental unity government became either 
                                                          
350 CT Ekwealor, “United States of Africa and Conundrums” (2018) 5(1) Journal of African Foreign Affairs 27. 
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unpopular or simply unattractive to most African leaders.354 To create a middle ground, and to 
keep the idea of African unity alive, the OAU Charter was signed in May 1963. The Charter 
provided that the OAU and its member states shall not interfere in internal affairs of other member 
states.355 This sounded the death knell on the dream of a politically united Africa.356 
 
In the 1960s, regional integration was perceived largely as an instrument for safeguarding 
recently acquired political freedom, and as a strategy to be used to facilitate economic 
development.357 The focus seems to have shifted to a more economically inclined approach to 
integration as opposed to political unity favoured in the pre-colonial epoch. 
 
According to Nye Jr, although the post-independence 1960s approach to integration 
gravitated towards economic objectives, its pan-African roots did not completely disappear.358 For 
example, there was the Pan-African Congress, in 1974, convened in Tanzania and hosted by 
President Nyerere. The Congress sought to mobilise Africa and its diaspora in support of the 
liberation of South Africa and cooperation in the agriculture; health and nutrition; research in 
science and technology; communications; political cooperation and support for the liberation 
movements in Africa.359 
 
During this era, the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), the Lagos Final Act (1980) (LFA) and 
Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (1985) (APPER) were launched as special 
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initiatives of the OAU.360 Their common objective was to play “a major development role to 
regional economic cooperation and integration.”361 The LPA envisaged the establishment of three 
regional arrangements aimed at creating separate but convergent and overarching integration 
arrangements in the sub-Sahara Africa region.362 This resulted in the establishment of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa, PTA (which 
subsequently became the COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS), together with the then already established Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in North Africa.  
According to the LPA, these sub-regional economic integration communities were to evolve into 
an integrated African economy. It is pursuant to this plan that the AEC Treaty was concluded in 
1991. 
 
Mistry argues that the first wave of economic integration failed due to cold war external 
influences as well as the failure of the post-independence African development model.363 He 
further points out that this model, in most sectors, involved national parastatal enterprises with 
non-commercial objectives that were mostly concerned with national issues, which in turn 
inhibited integration.364 The implementation and design of the integration arrangements, which 
stressed cooperation by state agencies as opposed to attraction of foreign investment and open 
trade, was largely ineffective.365 
3.2.3 1991-2001 Era: The Second Wave of Economic Integration 
Before 1990, and in the years of the capitalism-socialism divide, both ideological blocs scrambled 
for allies across the world, including in Africa. The ultimate goal of the West was to ensure no 
                                                          
360 Texts of the plans and programmes are <https://au.int/en/resources/filter> accessed on 20th September 2018. 
361SKB Asante, “The Need for Regional Integration: A Challenge for Africa” (1995) 22(6) Review of African 
Political Economy 574. 
362C McCarthy, “Reconsidering the Africa Regional Integration Paradigm” (2010) 9(2) Trade Negotiations Insights, 
<https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/trade-negotiations-insights/news/reconsidering-the-african-regional-
integration.> accessed on 12th November 2018.  Article 25 (Chapter VII) of the LPA was specific in the establishment 
of RECs in Africa for growth of intra- Africa trade. 
363PS Mistry, “Africa’s record of Regional Cooperation and Integration” (2000) 99 African Affairs 553-573, at 557. 
364 ibid. 
365 ibid, 571. 
74 
 
form of socialist order took root. In turn, the western powers turned a blind eye to the violations 
of human rights that occurred under the rule of despotic leaders who were their allies.366 As a 
consequence, the OAU watched helplessly because of the principle of non-interference with the 
internal affairs of member States. 
 
At the end of the cold war, Africa had to realign itself to the new world order and its 
challenges. Capitalist notions of free markets and democracy saw many African economies sink 
deep into recession as despots were removed from power through multi-party elections.367 It is in 
this context that the AEC Treaty was concluded. 
 
The AEC Treaty was adopted by the then OAU member states in the year 1991. Its primary 
role was to incrementally integrate African Markets into a supranational economic order known 
as the African Economic Community.368 This was to be achieved gradually, leveraging on existing 
RECs.369 The realities of the new world order required economic unity of the continent so as to 
achieve economic prosperity. 
 
This period saw the transformation of previously moribund Free Trade Area Agreements 
into Common markets and the proliferation and transformation of RECs across Africa. SADCC 
transformed into SADC and the East African Cooperation transformed into the East African 
Community (EAC).370 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) replaced the 
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Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGAD).371 Economic and Monetary 
Communities/Unions such as the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) 
and the West African Economic and Monetary Community (WAEMU) were created.372 New 
supranational economic organisations such as OHADA were also created.373 This flurry of 
activities in the economic integration arena is what was regarded as the second wave of regional 
integration. 
3.2.4 The Post 2001 Era: The Third Wave of Economic Integration 
The most significant feature of this period was the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the AU to 
replace the OAU Charter.374 The Constitutive Act of the AU redresses the principle of non-
interference with the internal affairs of member states, albeit to a limited extent.375 It also 
acknowledges and adopts the economic integration model provided in the AEC Treaty, with RECs 
used as building blocks towards the envisaged African Economic Community. 
 
The pan-African spirit still featured among the key motives of the transformation of the 
OAU into the AU.376 The renewed voices calling for African unity were led by three charismatic 
African Presidents, namely: Muammar Gaddafi of Libya; Thabo Mbeki of South Africa; and 
Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria.377 Just like in the 1960s, the African unity agenda had to rely on 
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the desire, drive and motivation of prominent and charismatic leaders for substantive progress to 
materialise.378 
 
Forty years later, the debate on the unity of the African continent was revived by President 
Gaddafi. With Gaddafi as champion, the dream of a united Africa seems to have survived the death 
of its main proponents, Nkrumah and Nyerere.379 Gaddafi resurrected the debate on African unity 
in the lead up to the creation of the AU in 2001. Gaddafi seemed to read from the same script as 
Nkrumah did in the 1960s. He envisaged that “Africa will only truly be powerful once it is led by 
one strong government that actually pushed for the creation of the United States of Africa to boost 
the continent’s international voice.”380 Like many pan-Africanists before him, Gaddafi viewed 
African boundaries as arbitrary relics of colonial imperialism that did not appreciate Africa’s 
ethnic and cultural similarities.381 To him, a united Africa would give birth to true African freedom 
and dignity.382 
 
Totolo observes that Gaddafi’s “United States of Africa” would be a federation of countries 
with one government, one currency, one passport and one army.383 Gaddafi’s views were 
moderated by his participation in the formation of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). This was seen 
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as an acknowledgement that continental integration would have to be incrementally built through 
sub-regional RECs.384 
 
Gaddafi experimented with a top-to-bottom approach to integration by financing the 
implementation of strategic continental projects that would, in his view, accelerate Africa’s 
Unity.385 In reaction to this, according to Pougala, the United States of America (U.S) government 
froze US$30 million belonging to the Libyan Central Bank.386 The reasons given by the U.S. were 
that it sought to “deprive Gaddafi and his government of the ability to siphon funds for personal 
gain, prevent further bloodshed in Libya, and secure the state’s assets for the benefit of Libyans 
when a future government is implemented.”387 
 
During this period, significant developments on the economic integration front have also 
been witnessed. Pursuant to the AEC Treaty, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) 
Agreement has been signed by 44 African States, creating a continental Free Trade Area as a first 
step to continental economic integration.388 At the sub-regional level, the Tripartite Free Trade 
Area (TFTA), which merges the three sub-regional RECs of COMESA, EAC and SADC, was 
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established in 2015.389 The TFTA is expected to feed into the grand plan of the AEC by the gradual 
amalgamation of the economies of its member RECs, with the goals of forming a Common Market 
and, ultimately, a Customs Union.390 
 
The post-2001 integration of the continent seems to be focused, largely, on economic 
integration, entrenching good governance and democracy, and the merging of markets with 
common rules. The AEC Treaty also envisages the strengthening of existing RECs and creating 
new ones where none existed.391Apart from the new RECs, existing RECs have deepened their 
integration with many achieving Customs Unions, Common Markets and even Monetary 
Unions.392 
 
Some scholars have averred that with Gaddafi’s death, the burden of pushing the “United 
States of Africa” agenda fell to the late former president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe.393 Mugabe 
lacked the energy and financial clout that Gaddafi possessed. In effect, Gaddafi’s death also 
marked the death of the idea of a “United States of Africa.”394 One may counter this argument by 
suggesting that recent AU initiatives such as the Agenda 2063 and NEPAD are underway. 
However, several decades of NEPAD and Agenda 2063 have hardly realised the desired results, 
largely due to lack of pragmatic championship of strong African leaders like the previous 
initiatives.  
 
There are other recent important efforts by President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, and the 
immediate former Chairperson of the AU. During his tenure as AU Chairperson in 2018, he 
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advanced an elaborate and ambitious plan to transform the AU, premised on pan-Africanism.395 
The plan advocated for the self-reliance of the AU, deeper trade and investment integration, and 
promotion of intra-Africa trade.396 Prioritising key AU projects that have an impact on the ground, 
and a self-financing model for the AU operations and projects are some of the central planks of 
the Kagame Report.397 Kagame’s critics have advanced that he lacks the democratic credentials to 
champion the AU’s transformation.398 Turianskyi and Gruzd argue that it was Kagame’s 
personality and record of being efficient that positioned him as the natural choice to lead the AU 
reform process.399 They also advance that it has become almost a necessity that reforms in the AU 
are led by a strong charismatic political leader, as has happened previously through former AU 
Chairmen and Presidents as did his predecessors, Gaddafi, Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki.400 
However, as it invariably happens in Africa, noble ideas do not survive the exit from office of their 
championing leaders.   
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3.3. Continental Economic Regionalism and Dispute Resolution 
3.3.1 The African Economic Community (AEC) 
The Abuja Treaty, establishing the AEC, has its roots in the pan-African political aspirations of an 
economically and politically united Africa.401 The treaty acknowledges the substantial efforts 
already made at sub-regional and regional levels towards economic integration.402 Thus, the treaty 
further provides that the community shall, by stages, ensure the strengthening of existing RECs 
and the establishment of new ones where none exist.403   
 
As an economic bloc, the AEC treaty also enjoins its members to eventually harmonise 
their national policies in order to promote economic activities.404 This is intended to be achieved 
through traditional integration models such as the adoption of a common trade policy vis-á-vis 
third states, establishment and maintenance of a common external tariff and common market.405 
The members are also expected to gradually reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and 
encourage free movement of goods and services within the community. Notably, the treaty also 
provides for affirmative action for land locked, semi-land locked, least developed and islands 
countries.406 
 
The establishment of the AEC is to be implemented and achieved through a gradual and 
step-wise approach, with six stages of varying durations, including a 34-year transition period.407 
RECs have been given special focus by the AEC Treaty, with an entire chapter dedicated to their 
place, functions, as well as an emphasis on the strengthening of existing RECs and establishing 
new ones where none exist.408 
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3.3.1.1 Structure, Organs and Institutions of the AEC 
The organs of the community include the Assembly of Heads of States and Government which is 
the apex and supreme organ of the community.409 Beneath it is the Council of Ministers which is 
responsible for the functioning and development of the community at a policy level.410Also 
established is a Pan-African Parliament whose role is left to a future protocol to define its 
composition, functions, powers and organisation.411This has since been achieved with the 
establishment in 2004 of the Pan African Parliament (PAP).412  
 
Included is the Economic and Social Commission consisting of ministers responsible for 
economic development, planning and integration of members.413  The Commission reports to the 
Council of Ministers and makes recommendations to the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government. Moreover, the Commission is the technical policy vehicle of the community. 
 
A secretariat, headed by the Secretary General, is charged with the day to day operations 
of the community, the implementation of decisions of the Council of Ministers and the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government, and is charged with projects of the community, including their 
monitoring.414 Specialised Technical Committees (STCs) composed of members with relevant 
expertise, in specific strategic areas, originate projects and concepts. STCs also recommend the 
same to the Assembly through the Council of Ministers and Secretariat. The committees are also 
tasked with assessing the viability of projects, their execution and coordination.415   
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The AEC Treaty also established the Court of Justice of the Community.416  However, this 
has been superseded by the creation of the ACJ&HR which created the single AU Court.  
 
3.3.1.2 The Place of the ACJ&HR (the AU Single Court) under Africa’s Economic 
Regionalism 
Article 18 of the Constitutive Act of the AU establishes the AU Court of Justice as one of the 
organs of the Union. The Court was established as the principal judicial organ of the AU with 
jurisdiction to decide over disputes on the interpretation and application of AU treaties.417 The 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights had earlier been established by Protocol in 1998.418In 
July 2004, the AU Assembly resolved to merge the two courts into a single court in order to ensure 
that adequate resources are available to fund the continental single court.419 
 
The ACJ&HR is governed by two main instruments: the Protocol and Statute of the Court 
of Justice and Human Rights. The Protocol deals with establishment and transitional matters, such 
as replacing the previous courts and forming of the single court. Furthermore, the Statute to the 
Protocol defines the court’s jurisdiction, composition and procedural matters. A protocol amending 
the Statute of the Court was adopted on 14thJuly 2014.420 
 
                                                          
416 Chapter IV Article 28. 
417 Article 5 of the Constitutive Act of the AU. 
418 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted by the then Members of the OAU in 
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3.3.1.2.1 Structure of the ACJ&HR  
The Protocol of the Court creates two sections: a General Affairs Section and a Human Rights 
Section; each composed of eight judges.421 The Amendment Protocol creates a third section, the 
International Criminal law Section.422 The General Affairs Section will hear all matters except 
those concerning Human and Peoples’ Rights.423 The Human Rights Section will hear all matters 
relating to Human and Peoples’ Rights.424 The International Criminal law Section shall have the 
power to try persons for international crimes, war crimes and crimes against humanity, as detailed  
in article 28A of the Amendment Protocol.425 
 
Article 4 of the Statute requires judges to be impartial and independent persons of high 
moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries, for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices, or juris-consults of recognised competence in 
international law and /or human rights law. Article 3 of the Amendment Protocol on the Court’s 
Statute includes a further qualification in international humanitarian law. 
 
Interestingly, both the statute of the Court and the Amendment Protocol seem to heavily 
slant towards expertise in human rights, international criminal and humanitarian law in the 
qualification of the persons who should sit as judges of the ACJ&HR. Apart from general expertise 
in international law, the judges expected to sit in the General Section of the Court are not required 
to possess any expertise in international trade and investment law. 
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now requires that there is gender equity in the composition of the court. 
422 Article 9 of the Amendment Protocol. 
423ibid, Article 17 (1). 
424ibid Article 17 (2). 
425 These include Genocide, piracy, unconstitutional change of Government, terrorism, corruption, mercenarism, 
drug and human trafficking and aggression. 
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3.3.1.2.2 Jurisdiction of the ACJ&HR 
On the surface, the jurisdiction of the Human Rights and International Criminal Law Sections of 
the court seem to be well defined, both in detail and scope, while the General Affairs Section is 
left wide open. Whether by design or default, the impression created is that the architecture of the 
court is more inclined towards human rights and international criminal law as opposed to trade and 
investment matters. 
 
The jurisdiction of the ACJ&HR can be divided into three sub-sets: subject matter 
jurisdiction, jurisdiction personae, and advisory jurisdiction. Article 28 of the ACJ&HR Protocol 
combines the subject matter jurisdiction of the former Human and Peoples’ Rights Court and the 
Court of Justice, now merged. Consequently, the single Court shall have jurisdiction over the 
following subject matters: 426 
 
a) The interpretation and application of the Constitutive Act of the AU; 
b) The interpretation, application and validity of other AU Treaties and all subsidiary 
legal instruments adopted within the framework of the AU; 
c) The interpretation and application of other legal instruments relating to human 
rights ratified by state parties concerned; 
d) Any question of international law; 
e) All acts, decisions, regulations and directives of the organs of the AU; 
f) All matters specifically provided for in any other agreements that State Parties may 
conclude among themselves, or with the AU which confer jurisdiction on the 
African Court; 
g) The existence of any fact which; if established, would constitute a breach of an 
obligation owed to a state party or to the AU; 
h) The nature of the reparations to be made for breach of an international obligation. 
 
                                                          
426These include: the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul charter); the Charter on the Right and 
Welfare of the Child; the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa or other legal instruments relating to human rights ratified by the state parties concerned. 
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Article 3 of the Amendment Protocol expands the jurisdiction of the Court to include international 
crimes and appeals from RECs, international organisations and inter-member state agreements. It 
is difficult, however, to discern how this expanded jurisdiction will sit with REC dispute resolution 
organs, some of which exercise appellate jurisdiction from member national courts and proclaim 
finality of their decisions under their establishing instruments.427 
 
The ACJ&HR Protocol and Statute do not seem to confer the Court with exclusive 
jurisdiction over matters relating to the interpretation and application of the Constitutive Act of 
the AU and all its treaties, protocols, agreements, conventions, acts, decisions. This omission goes 
to the heart of the mandate of the court, which is supposed to be the single AU court and should, 
therefore, speak with finality on the Union’s matters. The absence of supremacy of the Court and 
its decisions over sub-regional and national Courts and judicial tribunals is further compounded 
by the Article 46 H (1) of the Amendment Protocol. The provision states that the jurisdiction of 
the Court is complementary to that of the national courts, and courts of the RECs, where the same 
is specifically provided by the RECs. This means that the ACJ&HR Protocol acknowledges being 
a court; equal in stature, status and competence with national courts and REC judicial organs. 
 
Article 46H (2) and (3) of the Amendment Protocol addresses admissibility of cases by the 
ACJ&HR. The provision seems to suggest that the court will only exercise jurisdiction upon either 
exhaustion of local remedies (national and REC) or where it is demonstrated that the state member 
is unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute. Though largely speaking to the human rights or 
international crimes jurisdiction of the court, the provision highlights the applicability of the 
subsidiarity principle in the African continental dispute resolution system. 
 
The principle of jurisdiction personae essentially answers the question: who has the 
competence to bring cases to a court or tribunal? Articles 29 and 30 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR 
enumerate the persons with the right to access the Court. These are: state parties to the ACJ&HR 
Protocol; the Assembly, the Parliament and other Organs of the AU; and a staff member of the AU 
                                                          
427 For example, the decisions of the EACJ and ECOWAS Court of Justice are final. See the discussions in part 2.2.3 
and 2.2.4 
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on Appeal.428 The Amendment Protocol includes the AU Peace and Security Council and the office 
of the Prosecutor of international crimes as some of the only other entities that may access the 
Court.429 The Court is not open to states that are not members of the AU, nor to disputes involving 
non-members of the ACJ&HR Protocol.430 
 
Albeit in a limited scope, and in matters regarding the Court’s exercise of human rights 
and international crimes jurisdiction, African individuals431 and African Non-Governmental 
Organisations accredited to the AU or its organs, may access the Court.432 However, provision for 
direct access by individuals on trade and investment disputes is absent. To this end, the General 
Section of the Court, which is to exercise this jurisdiction, will only deal with inter-governmental 
disputes. The General Section of the Court may end up being moribund, given that African states 
do not have a culture of suing each other or perusing trade remedies in international courts or 
tribunals. Traders who engage in intra-African trade are usually not always state entities, while 
others may also be entities from non-AU states. The ACJ&HR, in its current frame, may not be 
useful in guaranteeing access to its trade and investment judicial remedies 
 
The ACJ&HR Protocol does not address latent inconsistencies in its application of Article 
29 of the Court’s Statute as read with Article 3 (2) of the Amended Protocol. Article 3(2) of the 
Amendment Protocol expands the Court’s jurisdiction to include appeals from decisions of judicial 
bodies of African RECs. Some African sub-regional RECs allow for direct access to their judicial 
organs by individuals, in trade and investment disputes, yet the ACJ&HR is clear that individuals 
cannot directly access the Court in matters other than international criminal law cases, presumably 
as complainants or victims seeking reparations. Should an appeal from a REC be brought to the 
                                                          
428Article 29(1) of the ACJ&HR Protocol. 
429Article 15 of the Amendment Protocol. 
430Article 29 (2) of the ACJ&HR Protocol. 
431Article 16 of the Amendment Protocol restricts the access to African individuals and African NGOs; a difficult 
term to define since many African states allow for dual citizenship. The NGOs must also have observer status with 
the AU or its Organs. 
432Article 30 of the ACJ&HR Protocol. 
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ACJ&HR from a decision of an African REC by an investor, would that not give such individual 
access to the ACJ&HR contrary to the express intention of Article 29 of the Court’s Statute? 
 
Article 53 of the ACJ&HR also confers advisory jurisdiction on the Court. The opinions 
may cover legal questions at the request of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government; the 
AU Pan-African Parliament; the Executive Council; the Peace and Security Council; the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC); the financial institutions, or any other organs 
of the AU as may be authorised by the Assembly.433 It appears, therefore, that the Statute does not 
permit State Parties or RECs to seek advisory opinions from the Court.  
3.3.2 The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) 
The AEC Treaty envisages the establishment of a continental Free Trade Area in its third stage of 
integration.434 This phase of the economic integration of the continent is to take place within ten 
years of the AEC Treaty.435 The AfCFTA Agreement was launched on the 21st March 2018, in 
Kigali Rwanda. The Agreement has since been signed by 54 African States.436 However, only 28 
states have deposited their instruments of ratification.437 It is the largest multilateral agreement 
after the WTO.438 The Agreement came into force on 30th May 2019 on the 15th ratification as 
required by Article 23 of the AfCFTA Agreement.439 Together with the Agreement, three other 
instruments were concluded in Kigali. The Protocol to the Abuja (AEC) Treaty relating to the Free 
Movement of Persons and the Right of Establishment; as well as the Kigali Declaration.  A 
Protocol on Rules and Procedure on the Settlement of Dispute was also adopted. 
 
                                                          
433Article 53(1) of the Statute of the ACJ&HR. 
434Article 6(c) of the AEC Treaty. 
435See the signature and ratification status of the AfCFTA at <https://au.int/en/treaties/agreement-establishing-african-
continental-free-trade-area.> accessed on 19th September 2019. 
436ibid. 
437ibid, the Agreement came into force on 30th May 2019 after attaining the minimum 22 ratifications as required under 
Article 23 of the Agreement. 
438 D Luke, (n) 2 [2].  
439ibid. 
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The key objectives of AfCFTA are spelt out in Article 3 of the Treaty. These, inter alia, 
include; creating a single market for goods and services facilitated by movement of persons so as 
to deepen the economic integration of the continent in accordance with the pan African Vision of 
“an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa” enshrined in the Agenda 2063. Significantly, the 
AfCFTA also aims at resolving the challenges of multiple and overlapping REC memberships, 
and to expedite the regional and continental integration processes.440   
 
Article 4 of the AfCFTA Agreement sets out the specific objectives of the organisation  to 
include the progressive elimination of tariffs and non-tariffs barriers to trade; cooperation in 
investment, intellectual  property rights, competition policy, trade related areas, customs and 
implementation of trade facilitation measure; establishment of mechanism for the settlement of 
dispute concerning their rights and obligations; as well as  establishing and maintaining an 
institutional framework for implementation and administration of the AfCFTA. 
 
The AfCFTA is administered through four organs: The Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of member states; the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Senior Trade Officials; 
and the Secretariat.441 The Assembly sits at the apex of the AfCFTA’s organisational pyramid and 
gives policy endorsement to recommendations of the Council of Ministers.442 The Council of 
Ministers is composed of trade Ministers of member states, and takes decisions on matters touching 
the AfCFTA Agreement.443 The Committee of Senior Trade Officials consists of Permanent or 
Principal Secretaries of member states.444 The Committee implements decisions of the Council of 
Ministers and develops programs and action plans for implementation under the agreement. The 
secretariat is hosted in Ghana and is charged with the day to day running of the AfCFTA.445 
                                                          
440Article 4(h) of the AfCFTA Agreement. 
441Article 9 of the AfCFTA Agreement. 
442Article 10 of the AfCFTA Agreement. 
443Article 11 of the AfCFTA Agreement. 
444Article 12 AfCFTA Agreement. 
445Article 13 the AfCFTA Agreement. The Choice of Ghana to host the Secretariat of the AfCFTA has both symbolic 
and sentimental significance. It is a befitting tribute to the pre- colonial and post-colonial pioneering Pan-Africanists 
led by Ghana’s first President, Kwame Nkrumah. It also underscores the AU’s commitment to its core values and 
principles, at least on paper, which Ghana exemplifies. These values include democracy, transparency, respect for 
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While some view the progression towards the AEC, beginning with the AfCFTA, as a 
milestone,446 others see the stepwise approach to continental integration as “too cautiously and 
hesitantly” undertaken.447 Fasan, for example, argues that the “variable geometry” principle 
enunciated in Article 5 of the AfCFTA Agreement introduces contradictions which are inimical to 
the single market objective.448 He goes on to state that the variable geometry principle was 
designed to recognise the heterogeneity and diversity in Africa’s economies that form the single 
market.449 However, this objective is not consistent with an a la carte approach, where members 
integrate at different speeds.450 Ideally, he notes, every member should be subject to the same 
levels of obligation.451 Furthermore, the variable geometry, which suggests a multi-speed 
integration, is not consistent with consensus in decision-making, another principle of the AfCFTA, 
as some states could hold back those willing to make faster progress. 452  He draws a useful 
comparison and notes that consensus in decision-making has been a major obstacle to the progress 
of negotiations at the WTO.453 
 
                                                          
human rights, economic prosperity, free movement of persons and right of establishment; which values the AfCFTA 
underwrites. For a discussion on the significance of the choice of Ghana to host the AfCFTA Secretariat, see W 
Mutubwa, “Selection of Ghana to Host the AFCFTA Secretariat a Befitting Tribute to Kwame Nkrumah” (2019) 
Afronomicslaw.<www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/08/2/selection-of-ghanato-host-the-AfCfTA-secretariat-a-beffitting-
tribute-to-kwame-Nkrumah>  accessed on 20th September 2019. 
446 For example, T Ngobeni T (2019) “The Relevance of the Draft Pan African Investment Code (PAIC) in Light of 
the Formation of the African Continental Free Trade Area” (2019) [2] 
<http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/01/11/the-relevance-of-the-draft-pan-african-investment-code-paic-in-light-
of-the-formation-of-the-african-continental-free-trade-area/> accessed on 30th September 2019 [1]; D Luke, (n)2 [30]. 
447O Fasan, “Why AfCFTA may not be a credible Forerunner of Single African Market” (2019) [8]  
  <http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/02/06/why-afcfta-may-not-be-a-credible-forerunner-of-single-african-
market/> accessed on 30th September 2019. 
448 Ibid [9]. 
449 ibid. 
450 ibid. 
451 ibid. 
452 ibid. 
453 ibid. 
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Ajibo summarises the problems confronting the AfCFTA continental economic integration 
as being four fold: fragmentation and divergences in trade norms and practices; sub-optimal 
performance of RECs; prevalence of lack of institutional capacity and transparency; and most 
importantly to this discourse, the defiance of rulings of sub-regional courts by REC member 
states.454 
3.3.2.1 Dispute Resolution under the AfCFTA. 
The Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes, made under the AfCFTA, is 
the principal instrument that prescribes the methods of dealing with disputes under the 
Agreement.455 The Protocol provides for a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) as the principal organ 
of settlement of disputes.456 Other amicable dispute settlement methods such as consultations, 
good offices, conciliation, mediation and arbitration are also prescribed as being useful before 
resort to the DSB.457 
 
The DSB operates through panels with an approach which is borrowed from the WTO 
dispute settlement system.458 According to Article 4 of the Agreement, the mechanisms adopted is 
                                                          
454 C Ajibo, “Regional Economic Communities as the building blocs of African Continental Free Trade Area 
Agreement: Challenges and Way Forward” (2019) [4-7] 
  http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/02/04/regional-economic-communities-as-the-building-blocs-of-african-
continental-free-trade-area-agreement-challenges-and-way-forward/ accessed on 30th September 2019. See also, 
generally, C Ajibo, “African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement: The Euphoria, Pitfalls and Prospects” Journal 
of World Trade 53, no.5 (2019):871-894. 
455 The Protocol is concluded pursuant to Article 20, Part VI of the AfCFTA. 
456 Article 2 and 5 of the Protocol. 
457 Articles 6, 7, 8 and 27 of the Protocol. 
458 O Bose,  “The Dispute Settlement Mechanism under the African Continental Free Trade Area” (2018) [1] 
<https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/13529-the-dispute-settlement-mechanism-under-the-african-continental-free-
trade-area.html.> accessed on 20th November 2018. See also, generally, G Erasmus, “Dispute Settlement in the African 
Continental Free Trade Area” (2019) <https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/14150-dispute-settlement-in-the-african-
continental-free-trade-area.html.> accessed on 23rd September 2019.  David Luke, the Coordinator of the African 
Trade Policy Centre (ATPC) at the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), confirms that the choice of the 
WTO approach in the AfCFTA inter-governmental trade governance system is deliberate and draws inspiration from 
the institutional arrangements for secretarial support and oversight at the WTO. Luke, (n) 2 [30]. 
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a central element in providing security and predictability to the regional trading system. The 
mechanism is also involved in achieving satisfactory settlement of a dispute in accordance with 
right and obligations under the Agreement. 
 
Article 20 of the AfCFTA Agreement establishes the DSB which is composed of 
representatives of states parties. The panels are established under Article 10 of the Protocol and 
their composition elaborated in the same Article. Each state party annually nominates individuals 
to serve on the panels. The panels sit on an ad hoc basis. Additionally, the panel members must be 
persons qualified in international law and international trade law, should be objective, reliable, of 
sound judgment, impartial, independent and should undertake to abide by the code of conduct 
developed by the DSB and adopted by Council of Ministers.459 The panellists are to be selected 
with a view to ensuring sufficient diversity and a wide spectrum of experience in the subject matter 
of the dispute, unless the parties decide otherwise.460 
 
The DSB only entertains disputes between states parties and disputes regarding the 
implementation and application of the AfCFTA Agreement.461 However, third party rights can be 
taken into account during the panel process by ensuring submissions are received from and served 
upon them.462 Third party rights also take into consideration decisions made with regard to their 
rights, entitlement and/or obligations.463 
 
The DSB renders to the state parties involved its report and recommendations in 
accordance with Article 19 of the Protocol. An Appellate Body (AB), established under Article 20 
of the Protocol, may hear and determine appeals from the first instance DSB panels. Final and 
binding recommendations of the DSB or its AB must be implemented by state parties.464 The DSB 
panel or its AB may suggest ways in which the state party concerned could implement its 
                                                          
459Article 10(3) of the Protocol. 
460Article 10(4) of the Protocol. 
461Article 3(1) of the Protocol. 
462Article 3(1) of the Protocol. 
463Article 13 of the Protocol. 
464Article 24(1) of the Protocol. 
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recommendations.465 The Protocol has established, under Article 24, a process of surveillance of 
implementation of recommendations and findings of the DSB Panels or the ABs. The DSB or the 
AB shall constitute a meeting to monitor its implementation thirty days after the adoption of 
recommendations or findings made by the DSB Panel.466 
 
In the absence of  voluntary compliance or in the event of non-compliance, the DSB panel 
or AB may recommend compensation, suspension of concessions or any other measures for 
purposes of enforcing its recommendations or rulings.467 In doing so, the DSB or AB will take into 
account the importance of such trade that is to suffer nullification or impairment to the state party; 
and the economic effects or elements related to the nullification or impairment and the broader 
economic consequences of the recommendation.468 
 
Just as in private dispute resolution, such as international commercial arbitration, the DSB 
determines the remuneration and expenses of the panellists, arbitrators and experts in accordance 
with the financial rules and regulations of the AU.469  These are borne by the parties in proportions 
determined by the DSB. 
 
The Protocol also provides for arbitration.470 Its processes and enforcement of decisions of 
the arbitral tribunal, mutatis mutandis, follow those set out in the Protocol with regard to the DSB 
panels.471 
 
The approach adopted by the Protocol is novel with respect to settlement of trade disputes 
in Africa, particularly in attempting the use of ADR mechanism as opposed to traditional 
adversarial methods such as tribunals and courts.  The qualification of panellists to the DSB is also 
                                                          
465Article 23 and 24 of the Protocol. 
466Article 24(2) of eth Protocol. 
467Article 25 of the Protocol. 
468Article 25(6) of the Protocol. 
469Article 26 of the Protocol. 
470Article 27 of the Protocol. 
471Article 27(7) of the Protocol. 
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cognisant of the need for international/regional trade expertise. The monitoring of the 
implementation and enforcement mechanisms availed to the DSB and AB go further than 
traditional court dispute settlement where a court/tribunal is rendered functus officio upon 
rendering its decision. 
3.4 Sub-Regional Economic Regionalism and Dispute Resolution in Africa 
3.4.1 The East African Community (EAC) 
Before its disintegration and dissolution in 1977, the EAC was an effort of integration by 
supranational institutions of the three East African countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.472 
The three countries emerged from British colonialism in the 1960s. The colonial administration 
had established administrative organs such as the East African Railways and Harbours, the East 
African Airways, the East African Revenue Authority, an East African University and the East 
African Court of Appeal.473 The organs and institutions were retained, and had a supranational 
authority over the three member countries, even after each of the three countries had gained 
independence and formed governments that exercised sovereign authority over their respective 
territories. The colonial EAHC was replaced in 1961 with the East African Common Services 
Organisation (EACSO).   
 
The East African Community Treaty was signed on 6th June 1967 in Kampala, Uganda and 
inaugurated on 1st December 1967 in Arusha, Tanzania. The EAC inherited the organs of the 
EACSO.474 In terms of dispute resolution, three important institutions existed: the Common 
Market Tribunal, the Court of Appeal of East Africa and the East Africa Industrial Court. These 
                                                          
472<https://www.eac.int/eac-history.> accessed on 28th June 2018. See I Delupis, I The East African Community and 
the Common Market (Longman London 1970) 9-26. 
473I Delupis, ibid, 31. These organs were administered under the East African High Commission (EAHC) established 
in 1948. Although it has been observed by Delupis that the EAHC was not an international Organisation in its strict 
sense because members were colonial entities. See also, J Bandfield, “The Structure and Administration of the East 
African Common Services Organisation” in C Leys and P Robson (eds), Federation in East Africa: Opportunities and 
Problems (Oxford University Press Oxford 1965) 30-40, 32. 
474Article 3 of the Treaty for the East African Cooperation (1967) https://www.eac.int/eac-history. accessed 20th 
September 2018. 
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institutions exercised supranational judicial powers transcending the national boundaries of 
member states.475 The EAC failed in 1977 primarily because of suspicion between the leaders of 
the three nations influenced by their differences and conflicting cold war era geo-political stand-
points and persuasions.476 A revival of the EAC founded on the 1999 EAC Treaty takes a 
significantly different integration approach from the defunct pre-1977 EAC.477 The current EAC 
integration seeks to develop a political federation, but through a stepwise integration process which 
mostly takes an intergovernmental approach based on the linear progression model of 
integration.478 
3.4.1.1 The Structure and Organs of the EAC 
The EAC makes a distinction between its organs and institutions.479 Its organs are the most 
important and include the Summit, the Council, the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), 
and the EACJ.480 The institutions encompass specialised bodies such as the East African 
Development bank, the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation and the Inter-University Council of 
East Africa.481 The summit is the apex authority organ of the community and is composed of Heads 
of State or Government of the member states.482 The Council comprises of ministers responsible 
for regional cooperation.483 The secretariat is the executive organ of the community and is led by 
                                                          
475A Springer, “Community Chronology” in R Fredland and C Potholm (eds), Integration and Disintegration in East 
Africa (University Press of America Lanham 1980) 3-36, 22. 
476B Fagbayibo, (n) 32, 49. See also, C Mathieson, “The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa: the East 
African Community (EAC)” (2016) European Centre for Development Policy Management. 
477T Ojienda, “The East African Court of Justice in the Re-established East African Community: Institutional Structure 
and Function in the Integration Process” (2005) East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights, 220-240, at 222. 
478 ibid. See also D Mazzeo, “The Experience of the East African Community: Implications for the Theory and Practice 
of Regional Cooperation in Africa” in Mazzeo D (ed.) African Regional Organisations (Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge1984) 150-170. 
479 P van der Mei, “Regional Integration: The Contribution of the Court of Justice of the East African Community” 
(2009) 69 ZaoRV 69 403-425, 406. 
480 P Apiko, “Understanding the East African Court of Justice” (2017) European Centre for Development Policy 
Management 1-23, 3. The organs are spelt out in Article 9 of the EAC Treaty. 
481 Article 9 of the EAC Treaty. 
482 ibid. 
483Articles 10-12 of the EAC Treaty. 
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a secretary general appointed by the summit.484 EALA is the legislative organ of the EAC.485 It is 
composed of 27 members and ex-officio members.486 EALA members are appointed by member 
states and serve for a renewable term of 5 years.487 
3.4.1.2 Jurisdiction of the EACJ 
Unlike its predecessor, the EACA, the EACJ does not engender supranational jurisdiction. Its 
jurisdiction is limited to the interpretation of the EAC Treaty and other instruments, to issue 
advisory opinions, arbitration, as well as employment and labour disputes that may arise between 
the EAC and its staff.488 Perhaps the most instructive illustration of the Court’s role in ensuring 
compliance with the treaty is seen in its decision in the case of East African Law Society and 
Others v Attorney General of Kenya and Others.489 The court found that an amendment to the EAC 
Treaty, made with the exclusion of the civil society and the private sector, infringed on Article 150 
of the Treaty.490 The Court, however, curiously, declined to invalidate the amendments stating that 
the infringement was not a conscious one and was unlikely to recur.491 
 
While the issue does not lie with the EACJ’s jurisdiction in interpreting the EAC Treaty 
and regulating relationships between the Community’s members and organs, it is not clear whether 
the Court exhibits the direct effect or supremacy principles of supranationalism. Article 33 of the 
Treaty provides that the decisions of the EACJ on the interpretation of the EAC Treaty have 
precedence over those of national courts on similar subject matter. Article 43 directs national 
courts and tribunals to refer a matter to the EACJ, if they consider that a ruling is necessary to 
enable the national court to give a judgement. This approach ensures harmony in the interpretation 
and application of the treaty by the partner states on the interpretation of the EAC Treaty.  
                                                          
484ibid. 
485Articles 66-73 of the EAC Treaty. 
486Articles 48-65 of the EAC Treaty. 
487Article 50 of the EAC Treaty. 
488Articles 23, 36, 31 and 32 of the EAC Treaty. 
489EAC (2008). <http://eacj.eac.int/?cases=east-africa-law-society-and-4-others-vs-attorney-general-of-kenya-and-3-
others>.accessed on 15th September 2018. 
490ibid, 30-31. 
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Article 30 of the EAC Treaty permits the EACJ to admit cases brought by legal and natural 
persons who are resident in the partner states. Individuals can therefore challenge the legality of 
an act, regulation, directive, decision or act of a Partner State, or an institution of the Community 
on the grounds of its unlawfulness, or infraction of the treaty. Unlike other similar treaties, the 
EAC Treaty is silent on the requirement for a person to exhaust local remedies before moving the 
Court. The doctrine of subsidiarity is therefore not applicable, rendering the EACJ accessible as a 
court of first instance. To this extent, the doctrines of direct effect and access are underscored by 
the Treaty. 
 
Three decisions of the EACJ are useful in placing this discussion into context. In the case 
of Anyang’ Nyong’o v Attorney General of Kenya492, which involved the election of members of 
the EALA representing Kenya, the applicant contended that Kenya’s representatives had been 
nominated in violation of Article 50 of the EAC Treaty.493 The Court held that a country cannot 
invoke its domestic laws as a justification for failure to meet its treaty obligations. This decision 
seems to suggest an inclination of the court towards an interpretation that favours supremacy of 
the EAC laws over national laws of member states. 
 
However, a subsequent decision of the same court seems to take an entirely different 
trajectory in respect of the supremacy principle. In its decision in the case of East African Civil 
Society Organization Forum v The Attorney General of the Republic of Burundi&2 others494, the 
Court held that it lacked the requisite jurisdiction to interfere with decisions of constitutional courts 
of member states or to sit on appeal on decisions of such courts. 
                                                          
492<http://eacj.eac.int/?cases=prof-peter-anyang-nyongo-and-others-vs-attorney-general-of-kenya-and-others.> 
accessed on 9th September 2018. 
493Article 50 stipulates that “The National Assembly of each partner state shall elect …nine members of the Assembly, 
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97 
 
 
Articles 33 and 34 of the EAC Treaty are clear that the EACJ is not an appellate court from 
member state courts. The Court’s decision in the East African Civil Aviation case also seems to 
clarify this position. However, in its decision in the case of Sitenda Sebalu v Secretary General of 
EAC and Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda495, the EACJ seems to suggest that an appeal 
from national courts could be entertained by the Court.  In the said case, the Applicant had brought 
the case as an appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court of Uganda. He averred that the 
continuous delay in establishing the East African Court of Appeal as stipulated by Article 27 of 
the Treaty is a blatant violation of the rule of law and the Treaty. The Court agreed with the 
Applicant and directed a quick operationalisation of the relevant Protocol. The Council of 
Ministers instead amended the draft Protocol to exclude the appellate and human rights jurisdiction 
to the EACJ as had been proposed. 
3.4.2 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
SADC was first created in 1980 as the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference 
(SADCC).496 Its underlying principal objective was to reduce its members’ dependence on the then 
apartheid South Africa.497 In anticipation of the democratisation of South Africa, SADCC 
transformed into SADC in 1992 and South Africa joined it in 1994. SADC’s predecessor SADCC 
was not a market integration arrangement in its strict sense but one whose members, known as 
front line states,498 adopted a broad development mandate. SADCC, therefore, engaged in cross-
border sector specific projects in infrastructure and energy such as the regional development 
corridors and the Southern African Power pool.499 
 
                                                          
495http://eacj.eac.int/?cases=honorable-sitenda-sebalu-vs-secretary-general-of-the-eac-attorney-general-of-the-
republic-of-uganda-honorable-sam-k-njuba-and-the-electoral-commission-of-uganda. Accessed on 9th September 
2018. 
496https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/. Accessed on 12th September 2018. 
497 T Hartzenberg, “Regional Integration in Africa, Trade and Centre for Southern Africa (Tralac) WTO 
Manuscript.” (October 2011) Staff Working Paper ERSD 2011-14, SADC Treaty 
<www.wto.int/files/9113/5292/9434/SADC_Treaty.pdf.> accessed on 4th July 2018, 5. 
498 Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
499 T Hartzenberg, (n) 497. 
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The SADC Treaty (and subsequently the SADC trade protocol) does not elaborate on a 
detailed integration plan, but such detail is to be found articulated in the Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) of 2003.500 The RISDP sets out to embark on a roadmap of 
SADC from a FTA by 2008, to a Customs Union in 2010, a Common Market in 2015, a Monetary 
Union in 2016 and the introduction of a single currency in 2018.501 Though not a legally binding 
instrument, the RISDP bears significant political legitimacy and is recognised as a blueprint 
towards the integration of SADC member states. 
 
The SADC approach has been likened to that of the EAC.502 Both are based on the linear 
market progression paradigm, with the only striking difference being that the EAC envisages a 
political federation, while the integration of SADC only ends at economic integration with a 
monetary union.503 SADC prides itself as having achieved 85% of intra- regional trade amongst 
its members in a phased programme achieved in 2008.504 However, the set minimum tariff 
liberalisation was achieved in 2012, later than the targeted 2008 date.505 Most member states still 
lag behind and as a result the strategic plan to achieve a Customs Union, with common external 
tariffs by 2010; a Common Market with common policies and production regulation by 2015; a 
macroeconomic convergence; and a monetary union by 2016 have not been met.506Additionally, 
the envisaged monetary union, first set to be achieved in 2016 has not been achieved and was 
therefore postponed to the year 2018.507 What is more, the fundamental key pillars for the 
establishment of a monetary union and adoption of a single currency, such as the establishment of 
a SADC central bank, are still lacking.508  
                                                          
500ibid. 
501ibid. 
502ibid, 6. 
503T Hartzenberg, (n) 497, 5. 
504 ibid. 
505 SADC <https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/.> aaccessed on 2nd September 2018. 
506 K Padamja, “COMESA and SADC: Prospects and Challenges for Regional Trade Integration” (2004) IMF Working 
Papers WP/04/227, 12-13. <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Comesa-and-Sadc-
Prospects-and-Challenges-for-Regional-Trade-Integration-17852.> accessed on 9th September 2018. 
507SADC Treaty, 13. 
508 ibid. 
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3.4.2.1 Structure and Organs of SADC 
Article 9 of the SADC Treaty creates the organs of Community. The organs include: the Summit 
of Heads of State and Government of the Member States509; the Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security Operations510; the Council of Ministers511; the Cuter Ministerial Committees512; the 
Standing Committee of Officials;513 the Secretariat514; the Tribunal515; and the SADC National 
Committees.516 
3.4.2.2 The SADC Tribunal 
Article 16 of the 2000 SADC Treaty establishes that the SADC Tribunal’s, role is to interpret the 
Treaty and its subsidiary instruments, as well as to adjudicate upon referred disputes. It can also 
give advisory opinions to the Summit of Heads of State and Government and Council of Ministers, 
if called upon. The SADC Tribunal was disbanded in 2012 after being suspended and staying 
moribund since 2010.517 Following a decision of the Summit of Heads of State and Government 
                                                          
509 Article 10, SADC Treaty. 
510 Comprising of Ministers of state parties for foreign affairs, public service, defence, state security or police. 
Article 10 A. 
511 Consisting of one Minister from each member state, preferably a Minister in charge of Foreign Affairs. Article 
11. 
512 In line with the various sectoral mandates of the Community such as, trade and Industry, finance and investment, 
infrastructure, education, labour, legal and judicial Affairs. Article 12. 
513 Each sectoral Committee shall consist of one Permanent Secretary or an Official of equivalent rank from each m, 
from the Ministry that is the SADC National Contact Point. Article 13, SADC Treaty. 
514 Led by the Executive General.Article14, SADC Treaty. 
515 Article 1, SADC Treaty. 
516 Created in each member state constituting key stakeholders to the implementation of SADC’s programmes. 
Article 16A, SADC Treaty. 
517 The Summit of Heads of State refused to appoint new judges or to renew the appointments of those serving. See, 
G Erasmus, “The New Protocol for the SADC Tribunal: Jurisdictional Challenges and Implications for SADC 
Community Law” (2015) <https://www.tralac.org/publications/article/6900-the-new-protocol-for-the-sadc-tribunal-
jurisdictional-changes-and-implications-for-sadc-community-law.html.> accessed on 2nd September 2019, 1. The 
new SADC Tribunal Protocol is available at <https://ijrcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/New-SADC-
Tribunal-Protocol-Signed.pdf.>. See the amendment Protocol at 
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held in 2014, a new SADC Tribunal Protocol was signed but has not received the requisite of 10 
ratifications for it to come into force.518 It is also important to highlight that it may take years to 
comply with the ratification processes under the new protocol, which involves compliance with 
the domestic laws of member states.519 
3.4.2.3 Jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal 
Under the new protocol, the tribunal’s jurisdiction was curtailed to specifically deal with disputes 
between state members. 520 Its necessity and continued existence is cast in doubt, particularly since 
member states do not ordinarily sue each other.  
 
The watering down of the mandate of the tribunal and its eventual disbandment by the 
bloc’s summit of heads of states was seen as an attempt to appease Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe had 
threatened to withdraw from the Protocol establishing the tribunal following the adverse decisions 
and orders by the Tribunal against it in the Michael Campbell v Zimbabwe case.521  
 
Neither the SADC Treaty nor the two SADC Tribunal Protocols expressly provide for the 
direct effect of SADC laws over member states or supremacy of the tribunal’s decisions over 
national courts. The direct effect of the Treaty’s provisions or the Tribunal’s decisions over 
Member states is also absent. Additionally, the Treaty and the 2000 Protocol on the Tribunal 
denied individuals the direct access to the court. However, the Tribunal, creatively, admitted and 
adjudicated claims, made by natural and juristic persons, invoking the implied power doctrine.522 
To this end, the Mike Campbell case is instructive. 
                                                          
<https://www.sadc.int/files/3515/6525/8317/Agreement_Amending_the_Protocol_on_the_Tribunal_-_2007_-
_English.pdf.> accessed on 2nd September 2019. 
518 Article 53 of the 2014 SADC Tribunal Protocol. 
519G Erasmus, (n) 517, 1.  
520 Article 33. 
521 [2008] SADCT 2 (28 November 2008) SADC Tribunal (SADC). See also, L Ndlovu, “Following the NAFTA star: 
SADC Land Reforms and Investment Protection after the Campbell Litigation” (2011) 15 Law Democracy and 
Development 1-30. 
522 The principle of Implied Powers essentially means that in the absence of express powers in the constitutive 
instrument establishing a tribunal, that tribunal can resort to implied powers to establish the jurisdiction necessary for 
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In the Mike Campbell case, the SADC Tribunal had awarded the Applicant, a company 
whose majority shareholding was owned by a South African citizen, against the government of 
Zimbabwe.  The Applicant subsequently moved to the Zimbabwean High Court to enforce the 
Tribunal’s decision, which was rejected. The Zimbabwean High Court went on to disallow Mr 
Campbell’s prayers on the grounds that the land reforms, upon which he lay his claim, formed part 
of public policy and was therefore for public good. The applicant had brought an action against 
the government of Zimbabwe subsequent to forceful land eviction in the aftermath of seizure of 
its land through a state sanctioned policy allowing independence war veterans to do so. The 
Zimbabwean government first resisted the jurisdiction of the SADC tribunal over the matter, and 
upon failure on this ground absconded appearing before the tribunal. The Zimbabwean government 
was found by the SADC Tribunal to be in contempt of the Tribunal’s orders and in multiple breach 
of the SADC Treaty. The applicant, thereafter, successfully sought to enforce the decision of the 
                                                          
the fulfilment of its mandate. On the other hand, the doctrine of Express Powers denotes that international tribunals 
derive their powers from the respective treaties adopted by member states. These treaties give them express powers. 
There is always tension between the two doctrines with scholarly support for each in equal measure. Those who are 
conservative subscribe to the Express Power approach, while the implied Powers is attractive to those liberally 
inclined. For example, Crawford asserts that the Implied Power principle can be applied by international tribunals 
while Nkatha advances that an attempt by an Organisation to impose new obligations that are not the in the founding 
instrument on Member States, would be an act ultra vires, beyond the powers originally given to the institution by the 
treaty. For a definition of the concepts and their application by international tribunals see, J Crawford, “Brownlie’s 
Principles of Public International Law” (2012) 12th ed, 651. For the application of the concept in judicial decisions ; 
see, Katabazi and 21 Others v Secretary General of the East African Community and Another (Ref. No1 of 2007) 
(2007) EACJ 3 (1 November 2007); LN Murungi and Gallinetti “The  Role of sub-Regional  Courts in the African 
Human Rights System” 2010 (7) International Journal on Human Rights law Journal 119-143, 119; MJ Nkatha  
(2012) “The Role of Regional Economic Communities in Protecting and Promoting Human Rights in Africa: 
Reflections on the Human Rights Mandate of the Southern Africa Development Community” (2012) 20 African 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 97. For a detailed analysis of the jurisdiction of the EACJ, see W 
Mutubwa “Martha Karua v. Republic of Kenya: A litmus test for East African Court of Justice’s ever shifting 
Supremacy and Jurisdictional Remit” 2019 available at https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/11/08/martha-karua-v-
republic-of-kenya-a-litmus-test-for-east-african-court-of-justices-ever-shifting-supremacy-and-jurisdictional-remit/ 
accessed on 19th November 2019. 
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tribunal through diplomatic protection in South Africa and subsequently moved to attach the assets 
of Zimbabwe in South Africa.523  
 
Both the South African Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court rejected 
Zimbabwe’s appeals after the South African High Court at Pretoria had allowed for the seizure of 
Zimbabwe’s assets. Zimbabwe, through its Justice Minister then wrote purporting to withdraw 
from the SADC Tribunal Protocol. In May 2011, in an extraordinary Summit of Heads of State 
and Government of SADC held in Namibia, declined to re-appoint or replace all the SADC 
Tribunal members rendering it non-functional. That  decision by the SADC summit of Heads of 
State and Government came under sharp criticism as it undermined not only the SADC Tribunal’s 
authority as an institution but also SADC as a REC.524 SADC’s credentials as a REC governed by 
the rule of law and its members’ commitment to that ideal were seriously cast in  doubt. 
 
The Mike Campbell case is celebrated for two memorable firsts.525 Firstly, it is celebrated 
as the first case in which assets/property of a state were seized in compensation for human rights 
violations committed by a member state. Secondly, the decision is marked as significant because 
of the SADC Tribunal’s ability to flex its muscles on its independence. The South African Courts’ 
resilience in the face of internal and external political pressure in upholding human rights, judicial 
independence and finality of the decision of the SADC tribunal, are also laudable. 
 
The Mike Campbell case also brought into sharp focus the judicial supremacy contest 
pitting regional courts/tribunals, on the one hand and national courts, on the other. Additionally, 
                                                          
523Diplomatic Protection is a principle developed in international law which allows one to invoke the diplomat 
assistance of one’s state against another to enforce rights recognised in international law. 
524 D Zongwe, “The Contribution of Campbell v Zimbabwe to the Foreign Investment on Expropriations” (2009) 5(9) 
Osgoode Hall Law School CLP Research Paper, available at 
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1158&context=clpe accessed on 19th November 
2019.  See also, PN Ndlovu, “Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe: A Moment of Truth for the SADC Tribunal” (2011) 
1 SADC Law Journal. Both SADC Lawyers’ Association and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) Africa 
office and the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU) roundly criticized the suspension of the SADC tribunal and sought 
the intervention of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
525ibid. 
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the case also demonstrated the lack of independence of REC organs over the overbearing summit 
of Heads of State and Government and by implication, the deficiency of the rule of law in the 
management of affairs of RECs in Africa.  
 
Praise for the SADC Tribunal, like the EACJ discussed above, for rising to the occasion 
and striking a blow for judicial independence have not been few.526  Both EACJ and the SADC 
Tribunal have demonstrated their ability to underscore their independence from national influences 
and regional politics. However, by the very architecture of these institutions, the control of judicial 
organs by the executive arm of the RECs (namely the summit of Heads of State and Council of 
Ministers), exercised through the appointment mechanisms, funding and enforcement of their 
decisions, has seen the continued recurrence of these unfortunate drawbacks. These include the 
suspension or dissolution of strong judicial organs always being a lingering possibility.  
 
Not many African national judicial organs and courts have the ability or wherewithal to be 
as independent of political pressure and machinations as was demonstrated by South African courts 
in the Mike Campbell case. Prospects of revival of the court in its original form remain dim. 
Fabricius (2019) notes that South Africa, the largest and most influential country in the SADC 
region and its leadership, as currently constituted, lack the wherewithal to push for revival of the 
SADC tribunal in its previous form.527 
3.4.3 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
The COMESA was first established as a Preferential Trade Area with members not only adopting and 
ratifying the PTA agreement but also domesticating it.528 The PTA transformed into the COMESA 
                                                          
526 See PJ Ngandwe, “The Predicament of African Regional Courts: lessons from the Southern African Development 
Community Tribunal” 2012 (1) The Pan African Yearbook of Law 47-66; L Nathan, “The Disbanding of the SADC 
Tribunal: A Cautionary Tale” 2013 (35) Human Rights Quarterly 870-892. 
527 P Fabricius, “Will South Africa Fight for the SADC Tribunal’s Revival” (2019) ISS Today <https://issafrica.org/iss-
today/will-south-africa-fight-for-the-sadc-tribunals-revival.> accessed on 20th September 2019. 
528 For example, the Preferential Trade Area (implementation) Act Cap 4B, Act no.7 of 1991 of the Laws of Kenya 
domesticates the 1981 Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States Treaty, 1981.  
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following for the adoption of the COMESA Treaty in the year 1994.529 The COMESA Member States 
have since concluded protocols on Rules of Origin (2015), Free Movement of Persons, Labour, 
Services, Rights of establishment and Residence (1998), Investment Agreement for COMESA 
Common Investment Area (2007), the Common Market and Customs Union Regulations (2009, 
2011).530 Regulation of trade in services competition and merger Assessment guidelines (2004 and 
2014) have also been concluded.531 
3.4.3.1 Structure and Organs of the COMESA 
The organs of the Common Market include: the Authority532; the Council533; the Court of Justice534; 
the Committee of Governors of Central Banks of Member States; the Intergovernmental Committee535; 
the technical Committees536; the Secretariat537; and the Consultative Committee.538   
3.4.3.2 The COMESA Court of Justice 
The COMESA Court of Justice (CCJ) is established by Article 7 of the COMESA Treaty.539 Article 19 
provides that the Court’s mandate is to ensure adherence to law in the interpretation and application of 
the Treaty. The Court has a first instance and appellate division.540 In addition, the Court has twelve 
Judges appointed by the Authority from persons proposed by member states in accordance with Article 
20 of the Treaty. The general jurisdiction of the Court is defined, in Article 23 of the Treaty, as “to 
                                                          
529 COMESA <https://www.comesa.int/company-overview-2/.> accessed on 28th June 2018. 
530 ibid. 
531 ibid. 
532 Consisting of Heads of State or Government of the Member States. Article 8. 
533 Ministers designated by Member States. Article 9. 
534 Article 19. 
535 Consisting of permanent and Principle secretaries designated by Member State. Article 14. 
536 On various thematic areas such as Budget, Agriculture, Energy and Finance Article 15. 
537 Led by a Secretary-General. Article 17. 
538 Made up of members of the business community and other interest groups. Article 18. 
539 For a summary of the institutional organisation and jurisdiction of the COMESA Court of Justice, see K Mwendwa, 
“Court of Justice of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)” (2009) 6 Miskolc Journal of 
International Law 60 -83, at 60-64. 
540 ibid. 
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adjudicate all matters which may be referred to it pursuant to this Treaty”. This definition of the Court’s 
remit is not helpful and seems vague, unless read in light of Article 19 of the Treaty. 
 
  The Court may admit claims from member states, the Secretary-General, and legal and natural 
persons.541Furthermore, the court also has jurisdiction to hear and determine treaty and special 
agreements arbitration to which the Common Market, its institutions, or member States, are parties and 
refer the same to the Court. 542 However, the Court’s jurisdiction is not exclusive, meaning that national 
courts are not excluded from hearing and determining disputes for the reason only that the Common 
Market is a party.543 Therefore, decisions of the Court on interpretation of provisions of the Treaty have 
precedence over decisions of national courts.544 
 
  Article 26 of the COMESA Treaty gives access to juridical and natural persons to the CCJ. This 
is however limited to residents of the member states and limited to matters regarding the determination 
of the legality of an act, regulation, directive, or decision of the Council or of a Member State. Direct 
access to the court is available but only to the extent that an applicant invites the Court to either 
interpret, apply or find an infringement of the Treaty by a State Party or the Common Market Organs.545   
 
  In its decision in the case of Malawi Mobile Ltd v Government of Malawi and the Malawi 
Communications Regulatory Authority546; the CCJ clarified its basic jurisdictional remit. Firstly, that 
the Court cannot be considered as a general supranational court with an obligation to control the legality 
                                                          
541Article 25 and 26. 
542Article 29. 
543Article 28(1). 
544Article 28(2). 
545Article 26. 
546Appeal number 1 of 2016 <https://www.comesacourt.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Government-of-Republic-
of-Malawi-Vs-Malawi-Mobile-Limited-Judgment-Appeal-no-1-of-2016-Part-1.pdf> For an overview of the import 
of the case on access to the court by individuals, see, generally, D van Wyk, “An Important COMESA Court 
Qualifier for Natural and Legal Persons approaching the Court” (2019) Available at 
>https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/14153-an-important-comesa-court-qualifier-for-natural-and-legal-persons-
approaching-the-court.html.>  Accessed on 23rd September 2019. 
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of every national legal act unrelated to the Treaty.547 Secondly, the Court emphasised that its authority 
to grant access to juridical and natural persons stems from Article 26 of the COMESA Treaty and that 
the said provision limited such access to matters relating to the Treaty.548 The Court, therefore, found 
that its decisions only overrode those of national courts on matters of interpretation and application of 
the Treaty and no further.549 This means that the CCJ has supremacy over member national courts only 
in the interpretation and application of the treaty. Judgements of the CCJ are “final and conclusive” 
and member states are required to take measures “without delay” to implement the judgements.550 
 
  In order to exercise its jurisdiction over matters submitted to it by individuals residing in the 
COMESA member states, such individuals must first exhaust local remedies in the national courts or 
tribunals of the member state.551 The CCJ can also entertain requests for preliminary rulings on the 
validity of the regulations, directives, and decisions of the Common Market from national courts of 
member states and issue advisory opinions regarding questions of law arising from provisions of the 
COMESA Treaty.552 
 
  The COMESA Treaty has created a hybrid mechanism for dispute resolution. It has created a 
supranational judicial organ capable of resolving all trade and investment disputes involving the 
Common Market, while at the same time permitting the resolution of disputes arising under the 
                                                          
547ibid, 11. 
548ibid, 13.  
549 See also, the Court’s decision in Polytol Paints & Adhesives Manufacturer Co. Ltd v The Republic of Mauritius, 
Case No.1 of 2012 COMESA CJ (31st August 2013)  <https://comesacourt.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/Judgment-Polytol-Paints-Adhesives-Manufacturer-Co.ltd-Vs-the-Republic-of-Mauritius-
%E2%80%93-Reference-No.-1-of-2012-Part-1.pdf .>  accessed 20th September 2018. 
550 Articles 31 and 32 of the CCJA. 
551 Article 26 of the COMESA Treaty. See also, P Muchlinski, P (2010) “The COMESA Common Investment Area: 
Substantive Standards and Procedural Problems in Dispute Settlement” SOAS School of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series” (2010) Research Paper No. 11/2010 <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/alternative-
visions-of-the-international-law-on-foreign-investment/comesa-common-investment-area-substantive-standards-
and-procedural-problems-in-dispute-settlement/3B5B73701E5033C58DF2629BBCE2FA56.>  accessed on 15th 
November 21, 2018. 
552 Articles 30 and 32 of the COMESA Treaty. 
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COMESA Investment Agreement through ad hoc investor-state arbitration.553 The ad hoc investor-
state dispute resolution mechanism in the COMESA Investment Agreement is modelled, in substantial 
part, on the analogous mechanism in the 2004 U.S Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2004 U.S. 
Model BIT).554 The approach incorporates many of the innovative procedural aspects of the 2004 
Model U.S BIT, including its mechanism for expeditious consideration of preliminary objections and 
rules admission of amicus curiae submissions.555 
3.4.4 The Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) Agreement  
The Agreement establishing the TFTA agreement was concluded on 10th June 2015.556 The 
agreement followed years of engagement between Member States negotiating the TFTA 
agreement. A tripartite summit of Heads of State and Government representing the three merging 
RECs held on 22 October 2008 agreed, inter alia, to establish a single Customs Union, beginning 
with a Free Trade Area.557 A tripartite memorandum of understanding was signed on 19th January 
2011.558 This was soon to be followed by the declaration launching the negotiations for the 
establishment of the Tripartite Free Trade Area in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 12th June 
2011.559 
 
In fairly similar terms to the Constitutive Act of the AU, the TFTA Agreement 
acknowledges the place and role of RECs as building blocks for trade liberalisation in Africa.560 
Like the AEC Treaty, the Agreement also expressly recognises the successes and best practices of 
                                                          
553 C Goretti, The Rules, Practice and Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers Boston 2011) 497. 
554 ibid. The 2004 US Model BIT has since been replaced by a 2012 version.  
555 Annex A, Articles 7 and 8 of the COMESA Investment Agreement <https://www.iisd.org/toolkits/sustainability-
toolkit-for-trade-negotiators/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/rei120.06tt1.pdf> accessed on 15th November 2018. 
556 Preamble to TFTA Treaty. A full text of the agreement and the declarations are available at 
<https://www.tralac.org/resources/by-region/comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite-fta.html.>  
557 ibid. 
558 ibid. 
559 ibid. 
560 ibid, 3. 
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RECs as important lessons from which it can draw on its march towards trade liberalisation under 
the TFTA Agreement framework.561 
 
The objectives of the TFTA can be gleaned from the founding Agreement. They 
fundamentally include, among others, a commitment to resolving the challenge of overlapping 
membership of the tripartite member/partner states to several RECs, job creation and income 
generation for the people of the member states, progressive liberalisation of trade in goods and 
service, deepening integration among member states and by progressively achieving elimination 
of import duties and other barriers to trade within the bloc.562   
 
The TFTA Agreement proceeds from the principle that member states shall accord each 
other the Most Favoured Nation Treatment. However, it qualifies the same by providing that 
nothing in the Agreement shall prevent a member state from maintaining or entering into new 
preferential trade agreements with third countries, provided that any advantages, concessions, 
privileges or favours granted to a third country under such agreements are offered to the other 
members of the TFTA on a preferential basis.563 Preferential agreements between member states 
of the TFTA are also not prohibited. However,  other members of the TFTA, not parties to such 
preferential agreement,  shall on a reciprocal basis, be accorded benefit of privileges under such 
an Agreement despite not being party thereto.564 
 
In furtherance of its harmonisation of import duties and in a bid to eliminate trade barriers, 
the TFTA members also agreed to design and standardise their trade and customs documentation 
and information in accordance with internationally accepted standards and to initiate trade 
facilitation programmes.565 
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562ibid. 
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3.4.4.1 Structure and Organs of the TFTA 
The organs for the implementation of the TFTA Agreement include the tripartite summit of Heads 
of State and/or Government, which sits at the pinnacle of its organisational superstructure.  Below 
this are the Council of Ministers, Sectorial Ministerial Committees, and a Task Force of the 
secretariats of the RECs, which gives policy guidance to the TFTA.  A Tripartite Committee of 
Experts enjoined to be responsible for overseeing and to guide its technical work, is also 
established.566   
 
The Tripartite Agreement retains the structures of the merging RECs and hopes to build 
upon their successes, experiences and structures before progressively incorporating them into its 
own systems. The seamless transition, therefore, heavily borrows and relies, at least at the technical 
implementation level, on the COMESA, EAC and SADC structures. 
3.4.4.2 The TFTA Dispute Settlement Body 
A Dispute Settlement Body is also created to administer the rules and procedures as well as settle 
disputes under the Agreement.567 The DSB shall operate through panels and appellate bodies. The 
Body shall go further to maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations 
of panels and its appellate bodies. Moreover, the DSB’s jurisdiction can only be invoked as a 
residual mechanism in the event of failure of good faith consultations and negotiations entered into 
with a view to amicably settling a dispute.568 
 
Neither the principles of direct effect nor supremacy of both the TFTA laws nor decisions 
of its Dispute Resolution Body, over national laws and judicial organs, have been provided for in 
the TFTA Agreement. In fact, the TFTA is largely an intergovernmental/inter- REC body with all 
its attributes, including access to its dispute resolution body, being available only to member states 
or the merging RECs.569 
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Significantly, the TFTA Agreement is categorical that in the event of inconsistency or 
conflict, between the Agreement, the treaties and the instruments of COMESA, EAC and SADC, 
with respect to dispute resolution, the TFTA agreement shall prevail to the extent of the 
inconsistency or conflict.570 However, the TFTA Agreement does not take a similar position with 
respect to inconsistencies or conflicts between it and the AU Constitutive Act or the AfCFTA 
established by the AEC Treaty dispute settlement organs. 
3.4.5 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
Thompson observes that the mid-nineteenth century nationalist struggle in West Africa intertwined 
with the emergence of pan-Africanist integration largely led to the birth of the ECOWAS.571 
Regional cooperation saw the creation of federal arrangements or establishment of common 
institutions such as a Court of Appeal and University in the sub-region.572 However, it was not 
until 1972 that the efforts to transform the sub-region into an institutional organisation eventually 
came to materialise. This was first through a bilateral agreement between neighbouring Togo and 
Nigeria. ECOWAS was formed in 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria by 15 founding state parties. Article 2 
of the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty provided for its objectives, which were largely economic, to include: 
the elimination of duties, the free movement of persons, capital, services, as well as the 
harmonisation of agricultural and industrial policies. 
 
Realising that a new political and economic world order had set upon them, the Member 
States of ECOWAS established, in May 1990, a Committee of Eminent Persons to review the 1975 
Treaty.573 A key recommendation of the Committee was to place more emphasis on 
supranationalism in the ECOWAS integration effort with stronger organs vested with more 
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power.574 The committee’s recommendations formed the basis of the revised 1993 ECOWAS 
Treaty.575 
3.4.5.1 The ECOWAS Court of Justice 
The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice is established under Articles 6 and 15 of the ECOWAS 
Treaty as the sole judicial organ of the Community. The 1991 Protocol on the Community Court 
defines the jurisdiction and composition of the Court. It also operationalises Article 6 and 15 of 
the Treaty.576 The role of the Court is to essentially ensure the observance of law and justice in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaty, Protocols and Conventions annexed 
thereto.577Additionally, it is also the responsibility of the court to be seised of the responsibility of 
settling such disputes, as may be referred to it in accordance with the provisions of Article 56 of 
the Treaty; as well as any disputes between states and the institutions of the community.578 
3.4.5.2 Jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court of Justice 
At its inception, the jurisdiction of the court was set out in Article 9 of the 1991 Protocol of the 
Court. The Court did not have a human rights mandate and only the member states and its organs 
had direct access to it. Consequently, private individuals or corporations did not have any direct 
access to it. The adoption of the supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 expanded the jurisdiction 
of the Court while at the same time conferred individuals with direct access to the court. Articles 
9 and 10 now vest the court with powers to determine cases on violations of human rights that 
occur in any member state and is open to applications by individuals in that respect.  
 
Neither the ECOWAS Protocol nor the ECOWAS Treaty provide for the supremacy of the 
Treaty or the decisions of the ECOWAS court over national laws or courts of Member States. 
However, the direct access of individuals to the Court, on the questions of human rights without 
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requiring one to first exhaust local remedies, demonstrates at least one quality of supranationalism, 
albeit to a limited scope. The ECOWAS Court has consistently held that exhaustion of local 
remedies is not a precondition for an individual accessing the court.579 The Court put it most 
succinctly in its decision in the case of Hadijatou Mani Karaou v the Republic of Niger.580 The 
Court held that  
 
[t]he absence of the requirement for preliminary exhaustion of local remedies in Article 
10 is not a lacuna which must be filled with the practice of the Court since the Court 
cannot impose on individuals more onerous conditions and formalities than those 
provided for by the texts without infringing on the rights of such individuals.581 
3.4.6 The Organisation for Harmonisation in Africa of Business Laws (OHADA) 
OHADA is the French-language acronym for the Organisation for Harmonisation in Africa of 
Business Laws. Though its name refers to harmonisation; the organisation goes further than 
harmonisation to also make uniform laws.582 The organisation has seventeen member states.583 
OHADA was launched in 1993 when member states signed the OHADA Treaty. The Treaty has 
been amended only once, in 2008. 
3.4.6.1 Structure and Organs of OHADA  
The most powerful aspect of OHADA is its Uniform Acts. Once adopted by OHADA legislature, 
the Council of Ministers automatically become part of each member state’s internal municipal law 
after ninety days.584 The OHADA Treaty also provides that the Uniform Acts shall have direct 
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effect, thereby allowing any party to rely upon its provisions 30 days after their publication in the 
OHADA official journal.585 
 
The two central principles of supranationalism, direct effect and supremacy, are found in 
the OHADA regulation of business laws anchored in the Uniform Acts. The Act establishes the 
common laws in the areas of: company law, general commercial law, securities, enforcement 
measures, insolvency, arbitration, accounting law and transportation. The direct effect of these 
laws therefore exhibit OHADA’s supranational inclination. National parliaments play no role in 
the approval of the Uniform Acts and cannot modify the text post their adoption.586 Therefore, the 
Uniform Acts must be business laws.587 The Uniform Acts are designed to attract foreign direct 
investments.588 A 2008 amendment added the conference of Heads of State and Government to 
OHADA organs.589 The OHADA Permanent Secretariat is another important organ. It is headed 
by the Permanent Secretary, appointed by the Council of Ministers.590 
3.4.6.2 The OHADA Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) 
The CCJA is a supranational apex court of the OHADA.591 The CCJA has three principal roles. 
The first is to review the draft uniform Acts, verify the same before it is adopted by Council of 
Ministers.592 The second role is to supervise arbitration effected by the arbitration centre sheltered 
under the CCJA’s wing.593  The third and most significant, is ensuring that the OHADA statutes’ 
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uniform texts are interpreted in a uniform manner.594 The OHADA CCJA also hears appeals from 
penultimate national courts and the CCJA’s decisions, on such appeals, are final. 595  Additionally, 
National Courts of members states are required to interpret and apply the Uniform Acts.596 The 
CCJA, therefore, has an overarching supremacy over national courts. Moreover, The CCJA’s 
decisions have a direct effect and are superior to national courts, although national courts play a 
complementary or subsidiary role to the CCJA. 
 
It is important to note that OHADA is not, per se, an effort at integration, but is rather a 
region with common business laws. It, however, presents a useful experiment on a common 
regional transnational supranational dispute resolution system. It is also a distinctively crafted 
African tool, fashioned by Africans, for Africa. It is, therefore, the closest one can find of a process 
of harmonisation of commercial laws that has operated fairly successfully in Africa’s unique socio-
economic, cultural and political contexts. Studies on the OHADA dispute resolution model have 
largely been around the workings and efficacy of the common court and arbitration under the 
OHADA Agreement on enabling laws.597 Since the continental integration envisaged under the 
AEC treaty is to end in harmonisation of laws, the OHADA approach becomes a useful reference 
point.598 Although the system has been effective in settling commercial and investment disputes, 
it may not necessarily be effectively adopted for trade disputes. Inter-state disputes are largely 
trade related and the system best system suited for the settlement of such disputes is in   RECs and 
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their judicial organs. Fagbayibo observes that differences in language, legal traditions, and 
democratic deficit in Africa militate against seeing the largely francophone OHADA as a model 
for Africa’s continental economic integration.599 Instead, he advocates for an approach that views 
RECs as the focal point for building continental integration.600 
3.4.7 The Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) 
CEMAC is an organisation established in 1961 meant to promote monetary cooperation amongst 
francophone central African states. It is the successor of the Customs Union of Central Africa 
(UDEAC).601 Its aim is to create a common market, to harmonise laws and to sectorial policies, as 
well as to promote the convergence of macro-economic policies of member states. CEMAC is 
made up of the following institutions: the Council of Ministers, the Community President, the 
community parliament, the Court of Justice, and the bank of the Central African States (BEAC). 
 
The BEAC is modelled to be a supranational institution responsible for issuing the common 
currency, the CFA Franc, and also controls the monetary policy of the integration Unit. CEMAC 
has in place harmonised financial and legal regulatory mechanisms for businesses.602 
 
The supremacy of community law over national laws, as a feature of supranationalism, is 
underlined both in the Treaty establishing CEMAC and national Constitutions of member states.603 
The observance of CEMAC laws is guaranteed by the possibility of sanctions.604 The principle of 
primacy of community law and its overriding effect over national laws of member states, is 
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underscored by an understanding that community law shall prevail in the event of contradiction or 
incompatibility between the two sets of laws.605 
 
The principle of direct effect or direct applicability manifests itself in CEMAC on at least 
at two levels.606 Firstly, the principle holds that community laws are passed into member nations’ 
legal order without the need for any national measures of transposition or reception.607 Secondly, 
the CEMAC Court of Justice has the powers to render decisions that are compulsive to member 
states. Article 5, of the Convention regulating the Court, states that the rulings of the Court has the 
authority of decided cases and executory force.608 
3.5 Summary 
This Chapter has discussed the various efforts at establishing supranational regional courts at both 
continental and sub-regional levels in Africa. The structural and institutional features and jurisdiction 
of the courts have also been highlighted. Several similarities and differences were noted.  
 
 Firstly, while most of the courts were created under RECs, some have since expanded their 
jurisdiction to include human rights and international crimes.609 Scholars’ opinions are split on whether 
this is good for the regional courts. Some view the metamorphosis from a pure economic integration 
to include human rights as being antithetical to the economic integration objective for which the RECs 
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and courts were set up in the first place.610 This school of thought advances that it is the introduction 
of human rights, political disputes, international criminal law into the realm of what was originally 
intended to be purely trade and investment courts that has led to the resistance of the courts by member 
states to the RECs.611 The opposite school of thought asserts that democracy and human rights are 
imperative for any integration effort including economic integration.612 This ideological school, 
therefore, argues that the expansion of the courts’ mandate to include human rights and international 
crimes jurisdictions is a welcome move towards ensuring that human rights standards and democracy 
are inculcated in the integration organisation’s members.613 
 
 Secondly, the foregoing discussion has established the following features as being critical for an 
efficacious continental dispute resolution system for the African continent and include: direct effect of 
the courts’ decisions, access by individuals (both natural and juristic), supremacy of the courts’ 
decisions on questions of regional law, and consistency in the application of the law. This thesis aims 
at fashioning an appropriate continental trade and investment dispute settlement system under the 
ACJ&HR. The afore-listed features are imperative for an effective continental trade and investment 
dispute settlement system. These features form the substratum of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ROLE OF THE AU SINGLE COURT IN RESOLVING TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES: JURISDICTIONAL, STRUCTURAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVES 
4.1 Introduction  
Dispute settlement has been described as the “backbone of the multilateral trading system.” 614 The 
importance of an efficient, effective and accessible dispute resolution mechanism cannot be over-
emphasised. Disputes in economic integration efforts primarily take the two forms of trade and 
investment disputes. Most RECs in Africa including the AEC seem to only anticipate and, 
therefore, legislate for trade disputes.  Even in so doing, trade remedies and dispute resolution 
seem to mainly be availed to state parties to the integration process. 
The history of African countries in international trade litigation has been aptly described 
as generally being unsatisfactory.615 This is primarily because African countries have been unable 
to implement compatible multilateral trade remedies, at the WTO level.616 At the continental level, 
the preferred dispute settlement systems seem to be inclined towards resolving inter-member state 
disputes with little, if any, regard to investor related dispute resolution. 
Three explanations have been offered for this state of affairs. Firstly, is that African states 
are not active users of international trade dispute settlement systems. Most believe that to provide 
for a stringent trade and investment dispute resolution regime is to disrespect the integration effort 
by suggesting that disputes may arise.617 Secondly, that African states lack the technical capacity 
and resources to engage at the multilateral trade dispute settlement stage and would, therefore, 
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rather recuse themselves from engaging therein.618 Thirdly, it is suggested that African countries 
prefer informal or diplomatic settlement of trade disputes.619  
Effective dispute resolution is important for both local and foreign investors. It guarantees 
legal certainty and predictability in markets and provides remedies when rights are violated.620 
Effective dispute resolution and implementation are, therefore, critical in the economic integration 
process. Saurombe highlights the importance of dispute resolution in Africa, with regard to 
integration efforts, by stating that the private sector in the region is unlikely to adjust their long-
term strategic investment planning, unless international agreements are backed by strong, rule-
based and objective third party adjudicative systems.621 Inter-state dispute resolution is important 
to partner states in a REC; just as much as the resolution of disputes resulting from private 
commercial and state–investor commercial transactions.622 Hertzberg strongly advocates for a rule 
–based regime that provides for certainty, predictability and transparency, for regional trade and 
investment to thrive.623 
Most trade transactions involve private parties who comprise traders in goods, service, and 
who are also owners of investment capital.  Intra-Africa trade can only thrive in an environment 
where legal remedies are availed to both the state and investors alike. The consequence of the state 
of affairs in Africa is that the absence of an all-encompassing and efficient dispute settlement 
system is costly to states and investors alike.624 The benefits of predictability and finality of dispute 
resolution are brought about by the removal of uncertainties, on the law applicable, the scope of 
rights, as well as the obligations of parties in international trade.625 Another advantage of an 
effective trade and investment regime is that African trade practice will develop the much needed 
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jurisprudence for guiding trade policy and private commercial practice.626 In negotiating economic 
integration, it has been observed, that African states tend to take dispute resolution as an 
afterthought.627This has led to the discord between regional and national systems in terms of trade 
and investment dispute resolution.628 
 
This chapter consists of four substantive parts. The first part addresses the jurisdiction of 
the ACJ&HR with respect to its competence to resolve trade and investment disputes. The second 
part addresses the structural bottlenecks that impede the Court’s ability to effectively discharge its 
mandate with respect to trade and investment disputes. The third part addresses the institutional 
capacity and challenges the Court faces or may potentially face in its quest to execute this mandate. 
The chapter concludes with a summary of the discussion undertaken in the chapter. 
4.2 The Trade and Investment Jurisdiction of the ACJ&HR  
The first section of this part lays out a conceptual background to jurisdiction by offering a 
definition of the term and its essential elements. The second section offers an analysis of the trade 
and investment jurisdiction of ACJ&HR against the various forms and elements of jurisdiction 
identified and highlighted in the earlier section. 
4.2.1 Jurisdiction of International Tribunals:  An overview  
Jurisdiction is a term that defies a universal definition.  However, the term, as used in this 
discourse, encompasses elements common to its varied definitions and uses. Jurisdiction, with 
respect to adjudicative authority, has been defined as a court’s power to decide a case or issue a 
decree.629 
The notion of jurisdiction in international law is founded upon classical principles as 
applied in national law. Two forms of jurisdiction are exercised by states in public international 
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law and consists of prescriptive/legislative jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction.630 
Prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction is described as the competence of states to create laws, 
recognised as valid in international law.631 Enforcement jurisdiction, on the other hand, relates to 
a state’s authority to act coercively so as to enforce its law.632 
Broadly, the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals falls into two categories: civil and criminal. 
The concept of jurisdiction has traditionally been founded on three bases: territoriality, nationality 
and the principle of effect.633 Of these three, territoriality is by far the most central. Territoriality 
denotes the exercise of a state’ sovereign authority within its territorial limits (land, see and air).634 
The effects theory foregrounds the ability of a state to exercise jurisdiction beyond its territory, 
where an infraction or action impinges on or affects a sovereign’s laws or interests.635 The 
nationality principle allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over their nationals for acts done within 
or outside the state’s territory. The principle stems from the recognition that sovereign states may 
legitimately impose obligations on their subjects, wherever they may be.636 
The jurisdiction exercised by judicial organs is referred to as adjudicative or adjudicatory 
jurisdiction.637 This jurisdiction is the concern of this part of this chapter. 
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The adjudicative jurisdiction of courts or tribunals refers to its competence to hear and 
adjudicate legal questions or issues.638 Jurisdiction demarcates the powers of a court to determine 
a case in terms of an instrument either creating the court or defining its jurisdiction.639Jurisdiction 
of courts, competence, mandate or remit are terms often used interchangeably to refer to the same 
concept.  
The finality and binding effect of a court or tribunal’s decision is a critical aspect of its 
jurisdiction.640 Generally, courts and tribunals are restricted to act within their jurisdiction, and 
acts or decisions of judicial bodies that exceed their jurisdiction are considered ultra vires, and, 
therefore, null and void.641 
The founding or constituting instrument of an international organisation is the primary 
source of its authority, mandate and powers.642 Often times, the mandate of such organs, including 
judicial organs, are couched in wide terms or in ambiguous wording.643It is in such circumstances 
that tribunals, in their interpretive role, proceed to apply a flexible approach to the reading of the 
founding instrument.  A strict and rigid interpretation or reading of an international judicial organ’s 
jurisdiction denotes an approval of the express powers approach, while a permissive liberal reading 
is regarded as approving of the implied powers approach. A brief illustration of these two concepts, 
                                                          
638AB Spenser, “Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A premised Analysis” (2006) 73 University of Chicago law Review 617-
672, 617. 
639B Chelf, General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2006) 132. 
640S Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-1996. Vol II (Martinis Nijhoff publishers The 
Hague 1997) 259. 
641WM Riesman, “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law” (1990) 84 America Journal of 
International Law 866-876, 128. 
642I Brownlie, (n) 635, 651. See also, L Bartels, “Jurisdiction and Applicable Law Clauses:  Where does a Tribunal 
find the Principal Norms applicable to the Case before it?”  in I Bander and Y Shany (eds), Multisourced Equivalent 
Norms in International Law (Hart publishing Oxford 2011) 115-141, at 115. 
643C Warbrick, “The Jurisdiction of the Security Council: Original Intention and New World Order(s)” in P Capps, 
and E Malcom (eds) Asserting Jurisdiction-International and European Legal Perspectives (Hart-publishing oxford 
and Portland 2003) 127-143, at 129. 
123 
 
as they apply to international tribunals in general, and the ACJ&HR in particularly, will now 
follow. 
4.2.1.1 Express Powers of the ACJ&HR  
International tribunals, ordinarily, draw their powers from their founding instruments adopted by 
member states.  In the case of the ACJ&HR, the ACJ&HR Protocol, the Court’s Statute and Rules 
of Procedure are the fundamental sources of the Court’s jurisdiction. These instruments expressly 
provide for the jurisdiction of the Court. Article 28 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR delimits the 
extent of the Court’s jurisdiction.  Article 28 of the Court’s statute is, therefore, an express 
provision of the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Commentators who are inclined towards a strict reading and application of the powers of 
an international tribunal, in determining its jurisdiction state how international tribunals should not 
seek to expand or engage in creatively enlarging their jurisdiction beyond what has been stipulated 
in their founding treaties or protocols. This is the express powers approach. For example, Nkatha 
asserts that any attempt by an international judicial organisation to impose new obligations on its 
member states would be an act falling beyond the powers originally given to the institution to 
interpret the treaty.644 Essentially, this thinking is to the effect that judicial bodies should not 
purport to legislate through their decisions but should apply the law/treaties as they are, without 
expanding them. This approach seems to bode well with the constitutional principle of separation 
of powers where legislative organs legislate or make laws, while judicial organs interpret the law 
and apply it. 
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The Statute of the ACJ&HR seems to have elaborately provided for the human rights and 
international criminal law aspects of the Court’s jurisdiction.645 However, the Statute deals with 
the powers of the General Chamber of the Court, where trade and investment matters would 
naturally fall, in a rather broad and permissive manner.646 If Nkatha’ s view was to hold, it would 
mean that the ACJ&HR’s jurisdiction to entertain, hear and determine matters related to 
investment and trade under the AEC Treaty would be an act falling beyond the powers originally 
given to  the court by its founding statute. 
Nkatha is not alone in her views. Murungi and Gallinetti assert that the notion of express 
powers requires that a tribunal performs its duties within the scope of its authority as expressly set 
out in the constitutive document.647 The alternative, they advance, would have a negative impact 
on the tribunal’s decisions, if its rulings are regarded as going beyond the power of the tribunal. 
Challenges to the legitimacy of the decision may follow, including providing an incentive for non-
observance of the decision.648 According to Murungi and Gallinetti, the incentive to observe 
decisions made by international tribunals has a direct correlation with the tribunal’s strict 
observance of its jurisdictional limits. A tribunal that exceeds the strict confines of its jurisdiction 
invites aggrieved parties to disregard or disobey its orders. 
However, a number of questions arise. What happens in the event of lack of clarity on the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction? Or, where there is a lacuna or lack of specificity in the founding instrument, 
with respect to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal? Is the tribunal helpless in the face of 
such difficulty?  In a practical sense: what should one see as being the extent of the jurisdiction of 
ACJ&HR with respect to trade and investment disputes? Should there be room for the Court to 
                                                          
645Article 28 of the Statute and 28A –N of the Amendment Statute elaborately sets out the jurisdiction of the Human 
Rights and International Criminal Law Sections of the Court without a similarly detailed expansion of the jurisdiction 
for the General section of the Court.  
646 Articles 16, 17 and 28 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR creates the General Section of the Court whose jurisdiction 
is to hear all cases submitted under Article 28 of the Statute save those concerning Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
647LN Murungi and T Gallinetti, “The Role of Sub Regional Courts in African Human Rights System” (2010) 
Human Rights Law Journal 119-143, at 132. 
648ibid. 
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interpret the Statute of the Court in a permissive and liberal manner so as to read into it its 
jurisdiction in settling trade and investments disputes, pursuant to the implied powers approach? 
4.2.1.2 Implied Powers of ACJ&HR  
Often times, there are controversies and disputes as to the actual competencies of international 
tribunals.649 This problem is not unique to African international organisations. The International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), in its decision in the case of Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service 
of the United Nations,650 adopted a flexible, liberal and permissive approach to the interpretation 
of the competency of international organisations.651 In the case, the UN General Assembly 
requested an advisory opinion from the ICJ on, inter alia, whether the UN had the capacity to bring 
an international claim against the responsible government for reparations on behalf of people who 
had died while in the service of the UN.  The ICJ observed that the Charter of the UN “does not 
expressly confer upon the organisation the capacity to include, in its claim for reparations, damages 
caused to the victim or to persons entitled through him”.652 The Court then proceeded to hold that 
in terms of international law, an organisation must be construed as having, by implication, been 
given powers necessary to discharge its duties.653 
The implied powers approach has been accepted at international law in three other 
landmark decisions of the ICJ.654 
                                                          
649 C Warbrick, (n) 643, at 237. Lauterpatch (1997) has offered a preposition that, “National Sovereignty ends 
where…international obligations begin”. See H Lauterpatch, “Sovereignty-Myth or Reality” (1997) International 
Affairs 149. 
650Advisory opinion, 1949 ICJ report 174 (hereinafter Reparation Case) 
651C Warbrick, (n) 643, 237.  
652 Reparations case, Advisory opinion, 1949 ICJ Report at 182. 
653ibid. 
654 See also, the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict 1996 
ICJ Reports 226; Advisory opinion on Competency of the International Labour Organisation to Regulate Incidentally, 
the Work of the Employer. ICJ services B-No 13 23rd July 1926; and the Certain Expenses of the UN (Article 17, 
paragraph 2 of the Charter) 1962 ICJ Report 159.  In all these cases, the intention rather than the letter of the founding 
instrument was given effect as according the organs the powers essential to the performance of their duties. 
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The implied powers approach has also been accepted and used by REC tribunals in Africa.  
For instance, the EACJ, in its decision in the case of Sitenda v Secretary General of the EAC and 
Another655 stated that despite not having express appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by 
national supreme courts, entertained and determined an application filed as an appeal from the 
Supreme Court of Uganda.  The Court justified this by stating that the matter dealt with questions 
relating to breach of the EAC Treaty. In three other cases, the EACJ held that it would amount to 
abdicating its duty of interpreting and applying the EAC Treaty if it failed to recognise an 
individual’s right to raise human rights questions before it. An expanded interpretation of Article 
6 and 7 of the EAC Treaty were found to confer implied jurisdiction on the Court to deal with 
questions of human rights as between individuals and state members.656 The SADC tribunal, in the 
Mike Campbell case, interpreted the SADC treaty in a liberal manner so as to give effect to the 
right of individuals to access the Court as a matter of right and for the Court to entertain claims of 
breaches, by a member state, of human rights obligations enshrined in the SADC Treaty.657  
                                                          
655EACJ (2011b) <http://eacj.eac.int/?cases=hon-sitenda-sebalu-vs-the-secretary-general-of-the-east-african-
community-3> accessed on 2nd October 2018.  The EACJ in East African Civil Society Organisation Forum v The 
Attorney General of the Republic of Burundi and 2 Others (2017) KLR, declined to take up implied jurisdiction 
choosing to state that its power and in interrogating matters related to the EAC Treaty and not to sit on appeal from 
member national courts or reopen matters determined by member national courts. 
656 In Katabazi & 21 others v Secretary General of the EAC (2007) EACJ  at p. 3; Praxeda Rugumba v Secretary 
General of the EAC and Attorney General of Rwanda (2011C) and Independent Medico Legal Unit v Attorney General 
Kenya 2011a); while acknowledging that Article 27 of the EACJ treaty divests the human rights jurisdiction from it, 
the EACJ nonetheless underscored its role under Article 7 of the Treaty, to interpret the EAC Treaty, as being 
expansive enough to enable it deal with breaches of the Treaty, including those of a human rights nature. These cases 
are also available at <http://eacj.eac.int/?page_id=2414> accessed on 2nd October 2018. Gathii observes that “in 
assuming jurisdiction over human rights cases, the EACJ has effectively arrogated to itself the power to establish the 
validity of the conduct of member states in this newly constitutionalized regional human rights regime. It has exercised 
jurisdiction over human rights notwithstanding the Council of Ministers’ failure to formally extend such jurisdiction 
… As such, its human rights case law goes far beyond the scope that the Treaty explicitly contemplated.” See, J Gathii, 
(n)83, 253.  
657Mike Campbell Pty Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/2007) 2008) SADCT 2 (28 November 2008). 
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Hay put it most aptly, that the supranationalism of an international organisation does not 
necessarily depend on express stipulations, but rather flows from powers and functions actually 
accorded to an organisation.658 
The Statute of the ACJ&HR is inadequately worded with respect to its General Section’s 
competence to entertain claims by individuals in trade and investment disputes, and the remedies 
it may avail such parties. The implied powers approach would, therefore, be useful to ensuring the 
Court’s ability to discharge its functions. As the ICJ put it in the Reparations case, the founding 
instrument of the Court should be interpreted in a manner that enables the organisation fulfil its 
mandate.  
Klabbers advances that the tensions between express and implied powers will persist, but 
the latter is more attractive because it is more concerned with the protection of community interests 
while the former appears to cling on to the old notion of state sovereignty.659 Brownlie is of the 
considered opinion that the doctrine of implied powers may be used to interpret an organisation’s 
founding instrument.660 This will see the ends of justice being met, particularly where Statute is 
either vaguely or generally crafted. 
4.2.2 Towards a Supranational ACJ&HR: The Trilogy of Supremacy, Direct Effect 
and the Preliminary Ruling Procedure  
The AEC is envisioned to emulate the supranational status and success of the EU. It has been 
suggested that the underlying intention of the architects, of the Constitutive Act of the AU, was to 
create a supranational entity through conferring supranational powers on its organs and 
institutions.661The AU single Court is modelled as one of the organs which are expected to develop 
AEC law and jurisprudence. It is also expected to have jurisdiction over member states throughout 
the continent. The three elements of supremacy, direct effect and use of the preliminary ruling 
procedure are often used to achieve or assess the supranationalism of an international judicial 
organ. 
                                                          
658P Hay, Federalism and Supranational Organisations (University of Illinois Press Urbana and London 1966) 30. 
659SD Klabbers, Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press UK 1999) 6. 
660I Brownlie, (n) 635, at 651. 
661B Fagbayibo, (n) 114, 496. 
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4.2.2.1 Supremacy 
Supremacy, in this context, refers to the overriding status of community law over the national laws, 
including constitutions, of member states of an integration effort. Similarly, decisions of judicial 
organs of the integration effort override those of national courts, including constitutional and 
supreme courts. 
Fitzmaurice describes supremacy as “one of the great principles of international law, 
informing the whole system and applying to every branch of it.”662 Supremacy of international 
law, generally seeks to subordinate the sovereignty of states to international law.663 A 
manifestation of supremacy of international law is its precedence over domestic law.664 In the 
event of conflict between international law and domestic law, international law will prevail in the 
legal order with domestic law being considered only as a fact from the standpoint of international 
law.665 
The principle of supremacy of international law is at the heart of international rule of law, 
which requires that states exercise their powers in accordance with international law.666 The 
principle, to the effect that international law is supreme over domestic law and the concept of 
                                                          
662G Fitzmaurice, “The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law” 
(1957) 92 (2) Recuiel des cours 85. Schneider states that supremacy reflects a member state’s willingness to relinquish 
sovereignty. A Schneider, “Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution in International Trade Organisations” 
(1999) Michigan Journal of International Law 703. 
663ibid, 6. 
664Scholars have examined the role of three elements of: Supremacy, Direct effect and Standing, and have concluded 
that these elements determine the level of “constitutionalisation” of the organisation and hence the depth of member 
states’ integration. See, for example, JHH Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe” (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 
2403; Ernest-Ulrich Peters-Mann (1996-7) “Constitutionalism and International Organisations” (1996-96) 
NW.J.INT’L L.&BUS 398; TC O’Neal, (1996-7) “Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst for Economic Integration and an 
Agent for Deepening Integration: NAFTA and MERCOSUR” (1996-97) 17 NW.J. INT’L L&BUS 6; D Carreau, Droit 
International (8th ed Podone United States 2004) 43-97. 
665A NollKaemper, “Rethinking the Supremacy of International Law” (2009) 1(36) Amsterdam Centre for 
International Law, University of Amsterdam 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1336946&download> accessed on 21st September 2019 13. 
666I Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers Amsterdam 1998) 213-214. See also, G Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International 
Court of Justice, Vol. II (Grotius Publications, Cambridge 1986) 586. 
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international rule of law, have a common premise; that there cannot be any rule of law without the 
presence of some principles being deemed of precedence over others of lesser importance.667 The 
objective is to therefore ensure uniform application of international law norms, thus maintaining 
equilibrium in the international rule of law sphere. According to NollKaemper, allowing states to 
prioritise fundamental rules of domestic law over international law would undermine the efficacy 
of international law and, hence, the international legal order.668 
Acceptance of international law’s supremacy over domestic law has not been without 
challenges or even outright resistance. Reluctance by states and domestic courts in embracing the 
supremacy of international law at the domestic level is as old as international law itself.669 Few 
states have declared their constitutions to be supreme, and many states determine that in the case 
of conflict between international law and domestic law, the will of the people as expressed in 
domestic parliamentary legislation would always prevail.670 
A few examples will suffice in illustrating this point. In 2003, the constitutional chamber 
of the Supreme Court of Venezuela declared that “above the Supreme Court of Venezuelan Justice, 
and the effects of domestic law, there is no supranational, transnational or international court” and 
the decisions of such (international) organs “will not be executed in Venezuela if they contradict 
the Venezuelan Constitution.”671 The Netherlands, regarded as the foremost monist state which 
grants supremacy of international law even over its constitution, has initiated discussions on the 
need to protect its constitutional values against the effects of international decisions that may fall 
short of the rule of law standards.672 The Supreme Court of Appeal of Malawi has held that a rule 
of international law that is not part of national legislation or constitution is not part of Malawian 
                                                          
667A Watts, “The International Rule of Law” (1993) 36 German Yearbook of International Law 15-45, at 22-23. 
668A NollKaemper, (n) 665, 4. 
669 ibid, 5. 
670A Peters, “The Globalisation of State Constitutions” (2007) in J Nijman and A NollKaemper (eds) New 
Perspectives on the Divide between International and National Law (OUP) 251, at 260. 
671 Judgement 1942 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court dated 17 July 2003, cited in the Annual 
Report of the Inter American Commission on Human Rights, 
<http://www.cidh.org/pdf%20files/VENEZUELA%202009%20ENG.pdf.> accessed on 30th October 2018 [275]. 
672A NollKaemper, (n) 665, 10. 
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law and cannot, therefore, be applied directly.673 The Court further held that the question as to 
whether customary international law forms part of Malawian law will depend on whether it is 
consistent with the country’s constitution or statutes.674 
A persistent challenge to supremacy of international law over domestic law also occurs 
when normative principles evolve beyond the initial concept which had the approval of member 
states.675 This is common when international courts expand their remit by way of implied 
jurisdiction.676 NollKaemper is of the considered conclusion that the acceptance of normative 
ideals of international law and its supremacy over domestic laws is good for both international and 
domestic law since the universal uniformity of principles of the rule of law and observance of 
international norms is guaranteed.677 
4.2.2.2 Direct Effect 
The principle of direct effect means that the laws of the Community, including pronouncements 
of the Community courts and tribunals, are enforceable in all member states’ national Courts, for 
and against states as well as individuals. According to Dehousse, direct effect, by providing 
individuals with an opportunity to challenge the community and national law, altered the dynamics 
of the EU integration process.678 Individual litigants have emerged as guardians of the integrity of 
the community system.679 
The principle of direct effect has its normative underpinnings in the two traditional theories 
of application of international law in the domestic sphere: monism and dualism. There is perhaps 
                                                          
673 Re Adoption of Children Act Chapter 26:01 of the Laws of Malawi and Re Chifundo James (an Infant), MSCA 
Adoption Appeal No. 29 of 2009; ILDC 1345 (MW 2009). 
674 ibid. 
675T Gehring, “Treaty-Making and Treaty Evolution” in Daniel Bodansky and others, The Oxford Handbook of 
International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press Oxford 2007) 466-499. 
676 See the discussion on implied jurisdiction in part 4.2 of this thesis. 
677A NollKaemper, (n) 665, 34. 
678 R Dehousse, The European Court of Justice. The Politics of Juridical Integration (Macmillan Press Ltd London 
1998) [5] 186, 40. 
679ibid. 
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a third, monism-dualism, which is a combination of the two general approaches. A brief 
elaboration of these fundamental theories will shape the discourse to follow. 
4.2.2.2.1 Monism, Dualism and Direct Effect 
The Monist approach in the application of international law essentially entails the direct 
observance of international law as part of the laws of the state without the necessity of 
domesticating the enabling treaty or convention.680 Treaties and conventions, therefore, apply as a 
source of law of the party state upon the signing thereof and ratification. Some states exhibit the 
monist approach either by direct application or by express provision in their constitutions which 
indicate international law as being a source and/or intrinsic part of the state’s law. A case in point 
is the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya.681 
 
Dualism distinguishes, in its elementary sense, national domestic sources of law (such as 
the state’s constitution and statutes) from international law instruments such as treaties and 
conventions. Dualist states provide, usually in their constitutions, that international law 
instruments entered into by the state do not automatically form part of the sources of law of the 
state party. The same only become applicable after domestication through domestic statutes and 
legislative processes. 
 
The dualist approach is informed, partly at least, by the conventional universal 
constitutional principle of separation of powers inherent in the political governance of states to the 
effect that parliaments enact laws while the executive, which binds states to treaties and 
                                                          
680 Monism is built on the ideas of Hans Kelsen. For his views on the relationship between international and national 
law, see H Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (The Law Book Exchange, New Jersey 1945) 363-38. See also, 
D Preshova, “Legal Pluralism: New Paradigm in the Relationship between Legal Orders” (2019) 
<https://www.s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/31611984/Denis_Preshova_Legal_Pluralism_New_para
digm_in_the_relationship_between_legal_orders_final.pdf?response-content-
disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DLegal_Pluralism_New_Paradigm_in_the_Rela.pdf.> accessed on 21st 
September 2019, 3-4. 
681 Article 2(5) and 2(6) of the Constitution of Kenya provides: 
“(5) The general rules of international law shall form part of the law of Kenya 
(b) Any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under this Constitution.”  
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conventions in international law, usually implement the law.682 It is, therefore, based on this 
constitutional principle that many dualist constitutions find it necessary to require the 
domestication of international norms and instruments through domestic parliamentary legislation. 
 
The other reason advanced in favour of the dualist approach is the fact that some 
international treaties and conventions are not self-executing and may rely on municipal laws for 
enforcement.683 It is also suggested that the process of domestication aids in mitigating and/or 
obviating inconsistencies and probable contradictions of international agreements with existing 
national laws.684   
 
The dualist approach is also expressed in Articles 11, 14, 15 and 16 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.685 The aforementioned provisions of the Convention 
underscores that treaties do not automatically become part of the corpus of a state party’s laws 
unless and until the same have been domesticated pursuant to national legislation providing for the 
procedure therefor. 
 
The monist-dualist approach exhibits traits or tendencies of both the monist and dualist 
approach, depending on the international law to be interpreted or applied. Monist-dualists justify 
their hybrid approach to the practicality and peculiarity that attends the observance of international 
                                                          
682 The principle of separation of powers is attributed to the 18th century French philosopher Montesquieu who is 
also referred to as the ‘father of the Constitution’.  
683 These may include international agreements on human rights whose enforcement often require domestic 
interventions. 
684 This is also known as the doctrine of lex posterior derogat prior, which essentially means that a later law or rule 
repeals or supersedes an earlier one. 
685 Concluded in 1966 and came into force in 1980. The Convention is the primary and principal instrument that 
codifies principles of interpretation of international treaties and agreements 
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf.> accessed on 
21st September 2019. 
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law norms, particularly treaties in their varied forms.686 International law instruments fall into two 
categories: those that are self-executing and those that require the aid of domestic mechanisms for 
enforcement or execution.687 The former category is often said to apply without the necessity of 
domestication.688 The latter, which include more complex or involving international agreements, 
and cover the rest of the agreements, including those creating human rights obligations, require 
domestication.689 
4.2.2.2.2 The Duality of Direct Effect of International Law 
The direct effect of international law has been aptly described as being both a sword and a shield.690 
It has been said to “function as a powerful sword that can pierce the boundary of the national legal 
order and protect individual rights where national law falls short.”691 This sword function is 
particularly strong in cases where courts can combine the two principles of direct effect with 
supremacy of international law.692 For example, if an international law collides with national law, 
an international law can only be of aid to a party if it is superior to the national law.693 
 
                                                          
686 Bogdandy (2008) argues that the two approaches to international law, Monism and Dualism are antiquated and are 
now ‘legal zombies’ overtaken by current realities. He advocates for legal pluralism instead. See AV Bogdandy, 
“Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say” (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 400. 
687 Developments such as globalisation and fragmentation of international law have created a need for new approaches. 
See, D Preshova, (n) 680 [5]. For more on the effect of globalization on the application of international law, see also, 
A Peters, (2007) in JE Nijman and A NollKaemper, New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and 
International Law (Oxford University Press Oxford 2007) 252-254. 
688 Sir Hersch Lauterpatch expressed himself on the relationship between international and domestic law as follows: 
“[T]he self-evident principle of international law is that a State cannot invoke its municipal law as a reason for non-
fulfilment of its international obligations.” See, H Lauterpatch, The Development of International Law by the 
International Court (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1982) 262. 
689 G. de Burca and O Gerstenberg, “The Denationalization of Constitutional Law” (2006) 47 Harvard International 
Law Journal 245. 
690A NollKaemper, “The Duality of the Direct Effect of International Law” (2014) 25(1) EJIL 105-125, at 105. 
691ibid, 108. 
692 ibid. 
693 ibid, 112. 
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Direct effect as a sword serves two principal functions. Firstly, it supplies the domestic 
sphere with hitherto unlegislated rights and obligations.694 Secondly, it strengthens the powers of 
municipal courts, which would otherwise be under the legislative control of political organs of the 
state.695 In essence, domestic courts are empowered with the flexibility of thinking outside the box 
or confines of domestic law-making processes and their restrictive provisions. 
 
As a shield, direct effect can provide a reason for domestic courts to circumvent statutory 
or other normative reasons, which would have otherwise restricted the application of international 
law. An example would be where the criteria set in domestic laws or constitutions is not met.696 
Further, in view of other barriers, such as the need for domestication in a dualist state, direct effect 
offers supremacy to international law, thereby avoiding such dualist requirements of domestic 
laws. It offers a convenient opening for avoidance of such restrictions.697 
4.2.2.2.3 Supremacy and Direct Effect: Lessons from the EU Integration 
EU law is supreme over national laws and even constitutions of member states. Accordingly, 
where there is conflict between European Community law and national law, European Community 
law shall prevail. This principle has been underscored by the CJEU in a long line of decisions since 
its first pronouncement on the subject in the Van Gen den Loos case in 1963.698  
                                                          
694 Ginsburg, “Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law” (2010) 38 NYU J Int’L & 
Policy, 707.See also, A Cassese, “Modern Constitutions and International Law” (1985)192 Journal of Review of 
Development Change 331.  
695 Benvenisti and Downs, “National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International law” (2009) 20 
European Journal of International Law 59. See also, Vereschestin, “New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the 
Relationship between International Law and National Law” (1996) 7 European Journal of International Law 29. 
696Prinssen and A Schrauwen (ed) Direct Effect: Rethinking the Classical EC Legal Doctrine (Europa Law Publishing 
Amsterdam 2002) 129. See also, A NollKaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (Oxford 
University Press Oxford 2011) 130. 
697Morgenstern, “Judicial Practice and the Supremacy of International Law” (1950) 27 British Yearbook of 
International Law, 42; Klabbers, “International Law in Community Law: The Law and Politics of Direct Effect” 
(2002) 21 British Yearbook of International Law 263. 
698R Arigho, “The Supremacy of European Union Law: An Inevitable Revolution or Federation in Action?” (2014) 
Journal of Post Graduate Research, Trinity College Dublin, 7-23, at 8 
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The EU, which the AEC aspires to emulate699, has developed a body of law known as the 
European Community law.700 This law applies across all EU member states.  The CJEU is tasked 
with the responsibility of ensuring that European Community law is uniformly applied across the 
EU membership.701 The CJEU is also mandated to interpret and apply EU law.702 Although 
national courts of EU member states are free to interpret and/or apply the community law, the 
ultimate jurisdiction to interpret and apply EU law, where there is uncertainty or inconsistency, 
rests with the CJEU.703 The CJEU’s role in the European integration is to ensure the uniform, just 
and consistent application of EU Community Law.704 
Arigho summarises the role of the CJEU as strengthening the community, increasing the 
scope and effectiveness of community law, and enlarging the powers of community institutions.705 
This, the Court achieves by identifying and establishing the principles of supremacy and direct 
effect. 
Because of the two doctrines of supremacy and direct effect, Nyikos observes that 
community law started to be accessible to the ordinary citizen for whom it was all along meant.706 
As Rasmussen further observes, the Court achieved the possibility of reaching national audiences 
of decision makers free of usual governmental political jargon and bureaucracy.707   
                                                          
699 By the creation of an African Economic Community under the AEC Treaty. 
700 This refers to the body of law constituted in the EU treaties, Protocols, status and pronouncements of the EU Courts. 
701 This role was first spelt out in Article 31 of the Treaty of Paris which established the ECSC.  It provided for the 
jurisdiction of the then European Court of Justice to ensure the interpretation and application of the Treaty, 
implementation thereof and observance of the law. 
702 Article 4 of the Treaty of Rome signed in 1995 officially recognised the CJEU as an institution of the EU 
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2016/art_19/oj> accessed on 22nd September 2019. 
703 Article 19 of the Treaty of Rome. 
704 M Kallestrup, “European Court of Justice be seen as a pro-integration Institution?” (2009) 10 ECTS 3. 
705 R Arigho, (n) 698, 9. According to Green, political integration means legal integration.  AW Green, “Political 
Integration by Jurisprudence: The Role of the Court of Justice of European Community in European Political 
Integration” (Leyden Amsterdam Nijhoff 1996) 9-26, 21. 
706SA Nyikos, “S.A. Courts” in Grazino and Paolo and Maasten Vink (ed), Europeanization: New Research Agendas 
(Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke 2007) 182-194,184. 
707 H Rasmussen, European Court of Justice Copenhagen: Gadjura, Thomas Information (1998) 127-169, 128. 
136 
 
Alter notes that supremacy of the EU law, and decision of the CJEU, flows, logically, from 
the doctrine of direct effect.708 He adds that for individuals’ rights to have any meaning, EU law 
need to be supreme to the national law, otherwise member states would be able to simply avoid 
their obligations by creating new national rules or laws.709 
4.2.2.2.4 Africa’s Experiments with Supremacy and Direct Effect 
The AEC, through the AU legislative organs and decisions of the ACJ&HR, will have to develop 
its own body of community law.  After all, the doctrines of Supremacy of EU law and direct effect 
were not established in any protocols or treaties, but emerged following creative and teleological 
reasoning of the CJEU in light of the purpose of, rather than a literal reading, of EU laws.710 
Raworth underscores that judicial organs play an influential role in the integration process through 
developing concepts and principles which are essential for the furtherance and solidification of the 
integration process.711 Fagbayibo sees the ACJ&HR as having the potential of fast-tracking closer 
integration by making judicial pronouncements on issues which may not go down well with 
member states.712 
According to Weiler, the supranational status of an international organisation is determined 
by the existence of both decisional and normative supranationalism within its institutional 
framework.713The quality of the supranational status of an international organisation is determined, 
                                                          
708 K Alter, “Establishing the Supremacy of European law” (2001) New York: Oxford University Press, 1-63, at 18. 
709ibid. 
710S Enchelmaier, “Supremacy and Direct effect of European Community Law Reconsidered, or the use and Abuse of 
Political Science for Jurisprudence” (2010) 23(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 281-299, at 281.  
711P Raworth, Introduction to the Legal System of the European Union (Oxford University Press Oxford 2001) at 84. 
712 B Fagbayibo, (n) 114 above, at 498. 
713J Weiler, “The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism” (1981) Yearbook of European Law 
271-281. ibid. Fagbayibo adds that in the African continental integration context, this would imply acts such as the 
ratification and compliance with the Constitutive Act of the AU, African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the Pan African Parliament Protocol (PAP). B Fagbayibo, (n) 
114 above, at 498. 
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to a large extent, by the measure of sovereignty that has been transferred to such an organisation 
by its member states.714 
Examples are also abounding on the African continent, mainly in the sub-regional context, 
with regards to efforts at supremacy and direct effect of decisions of its regional courts and/or 
tribunals. The OHADA Uniform Acts apply to all member states without requiring their 
domestication.715 The decisions of the OHADA CCJA have a direct effect on member states and 
are directly enforced without adoption by national courts.716 The OHADA CCJA has appellate 
jurisdiction from national supreme (highest) courts on all matters regarding OHADA laws.717 The 
OHADA CCJA also possesses both original and residual jurisdiction to interpret and apply 
OHADA laws when moved by either an individual (juristic or natural) or a state party.718 
 
While the OHADA experience illustrates the effect of supremacy and direct effect in 
deepening economic integration, other sub-regional RECs do not espouse the supremacy and direct 
effect principles. For example, the EACJ, the judicial organ of the EAC, does not possess exclusive 
jurisdiction on EAC Treaty matters, but shares this role with national courts.719  However, the 
EACJ’s decisions on the interpretation of the EAC Treaty override decisions of national Courts.720  
                                                          
714ibid, 499. Hay explains the relationship between supranationalism and sovereignty by remarking that “the concept 
of a transfer of sovereignty may be the legal-analytic counterpart of a political-descriptive notion of supranationalism”. 
See, P Hay, Federalism and Supranational Organisations: Patterns for New Legal Structures (Urbana: Illinois Press 
1966) 69. 
715 The direct effect of the OHADA uniform Acts is spelt out in Article 9 of the OHADA Treaty.  The Acts come into 
direct effect in Member States, 30 days after their publication in the OHADA official Journal.  
716 Article 18 of the OHADA Treaty underscore the Court’s supremacy over national Courts. 
717 Article 14 of the OHADA Treaty underscores the CCJA and OHADA laws’ supremacy over national laws and 
Courts of Member States. 
718ibid. 
719Article 33 of the EAC Treaty recognises the Jurisdiction of national courts to interpret and apply provisions of the 
treaty. 
720Article 33 of the EAC Treaty provides that decisions of the EACJ on the interpretation of the EAC Treaty take 
precedence over those of national courts on similar subject matter. Article 34 directs national courts or tribunals to 
refer a matter to the EACJ if it considers that a ruling on interpretation and application of the EAC Treaty is necessary 
to enable the national court to give a judgment. 
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In fact, the EACJ has held that it does not possess appellate or supreme powers over decisions of 
national constitutional or supreme courts of member states.721 The COMESA Court has similarly 
held that it does not possess appellate or supervisory authority over national courts of member 
states.722 
While the architects of the General Section of the ACJ&HR modelled it along the General 
Court of the CJEU, it seems to have been lost on them that the context of economic integration in 
Africa takes a significantly different complexion. The EU does not have to contend with sub-
regional economic communities, each with different objectives and stages of integration. The 
result is that a dispute resolution mechanism that does not take into account the many RECs and 
their own unique dispute settlement systems is difficult to conceive and ultimately achieve. 
Problems of choice of forum and forum-shopping are bound to arise, particularly since the sub-
regional RECs have to exist side by side with the AEC, AfCFTA and TFTA, which all have a 
unique dispute resolution mechanism that address trade and investment issues.723  
At the continental level, the AfCFTA Dispute Settlement Body will have to contend with 
overlapping jurisdictional questions with the ACJ&HR on matters relating to economic 
integration. Yet, this can be avoided by providing a continental overarching dispute resolution 
mechanism that transcends all the fragmented RECs in Africa. 
Another challenge in attaining supranational status for continental integration organs, 
including courts, is the reluctance by states to cede judicial or political sovereignty. A healthy but 
delicate balance has to be struck. For example, Fagbayibo observes that supranational legal and 
                                                          
721 In the case of East African Civil Society Organisation Forum v The Attorney General of the Republic of Burundi 
& 2 others Ref No. 2 of 2015, the EACJ held that the Court has no jurisdiction to revise, review or quash a decision 
of the constitutional Court of a Partner state. <http://eacj.eac.int/?cases=the-east-africa-civil-society-organisations-
forum-eacsof-vs-the-attorney-general-of-burundi-2-others.> accessed on 10th October 2018. 
722 In Malawi Mobile Ltd v Government of Malawi and Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority Appeal Number 
1 of 2016.  The COMESA Court of Justice held that it was not a supranational court with a mandate to control the 
legality of every national act of a member state, unrelated to the COMESA Treaty. 
723 The Judicial Organs of the regional RECs have been discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of this work.  It is not worthy 
to observe that the problem of overlapping Jurisdiction between the ACJ&HR and REC judicial organs is also 
addressed.  Chapter 5 of this thesis lays a basis for consolidating and devolving the ACJ&HR Court structure to the 
sub-regions. 
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political entities serve the crucial role of safeguarding member state’s interests, by ensuring that a 
healthy balance is struck between the sovereignty of supranational international entities and 
national interests.724 He reckons that clothing AU institutions with sovereign attributes will not be 
easy. However, with calculated steps, tactful negotiations, constant assurances and compromises, 
this is still a possibility.725  
The attitude of most African leaders towards ceding sovereignty has been described as 
lackadaisical.726 Udombana’s analysis is a harsh indictment of the attitude of most African states 
to integration:727  
 
African leaders lack the certitude to face the challenges of integration. Integration requires 
that each constituent party have clearly defined national plan and strategies to achieve 
economic development. Like a child in a toyshop, most leaders in Africa do not know 
which way to look. They have been unable to make the changes that will sustain growth 
and development. Others are not prepared to subordinate immediate national plans to long 
term economic regional goals or to cede essential elements of sovereignty to regional 
institutions. 
 
The partial loss or sharing of sovereignty between national courts and a supranational 
judicial organ should not be the reason for state parties to undermine the integration effort but 
should instead encourage the process. The key reason for state members’ reluctance to cede 
sovereignty is largely due to the adversarial focus in international negotiations, with one side losing 
for the other to gain, and not a win-win result. MacCormick suggests, using an interesting analogy, 
a pragmatic, win-win mentality approach:728  
                                                          
724B Fagbayibo, (n) 114, at 500. 
725ibid.  
726ibid. 
727Udombana, “A Harmony or Cacophony? The Music of Integration in the African Union Treaty and The New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development” (2002) Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 202. 
728MacCormick, “Beyond the Sovereign State” (1993) The Modern Law Review 16. 
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We must not envisage sovereignty as the object of some kind of zero sum game, such that 
the moment X loses it, Y necessarily has it. Let us think of it rather more as of virginity, 
which can in at least some circumstances be lost to the general satisfaction without anybody 
else gaining it. 
4.2.2.3 The Preliminary Ruling Procedure 
The preliminary ruling procedure was first established in Article 177 of the now defunct European 
Community (EC), and was renumbered, following the Amsterdam Treaty, to Article 234.729 The 
procedure provides that national courts or tribunals can request for a preliminary ruling from the 
CJEU in cases where the following are in issue:  
 the interpretation of the Treaty; 
 the validity or interpretation of the acts of the community institutions;  
 the interpretation of the statutes of bodies created by the council, where those 
statutes so provide. 
 
The preliminary procedure is available before the national court delivers a final Judgment 
in a particular case.  This intervention is available to national courts and is described in various 
ways by REC instruments across the world.730 National courts of the highest level, from whose 
                                                          
729K Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European law (New York Oxford University Press New York 2001) 1-63, 
at 9. 
730T Kennedy, “The European Court of Justice” in J Peterson and M Shackleton, The Institutions of the European 
Union (Oxford University Press Oxford 2006) 125- 45, at 133. The preliminary procedure is also referred to in other 
international integration systems, for example under Article 22 of the Statute of the Court of the Central American 
Court of Justice (CACJ), as “pre-judicial consultations”; the juridical effect of this procedure is similar to the 
preliminary ruling procedure, the intention being to ensure uniformity and compliance with the principles of the 
Central American integration system. See, SM Joridson, “The Central American Court of Justice: Yesterday, Today 
and Tomorrow?” (2009) 25 Connecticut Journal of International Law, 183. The Caribbean Court of Justice’s rules on 
preliminary ruling jurisdiction are found in identical provisions in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Treaty, 
Articles 211 (1) (c), 211(2) and 214 of the CARICOM Treaty and articles XII(1)(c), XII (2) and XIV of the Agreement 
Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice. These provisions obligate all domestic courts or tribunals of member 
states to seek a preliminary ruling in relation to the interpretation or application of CARICOM law. See, A McDonald 
“The Caribbean Court of Justice: Enhancing the law of International Organisations” (2004) 27 Fordham International 
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judgment no right of appeal lies, are obliged to submit the question for preliminary ruling, when 
the case before it raises questions concerning European Community law.731 The effect of the 
preliminary ruling is that it is binding on national courts from which it is sought.732 It also leads to 
real and fruitful collaboration between the municipal courts and the CJEU.733 
To give effect to its supremacy, besides direct effect, EU law employs two principles of 
supranationalism. The first is through pre-emptive legislation, which binds the member states not 
to enact law that contradict EU laws.734  The second principle is through the preliminary ruling 
procedure of the CJEU.735   
4.2.2.3.1 Contribution of the Preliminary Procedure to the Integration Process 
The preliminary ruling procedure is concerned with the interaction and cooperation between 
international and national courts. The use of the preliminary ruling procedure by international 
courts and tribunals has had at least two advantages in the EU. According to Kennedy, the use of 
the preliminary ruling procedure does not invite a contest or competition between the CJEU and 
                                                          
Law Journal at 930. See also, D O’Brien and S Morano-Foadi, “The Caribbean Court of Justice and Legal Integration 
within CARICOM” (2009) 8 LPICIT 399. 
731MA Pollack, The Engines of European Integration (Oxford University Press New York 2003) 155-203, at 162. 
732Arsenal v Reed, case number 206 /2002, European Court Reports 2002 I-10273 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/HR/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62001CC0206> accessed on 23rd September 2019. 
733 De Geus, case number 13/1961. ECLI:EU:C: 1962:11. 
<https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61961CJ0013> accessed on 23rd September 2019.  
734Case C – 26/1962 Van Gend Loos (1963) E.C.R 1; Costa v ENEL Case C-6/64 (1964) E.C.R 585 and Delo Stato v 
Simmenthal SpA (1978) E.C.R 629.  The Court emphasised that the supremacy of EU law goes beyond the 
constituency of member states.  EU law is therefore the grand norm of members’ states.  See generally, DR Phelan, 
Revolt or Revolution:  The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community (Round Hall sweet and Maxwell 
Dublin 1997). 
735The Three approaches have been christened the magic triangle of “direct effect”, “supremacy” and “preliminary 
ruling” A Vauchez, “Integration-through law: Contribution to socio-history of EU Political Common-sense” (2008)  
EUI Working Papers, 10. On how the EU legal system and laws have shaped and influenced integration, see also, R 
Byberg, “The History of Integration Through Law Project: Creating the Academic Expression of a Constitutional 
Legal Vision for Europe” (2017) 18(6) German Law Journal 1531-1556 
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national Courts, but instead creates cooperation.736 Moreover, national courts become allies of the 
CJEU in extending the scope of EU law, which in turn deepens the integration process.737 
Arnull describes Article 234 of the Amsterdam Treaty as “a stroke of genius”.738 Craig and 
De Burca call it “the jewel in the crown” of European integration.739 In its decision in the case of 
Rheinmutilen740, the CJEU held that Article 234 is essential for the preservation of the community 
character of law established by the treaty and has the object of ensuring that in all circumstances, 
the law is the same in all the states of the community. The court added that it had a “panoramic 
view” of the Community and its law, and hence is best placed to ensure uniformity in its application 
and observance through is exercise of its preliminary procedure jurisdiction.741 
Virzo writes that the CJEU has moulded many principles that have had a significant impact 
on the development of the EU integration process, and the use of the preliminary ruling procedure 
is one such notable principle.742 The success of the preliminary ruling procedure in the EU 
integration process has largely been attributed to its role in enabling the CJEU to engage in 
cooperation, rather than competition, with national courts of member states.743 This has led to a 
healthy “dialogue” between the two courts, which discourse has shaped the Union’s legal 
System.744 Arnull sees the relationship between the CJEU and the referring national court as 
cooperative rather than hierarchical, with proceedings taking the form of a dialogue or 
conversation in which the two courts jointly seek a solution to the case at hand in harmony with 
                                                          
736T Kennedy, (n) 730, 133. 
737ibid. 
738A Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006) 96. 
739P Craig and G De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (6th ed. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2015)  
740 Rheinmutilen-Dusseldorf (1974) [4]. 
741ibid. 
742 This is alongside the principles of Direct effect and Supremacy. R Virzo, The Preliminary Ruling Procedures at 
the International Regional Courts and Tribunals (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Amsterdam 2011) 285-313, at 285. 
743ibid, at 286. 
744 Opinion of the Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-205/08Umweltanwalt von Karnten and Alpe 
Adria Energia SpA (25 June 2009), [30]. 
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the requirements of Community law.745 The uniformity of interpretation, and hence application, of 
EU norms throughout the Union, is the direct product of use of the procedure.746 
The requirement for exhaustion of local remedies and the principle of subsidiarity limit the 
scope of application of the preliminary ruling procedure. The complementary jurisdiction of the 
CJEU with national courts on matters regarding the interpretation and application of EU law has 
led to the emergence and hence requirement, which parties must first exhaust local or domestic 
remedies/mechanisms before approaching the CJEU.747The doctrine of subsidiarity, on the other 
hand, implies that international organisations should only deal with matters that cannot be 
sufficiently handled at the domestic level.748 
4.2.2.3.2 Use of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure by African Sub-Regional Courts 
The preliminary ruling procedure is provided for in the jurisdiction of the regional courts of SADC, 
COMESA, EAC, UEMOA, CEMAC and OHADA. There is, however, a distinction in terms of 
the approach employed. ECOWAS seems to provide a non-mandatory or optional approach, while 
the others prefer a more stringent and compulsory approach. The difference is even more apparent 
when one looks at the consequences of failure to make the reference.  
Article 10 (f) of the Protocol on the Community Court of Justice of the ECOWAS provides 
that domestic courts that wish to exercise that option may seek a preliminary ruling to the Court 
of Justice provided that the question concerns the interpretation of the ECOWAS Treaty, its 
protocols and secondary laws. The wording of this Article is clearly couched in permissive terms 
that leaves the discretion or choice of referring preliminary questions to the national court 
concern.749 
                                                          
745A Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) 96. 
746R Virzo, (n)742, 286. 
747CF Amerasinghe, “Whither the local Remedies Rule” (1990) 5(1) Foreign Investment Law Journal 292-310, 293. 
748A Dashwood, European Union Law (Hart Publishers Oxford 2000) 158-159. 
749See AO Enabulele, “Reflections on the ECOWAS Community Court Protocol and Constitutions of Member 
States” (2010) 12 International Community Law Review 111. See also, O Karin and A Zimmerman (eds), Dispute 
Settlement in Public International Law (2nd ed Springer Berlin 2001) 1022. 
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Article 16 of the SADC Tribunal Protocol provides that all domestic courts and tribunals 
are under an obligation to make the preliminary reference on matters of interpretation and 
application of the SADC law, including the Treaty, protocols, statutes and other laws. However, 
the SADC Tribunal is precluded from ruling on the merits of the case pending before the referring 
domestic court. 
Domestic or national courts and tribunals of the EAC, COMESA, UEMOA and CEMAC 
member states must, on questions of interpretation, applicability and validity of domestic laws vis-
a-vis regional law, seek a preliminary ruling from respective regional courts.750 These RECs apply 
a mandatory approach to the use of the preliminary reference process. 
As noted above, the difference between non-compulsory and mandatory approaches is in 
the consequences of failing to refer. The mandatory approach entails the possibility of the failure 
triggering infringement proceedings. The basis of this is that failure to refer, in accordance to a 
treaty or protocol is, strictu sensu, a breach of the treaty obligations of a member state and could 
trigger treaty infringement proceedings. Mackenzie, Romano, Shany and Sands observe that the 
failure of a national court, which is a court  of last resort, to request a preliminary ruling from the 
regional tribunal might be considered a violation of due process, which could render null and void 
the judgement of the national court.751 For example, Article 29 of the EAC Treaty, and Article 25 
of the COMESA Treaty, whose terms are almost identical, provide for institution of infringement 
proceedings by the respective Secretary-Generals of the organisations upon failure to resolve the 
matter by the respective Councils of Ministers. A provision identical to Article 14 of the First 
Protocol to the Treaty establishing UEMOA is found in Article 19 of the Treaty of Libreville 
regarding the CEMAC Court of Justice. These provisions envisage sanctions for breach of the 
obligation to seek a preliminary ruling. 
The use of the preliminary ruling procedure in Africa is not without resistance. The first 
problem revolves around the relations between national courts and regional courts with respect to 
supremacy and the jealous exercise of sovereignty by national courts. National courts often view 
                                                          
750 Article 29 of the EAC Treaty; Article 25 of the COMESA Treaty; Article 14 of the UEMOA Treaty; and Article 
19 of the CEMAC Treaty. 
751C Mackenzie and CPR Roman and Y Shany and PJ Sand, The Manual on International Courts and Tribunals 
(2nd ed. Oxford University Press Oxford 2010) 296. 
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the role of regional courts, with respect to the use of the preliminary procedure, as being intrusive 
and a condescending undermining of their sovereignty.752 For example, the Zimbabwean Supreme 
Court, in Gramara and Bailie Cloete v Republic of Zimbabwe753, stated that as a matter of public 
policy of Zimbabwe, decisions of international and foreign courts are construed as being capable 
of being recognised, invoked and enforced in Zimbabwe, only if they do not conflict with 
Zimbabwe’s constitution.  
The other challenge that arises is one of  multiplicity of membership to RECs, a common 
feature in Africa.754 The relationship between UEMOA, CEMAC and OHADA is another 
interesting source of conflict in this regard. All UEMOA and CEMAC members are also members 
of OHADA. This means that proceedings before a domestic court of a member state could raise 
questions as to the interpretation or application of UEMOA or CEMAC law on the one hand and 
the interpretation or application of OHADA law on the other hand.755 
OHADA has developed an elaborate procedure for ensuring uniform interpretation of 
OHADA laws. Articles 14-20 of the OHADA Treaty are instructive in this regard. These include: 
the direct effect of OHADA Uniform Acts; express provision on supremacy of the OHADA CCJA 
over national courts of member states (including supreme and constitutional courts); determining 
appeals; and taking over matters from national courts and assuming jurisdiction with respect to 
interpretation and application of OHADA laws.756 Even such an elaborate system has not deterred 
national courts from declining to give effect to the reference procedure. In its judgement in the 
case of Snar Leyma v Hima Souley,757 the Supreme Court of Niger, a state member of the OHADA, 
                                                          
752 See, R Virzo, (n) 742, 294-295. 
753 HH 169-2009, HC 33/09 <http://www.veritaszim.net/node/327> accessed on 28th October 2018. 
754African states are members of at least 6 RECs, most with overlapping objectives, leading to the phenomenon 
known as the “spaghetti bowl” problem. This phenomenon and its effect on continental trade and investment dispute 
resolution on the continent is discussed in next Chapter of this thesis at 5.3.1. 
755 R Kamto, “The Courts of Justice of Communities and African Economic Integration Organisations” (1998) 6th 
Yearbook of International Law, 107, 147-150. See also, Y Shany, “Regulating Jurisdictional Relations between 
National and International Courts” (Oxford University Press Oxford 2007). 
756Articles 14-20 of the OHADA Treaty. 
757 Niger Supreme Court Judgement in case 01-158/C. <http://www.ohada.com/jurisprudence/ohadata/J-02-28.html 
accessed on 28th October 2018. Also quoted in Virzo, (n)742, 295.  
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ruled that it did not need to refer the annulment proceedings before it to the CCJA. The Court’s 
reasoning was that while the case raised issues concerning an OHADA Act, it was based mainly 
on the grounds that the appealed judgement violated the rule governing the Niger code of civil 
procedure.758 
4.2.2.3.3 The Preliminary Ruling Procedure as an Imperative for the ACJ&HR 
Uniformity in the interpretation and application of community law is critical for a well-functioning 
economic integration effort.759 The Protocol and Statute of the ACJ&HR does not provide for the 
supremacy of the Court over national or sub-regional courts and tribunals. The Court’s decisions 
do not have a direct effect/application in the sub-region or member states. Instead, national and 
sub-regional courts have complementary jurisdiction to the ACJ&HR.  
The enforcement of the ACJ&HR’s decisions is largely an intergovernmental affair relying 
on the good will of the member states to give it effect.760 The ACJ&HR possess neither exclusive 
jurisdiction nor preliminary ruling jurisdiction on questions of interpretation and application of 
AU statutes and laws.761 In other words, there is no requirement on the part of the AU member 
states or their national courts to refer questions on AU law to the ACJ&HR. There is also no way 
of ensuring uniform application, by member states, of AU laws since the AU single Court is not 
the last court of resort on such matters. 
The state of affairs obtaining in Africa is that various national/domestic and regional court 
systems operate, at the same time, undertaking the function of interpretation and application of the 
law of RECs. This multifarious approach raises a risk of a conflict of judgements and an uneven 
application of the African Economic Community law within member states. This can ultimately 
compromise attainment of the lofty goal of economic integration of the continent. This situation is 
made worse by the multiplicity of RECs in Africa with an overlapping membership, objectives 
                                                          
758 R Virzo, ibid. 
759JT Gathii, “African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Legal Regimes” (2010) 35 North Carolina Journal of 
International Law and Commercial Regulation, 608-641. See also, P Van der Mei, “Regional Integration: The 
Contribution of the Court of Justice of the East African Community” (2009) ZaoRV 69. 
760 Article 49 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR. 
761 See Articles 26 and 46 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR; there is no mention in both the Statute and the Amendment 
Protocol of the either the Direct Effect or the Preliminary Ruling jurisdiction. 
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and jurisdiction of its judicial organs. It is important that in the context of the economic integration 
of the continent under the aegis of the AEC, the various domestic/national systems and RECs 
delegate or cede this jurisdiction to an overarching continental judicial authority. 
The preliminary ruling procedure is not a perfect panacea to the problems that afflict the 
uniform application of international law; and sometimes, if not properly employed, may lead to 
delays in determining cases pending before national courts and friction between the international 
and domestic courts.762 It, however, presents, so far, the most effective approach to ensuring the 
uniform application of international or regional norms.763 
4.2.3 Jurisdiction Personae and Direct Access to the ACJ&HR by Individuals 
The concept of Jurisdiction personae determines who has the competence to bring cases and 
actions before the Court. Articles 29 and 30 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR replicate the provisions 
of jurisdiction personae from the now defunct Protocol on the African Court of Justice.764 The 
provisions entitle state parties, the Assembly, Parliament and other organs of the union, authorised 
by the Assembly, to submit any case to the Court on any issue or dispute provided for in Article 
28. A staff member of the AU Commission is also entitled to file an appeal with the Court 
regarding a dispute, in accordance with the staff Rules and Regulations of the AU.765 
 
                                                          
762 See, CJEU Papers “The Future of the Judicial System of the European Union” (May 1999) 
<http://www.alanuzelac.from.hr/Pdf/eu-postdip/Buducnost%20suda%20Europskih%20zajednica%20-%20ave.pdf> 
accessed on 23rd September 2018, 12-13, See also, the Due Report January 2000 (CJUE Papers) “The Future of the 
European Community Court System” <http://www.curia.europa.eu>jcms>jcms> accessed on 23rd September 2019. 
763See the critique of the preliminary ruling procedure by E David, “Preliminary Reference Procedure: Constraints 
and Remedies” (1999) <https://www.law.du.edu/documents/judge-david-edward-oral-history/1999-the-
preliminary.pdf.> accessed on 30th October 2018. 
764 Article 29 seems to be connected with the General Section while Article 130 is connected with the Human Rights 
jurisdiction. See also, M Evans and R Murray (ed), The African Charter on Human and People’ Rights. The System 
in Practice 1986-2006, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008) 1; Articles 28 and 28 of the Statute of 
ACJ&HR are substantively similar to Article 19 of the now defunct Protocol on the African Court of Justice. 
765Article 29 (1). 
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4.2.3.1 Absence of Direct Access by Individuals to the General Section of the ACJ&HR 
The human rights and international criminal law jurisdictions of the Court are quite elaborately set 
out in Articles 28A (1) of the Court’s Statute.  Individual’s access of the International Criminal 
Law section of the Court is assured even in more elaborate terms by the Court’s amendment 
protocol.766 However, there is a glaring absence of similar provisions for the General Section of 
the Court. Neither the Statute nor the amendment Protocol provides for, nor addresses, the right of 
the individuals to move the Court.  Under Article 29 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR, only state 
parties have an express right to file cases before the General Section of the Court.  It, therefore, 
follows that trade and investment justice at the ACJ&HRs is the preserve of state parties, and is 
purely an intergovernmental affair. 
The principal objective of the AEC is to deepen economic integration of the continent by 
growth of intra Africa trade.  Most trade transactions involve the private sector (as producers or 
traders in goods, providers of services and as investors).767 This, therefore, requires that legal 
remedies for the private sector be accommodated to ensure efficient outcomes and optimal 
practices.768 The current approach to international dispute settlement means that an aggrieved 
investor will only be protected if his state of nationality acts on his behalf when trade agreements 
are violated.769 Under this classical approach to international dispute resolution, only state parties 
to an integration agreement or treaty have access to the dispute settlement mechanism established 
thereunder.770 This approach, according to Erasmus, only made sense when the sovereign equality 
of states dominated the governmental relations.771 This approach, however, has been found to be 
unsuitable in addressing contemporary needs and realties of globalisation.772 
                                                          
766Article 30 (f) of the Statute of the ACJ&HR, limits individual’s access to the court cases regarding violation of 
human rights guaranteed by the African Charter, Charter on Rights and Welfare of the child, the protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights of women in Africa and other legal instruments relevant to Human rights 
ratified by State Parties concerned. 
767G Erasmus, (n) 276, 4. 
768ibid. 
769ibid. 
770ibid, 3. 
771ibid. 
772ibid. 
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The current situation availed by Article 29 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR portends at least 
three consequences. Firstly, the Statute permits states to shield themselves from complaints by 
their own citizens and foreign investors who allege trade and investment violations. Investors 
always prefer an international investment system because of the perceived states of national or 
domestic judicial systems, particularly in state-investor disputes. 
Secondly, the absence of an individual’s access to the Court in trade and investment related 
disputes, renders access to justice by investors and traders illusory and is a significant set-back to 
progressive strides made by sub-regional mechanisms. Sub-regional dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as the EAC, SADC and OHADA have either expressly provided for access by 
individuals to their disputes resolution bodies or have evolved jurisprudence that had permitted 
such access.773 It would be a drawback to these sub-regional advancements in denying individuals 
access to trade and investment justice at the continental level, when sub-regional systems have 
already advanced to granting this right. This is significant, noting that continental economic 
integration is supposed to build upon the developments already made at sub-regional REC 
levels.774 
Saurombe offers insights into why African RECs are generally averse to participation in 
REC affairs and decision-making process by other persons except for state parties.775 He opines 
that REC organs treat Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and civil society groups as 
members of opposition political parties whose views are either disruptive or antithetical to its 
objectives.776 Most of these organisations question member states’ adherence to the rule of law, 
human rights standards set out in REC treaties and protocols, and democratic ideals. This makes 
them unpopular to many African states. In fact, most African States have adopted democratic 
                                                          
773Article 30 of the EAC Treaty of 1999 permits on individual to move the EACJ; the OHADA Treaty incorporates 
upon adoption of uniform laws, the same into national laws of the member states, and both natural and juridical persons 
can access the Court.  The SADC tribunal has pronounced itself on this aspect in the Mike Campbell Case; Article 9 
and 10 of the ECOWAS Treaty allows limited access to the Court by individuals in matters relating to human rights 
violation. Article 26 of the COMESA Treaty permits both natural and juridical persons resident in a member states to 
bring an action in the COMESA Court of Justice. 
774Article 6 of the AEC Treaty. See also Article 3(l) of the AU Constitutive Act. 
775A Saurombe, (n) 614, 104. 
776ibid. 
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ideals only on paper and not in practice. Oluwo, for example,  is sceptical about most African 
states implementing shared norms such as democracy, human rights observance, and good 
governance, which they subscribe to in integration agreements but domestically observe only in 
breach.777 Olowu rhetorically poses: 
How then could leaders whose claim to political authority is questionable commit 
themselves to programmes that would empower the mass of their people? How can such 
rogue regimes turn around to promote the core principles of rule of law and good 
governance within their domain? 
 
Thirdly, the limitation to access by individuals to the General Section of the ACJ&HR will 
eventually undermine the development of African trade and investment governance. As noted 
above, Africa’s trade and investment governance jurisprudence has not significantly grown, as 
compared to other parts of the world, largely due to the limitations placed on individuals’ access 
to continental and regional dispute resolution mechanisms.778 Coupled with the fact that African 
states do not sue each other, the culture of adherence to a rule-based and transparent trade and 
investment regime is not deeply entrenched in Africa. A change of this culture can only be 
achieved by evolving a predictable trade and investment regulation that is supported by an efficient 
trade and investment dispute resolution mechanism. It will also be important to open up trade and 
investment dispute settlement to both states and individuals. A well-designed continental 
integration regime will grant both states and private persons, juristic and natural, standing before 
its dispute resolution organs. Such private parties will then be entitled to remedies when trade 
agreements are infringed on, and thus suffer the consequences.779 
 
 
 
                                                          
777 Olowu, “Regional Integration, Development and the Africa Union Agenda: Challenges, Gaps and Opportunities” 
(2003) Transnational International law &Comparative Problems 39. See also J Gathii, (n) 83, 250. 
778G Erasmus, note 276, 1. 
779 ibid, 4. 
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4.2.4 Advisory Jurisdiction of the ACJ&HR 
Article 53 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR confers advisory jurisdiction upon the Court.  However, 
it is only the organs of the AU, such as the Assembly of Heads of State and Government; the Pan-
African Parliament; the Executive Council, the Peace and Security Council; the Economic, Social 
and Cultural Council; the Financial Institutions or such other organs of the AU, as may be 
authorised by the AU assembly, which can request such advisory opinions.  This provision is 
narrower than that in the Protocol establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.780  
Article 4 of the Protocol establishing the now defunct Africa Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
permitted the Court to deliver advisory opinions at the request of member states of the OAU, and 
any of its organs or African organisations recognised by the OAU. 
Sub-regional RECs such as the EAC, SADC and ECOWAS have conferred, in their 
respective establishing treaties, jurisdiction upon their courts and tribunals to render advisory 
opinions, to both the organs of the RECs and member states.781 This is an important consideration 
since the achievement of the AEC primarily rests upon the ability of the AU to coordinate RECs 
and harness the developments already achieved at the sub-regional REC levels. It cannot, 
therefore, be progressive for the AU to be seen to be pulling in different directions with RECs, 
particularly on normative questions of jurisdiction of the ACJ&HR. 
Though advisory opinions are not always binding, practice in other economic integration 
organisations outside Africa has shown that the advisory opinion jurisdiction of regional and sub-
regional courts is important in reducing disputes and enhancing integration.782 Both the EU and 
                                                          
780Article 4 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights <https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights-
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781 Article 36 of the EAC Treaty; Article 10 of the ECOWAS Court Protocol, Article 4 of the SADC Treaty and Article 
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inter American Courts exercise advisory opinion jurisdiction on the request of EU organs and 
member states or their courts.783  
It is, therefore, not clear why the framers of the ACJ&HR have decided to break away from 
tradition and practice established by other regional courts the world over, and sub-regional courts 
in Africa. Advisory opinions enable states to approach the Court to test the compatibility of its 
domestic laws with international or regional law and values.784 As noted in the foregoing parts of 
this chapter, African states regard amicable dispute resolution and diplomacy as the better option 
over litigation, because advisory opinions offer a less confrontational approach to dealing with 
potential disputes.785 
4.2.5 Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and Arbitration Jurisdiction of the 
ACJ&HR 
African governments prefer diplomatic channels for settling their differences, as opposed to 
regional or international Courts.786 African states are, therefore, also not regular or active users of 
the dispute settlement systems at the World Trade Organisation (WTO).787 Although there is no 
evidence that the use of diplomatic channels has always successfully settled disputes between 
African states, there is evidence that African states do not favour regional institutions with the 
                                                          
783Article 218 of the Treaty of the European Union, provides for the General Court’s jurisdiction to issue opinions on 
application of either the EU organs or a member state:  Protocol 2 of 1970 empowered the ECHR to give Advisory 
opinions.  See K Dzehtsiarou and N O’Meara, Advisory Jurisdiction and the European Court of Human Rights: A 
Magic Bullet for Dialogue and Docket Control? (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2018) 
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies/article/advisory-jurisdiction-and-the-european-court-of-
human-rights-a-magic-bullet-for-dialogue-and-docketcontrol/E7BDA1704CCB5045CDB47F72C5DFBCB7.> 
accessed on 5th October 02018. VO Nmehielle, “The African Human Rights System.  Its laws, Practice and Institutions.  
(Martinus publishers The Hague 2001) 272. 
784ibid. 
785 F Viljoen, International Human Rights in Africa, (Oxford University Press Oxford 2007) 505. 
786G Erasmus, Alternative Dispute Settlement Procedure for Trade-related Disputes in Africa (2018) 
<https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/13527-alternative-dispute-settlement-procedures-for-trade-related-disputes-in-
africa.html.> accessed on 4th October 2018, 4. See also, R Simo, (n)611, 4 [3]. 
787ibid, 3. 
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power to monitor compliance with trade and investment obligations.788 It has been suggested that 
this is largely because African nations are reluctant in ceding sovereignty.789 
International law has developed a body of principles of law known as Lex Mercatoria or 
law merchant, which regulates international investment and international commercial arbitration 
as one of its main features.790 International Courts are increasingly incorporating ADR as part of 
their efforts in resolving trade and investment disputes. This is in recognition of the unique nature 
of such disputes. Disputes between states are best resolved through a mediated settlement, while 
state-investor or investor-investor disputes are best settled through arbitration. ADR and 
particularly arbitration provides disputants with important qualities which are attractive to 
commercial persons. These include: confidentiality of the process, expeditious settlement of 
disputes, use of experts as dispute resolvers (persons with skills and knowledge in the specific area 
of dispute); and finality of the process, since no appeal lies on the merits of an arbitral award.791 
Transnational commercial persons also prefer international arbitration because it assures them of 
an impartial arbiter free from state influence, particularly in disputes involving states or state 
organs and foreign investors.792 
A progressive trade and investment dispute resolution mechanism should, therefore, 
incorporate an ADR mechanism within its architecture. Unfortunately, the ACJ&HR General 
Section does not provide for ADR or arbitration. Yet, as noted above, the objective behind the 
AEC, and the AfCFTA, is to boost intra-African trade.793 The timeous, efficient and effective 
settlement of disputes is, therefore, a binding obligation upon all state parties to the AEC Treaty. 
                                                          
788ibid, 4. 
789 R Simo, (n) 611 [10]. 
790H Booysen, “International law as a Legal System: the Quest and the need for a Private – Law Leg” (1996) 21 South 
African Yearbook of International Law 60-72 60. See also, SA Sweet “The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational 
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On the international plane, evidence of widespread use of international commercial 
arbitration, and other forms of ADR, demonstrates its significance. Although the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is facing legitimacy challenges lately, its 
relative success of is living proof of the role of international  arbitration in settling state-investor 
disputes.794 According to Berger, 90% of all transnational commercial contracts contain arbitration 
clauses.795 
In the African region, and its sub-regions, a similar approach providing for ADR has been 
adopted. Apart from providing elaborate trade remedies and safeguards, the AfCFTA underscores 
a rule based, transparent and efficient dispute resolution mechanism which includes a Dispute 
Settlement Body (AB), an Appeals Body (AB) and Arbitration.796 The AfCFTA Protocol on the 
Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes also emphasises the role of negotiations, use 
of good offices, conciliation, mediation and consensus building in settlement of trade disputes 
between state parties.797 The EAC, COMESA and ECOWAS have integrated ADR, and 
particularly arbitration, in their dispute resolution mechanisms.798 
While Africa seems to favour diplomatic or informal means of settling disputes, these do 
not always work for all forms of disputes.  A certain and predictable dispute settlement system is 
important, particularly where the private sector is involved.  Inter-state disputes are not the only 
ones to be resolved in international trade. Private commercial transactions also require dispute 
                                                          
794C Schreuer, “Commentary on the ICSID Convention” (1996) 11(2) Foreign Investment Law Journal, 318-492, at 
1. 
795K Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria (Kluwer The Hague 1999) 111. 
796 The AfCFTA has taken the WTO model of dispute resolution that provides for ADR Mechanisms. See, Articles 5, 
6,7,8,10,21 and 27 of the Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes. 
797 Article 7 and 8 of the AfCFTA Protocol on the Rules and procedures on Settlement of Disputes. 
798 Article 28 of the COMESA Court confers the COMESA Court of Justice with jurisdiction  to undertake Arbitration 
under  special agreement of parties, the common market on any of its institutions; the EAC Treaty, Article 32 similarly 
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settlement mechanisms, for resolving disputes over contractual agreements. It is frequently seen 
as easier and as cheaper for private companies to resort to ADR mechanisms. 
Globalisation, technological developments and the complex cross-border nature of modern 
commercial transactions make uniformity a more expeditious settlement procedure, as well as an 
attractive option.799 ADR has, therefore, gained widespread acceptance and has become a standard 
feature of private commercial dispute resolution. 
4.3. Structural and Institutional Impediments 
4.3.1 Appointment Procedure and Qualifications of Judges of the ACJ&HR 
The composition of the Court is set out in Article 3 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR.  It provides that 
the Court shall consist of sixteen Judges who are nationals of the state parties. The appointment of 
the Judges shall have regard to the geographical regions of the continent, with each region, where 
possible, represented by three Judges; except for the western region which shall have four (4) 
Judges.800  Article 4 of the Statute of the Court proceeds to lay out the qualifications of candidates 
for the positions of Judges. The Judges shall be elected from among persons of high moral 
character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to 
the highest judicial offices or are juris-consuls of recognised competence and experience in 
international law and/or human rights.801 The candidates are then subjected to an election process 
governed by Article 7 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR.802  
The qualifications and process of appointment of Judges, present three issues in so far as 
the General Section of the Court and its trade and investment disputes settlement jurisdiction is 
concerned. Firstly, the qualifications of Judges are skewed towards a bias in formal training in 
international law and human rights only.  Qualification in international trade and investment law 
is not a specific requirement. The impression created is that the drafters of the Court’s Statute did 
not hold trade and investment dispute resolution in the same regard as international human rights. 
                                                          
799 G Erasmus, (n) 786, 5. 
800 Article 3(1). 
801 Article 4. 
802 The Candidates are elected by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government from the Candidates by a two-
thirds majority. Article 7(5) requires that the Assembly ensures that there is equitable gender representation.  
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For a court which is supposed to develop African trade and investment jurisprudence and direct 
the growth of the AEC, specific competence and expertise of some judges, who will serve in its 
General Section, in African international trade and investment law should have been an imperative. 
Secondly, the election of judges as provided for under Article 7 of the Statute of the 
ACJ&HR undermines its judicial independence.803 Unlike other organs of an international 
organisation, courts or tribunals must always be free from political or executive direction and 
control. Judicial independence is underwritten by the process of appointing judges, a guarantee of 
their security of tenure, as well as an objective and clear process of their removal.  
However, the process as currently stipulated in the statute for the appointment of judges 
leaves the Court vulnerable to the whims of the Council or State Parties who supported their 
election. This is a result of system proposed in the Statute in which nominees are subjected to an 
election by the Executive Council of Ministers of the AU, which council constitutes of appointees 
of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Further, the disbanding and the visiting of 
reprisals, such as refusal to renew the appointment of judges, when they make decisions which are 
deemed unpopular to governments of member states of RECs, has been experienced in the past 
with respect to the SADC Tribunal and EACJ.804 The situation is more worrying since the Statute 
                                                          
803 The EU has attempted to reduce the over-politicisation of the Court by reducing the process of appointment of 
Judges to the CJEU. This included, in the appointment process, a panel comprising members of the Court and National 
Supreme Courts which would rule on suitability of candidates, from which governments could only appoint candidates 
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extended jurisdiction of the Court.  See K Alter and J Gathii and LR Helfer, (n) 59, 303. See also Apiko, (n) 480, 12-
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of the ACJ&HR does not provide for security of tenure for the Judges of the Court, nor a process 
for their removal, save that a Judge can only be removed or suspended following a 
recommendation of two-thirds of other members.805   
Therefore, the security of tenure, underpinned by an open, transparent and competitive 
appointment process that does not leave judges beholden to states or persons who supported their 
candidature, and elaborate removal/suspension procedure, will guarantee independence of the 
Court in the exercise of its functions. 
4.3.2 Seat of the Court and the need for its Devolution to the sub-regions 
Article 25 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR provides that the seat of the Court shall be the same as 
the seat of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Court may sit in any other 
member state if circumstances warrant, and with the consent of the member state concerned. The 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government may change the seat of the Court after due 
consultations with the Court. 
Access to trade and investment dispute resolution is imperative for a properly functioning 
economic community which the AEC Treaty envisages. The AEC intends to build on sub-regional 
RECs as blocks towards the Economic Community.806 This approach is reiterated in the 
Constitutive Act of the AU, the AfCFTA Agreement and the TFTA.807 As early as 1980, in crafting 
the LPA, African states understood that their economic inter-independence and integration is 
anchored in the establishment of RECs, hence the setting up of SADC in the South, ECOWAS in 
the West and the EAC in the East.808 
                                                          
805 Article 9 (2) of the Statute of the ACJ&HR. 
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Therefore, as Africa steps up continental economic integration, it is important that RECs 
play a pivotal role.  RECs have gathered immense experience at the sub-continental level spanning 
over 50 years.  It is also critical that RECs are not only regarded as building blocks for the 
continent’s integration process, but offer critical structural and institutional infrastructure for the 
integration. There seems to be a clear road map in Article 6 and 28 of the AEC for the economic 
integration of RECs on the continent. The road map, however, does not seem to include the 
integration of dispute settlement systems into the AEC system. Instead, the REC dispute settlement 
systems remains intact and seems to be operating parallel or side by side to the continental 
mechanisms. Yet, the objective they serve should be converging at the continental level.  
 
With respect to the seat of the Court, it would enhance access to trade remedies and 
investment justice if the seat of the ACJ&HR is devolved to the sub-regional RECs in Africa. After 
all, it is expected that all African RECs will cease to exist when the AEC becomes a reality.809 It 
will be good use of existing resources such as buildings, judges, technical support staff and 
registries of Courts established at sub-regional levels to act as sub-registries and branches of the 
Court. It will also make it logistically easier for disputants to access the Court in the sub-regions 
than to travel to its seat at Arusha in Tanzania. 
4.3.3 Enforcement of Judgments of the ACJ&HR  
Enforcement of judgments and decisions of African regional courts and tribunals remains a 
significant stumbling block to the effectiveness of the use of international dispute resolution 
mechanisms in Africa. The experiences in the SADC, EAC and ECOWAS have shown reluctance 
by most African States in obeying or giving effect to decisions of REC adjudicatory bodies, 
particularly when they seem to offend a member state’s government.810 As a result, many of the 
                                                          
809Article 6 of the AEC Treaty sets a period of 34 (maximum 40) years of the date of the Treaty (1991) for the 
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adjudicatory organs have since been met with belligerence or rendered moribund or intimidated 
into rendering compliant decisions.811 This approach does not bode well with inspiring confidence, 
in foreign investors, or in transnational African and foreign traders, who can only invest and trade 
confidently in the knowledge that there are reliable and independent dispute resolution 
mechanisms assured in an economically integrated Africa. 
Article 46 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR provides for the mechanism for the 
implementation and enforcement of decisions/Judgments of the Court. The provision set out that 
the decision of the Court is both binding on the parties and is final. Where a party has failed to 
comply with the judgment, the Court shall refer the matter to the AU Assembly which shall decide 
upon the measures to be taken to give effect to the Judgement.  Article 23 of the Constitutive Act 
of the AU gives the AU Assembly the power to impose sanctions on states which refuse to enforce 
decisions made by an AU organ, which includes the Court. Historical evidence, however, suggests 
that AU states are usually reluctant to employ this approach in ensuring compliance with its own 
decisions.812 
The enforcement of decisions of international courts in Africa has traditionally taken two 
approaches. The first approach is one where the decision is considered as a foreign judgment and, 
therefore, has to be enforced only through the strict application of national law as regards to 
enforcement of foreign judgments.813 The second approach is whereby the judgement is 
enforceable as a decision of domestic courts without the rigours of adoption through national law 
processes.814 The latter approach is preferred by investor friendly states, such as those in the 
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OHADA region.815 Other effective approaches have also evolved. The ECOWAS Court of Justice 
has an enforcement organ in each state that can follow the implementation of the decision of the 
Court.816 Even with its creative approach to enforcement of its decisions, the ECOWAS Court of 
Justice has still had to contend with intransigent member states who are unwilling to voluntarily 
give effect to its decisions.817  
If the experiences so far drawn from the attitude of African sub-regional RECs, including 
SADC, ECOWAS and the EAC are anything to go by, then the ACJ&HR cannot rely solely on 
the whims of the AU Assembly and member states’ good will for enforcement of its decisions. 
The AU sanctions option together with pragmatic solutions modelled around the approaches 
employed by the OHADA CCJA and ECOWAS offer a useful model. The hybrid approach will 
give assurance to the Court’s users, particularly private parties, of the ability of the Court to render 
sound independent decisions, and that the decisions will be enforced.818 The CJEU approach is 
instructive in this respect. Article 260 of the CJEU Treaty confers jurisdiction upon the Court to 
sanction a state member whom fails to comply with the Court’s Judgment by meting out fines and 
other punitive orders, including declarations of breach under Article 253 and 259. Similar 
jurisdiction is absent from the Protocol and Statute of the ACJ&HR. 
The role of an effective enforcement mechanism to the success of a regional court cannot 
be overstated. It is not only important that judges of the court possess the requisite set of skills and 
competencies in international law, but it is also critical to have effective enforcement mechanisms 
which ensure the implementation of the court’s decision to the letter.819 
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4.3.4 Financial Constraints and Autonomy  
Financial autonomy of a court impinges on the ability of the court to discharge its functions and to 
render its decisions with the required independence. Article 26 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR 
provides for the Court’s budget. It provides that the Court shall prepare its draft annual budget and 
shall submit it to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government through the Executive Council 
of Ministers.820 The budget of the Court is to be borne by the AU.821 The Court is accountable to 
the executive arm of the AU over its budget. The Court is required to submit reports thereon to the 
Executive Council of Ministers of the AU, in conformity with the Financial Rules and Regulations 
of the African Union. 
It is apparent that no fixed fund for the Court is provided for by the Statute of the Court. It 
is largely a function of the Assembly and Council of Ministers of the African union. The Court is, 
therefore, subject to the financial rules, regulations and, indeed, constraints that affect the financing 
of AU organs and institutions at large. 
Constraints on financing are not unique to the AU or the African Court but are almost a 
permanent feature of African RECs and its sub-regional Courts. This can be seen in the example 
of the EAC.  The EACJ is funded by the EAC as one of its organs.822 Additionally, the EAC Treaty 
is funded by equal contribution by partner states and receipts from regional and international 
donations and any other sources as may be determined by the EAC Council of Ministers.823 
Moreover, the EACJ has financial challenges leading to its largely ad hoc operations without a 
regular schedule, despite its large workload.824  Apiko observes that the inadequate funding of the 
EACJ could make the Court vulnerable to the whims of state parties and affect its ability to 
effectively discharge its functions.825 Similarly, SADC has limited resources and is largely 
dependent on donor funding, principally from the EU.826 Saurombe suggests that this over-reliance 
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on the EU, together with a lack of deliberate efforts to establish self-funding initiatives, has availed 
an opportunity to the EU taking advantage of SADC members to have them sign lopsided 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).827 
Since the AU’s financing model and its sustainability affects the operations of the 
ACJ&HR, it is useful to briefly examine it. The AU organs’ activities are funded by contributions 
by member states and development partners. In fact, 72% of the AU’s budget is funded by external 
sources.828This creates risks associated with over dependency hence undermining ownership of 
AU programmes. In 2016, the AU adopted a sustainable financing model in order to deal with this 
problem. The model is founded on four objectives which is to provide reliable and predictable 
funding for peace and security initiatives; to relieve pressure on national treasuries, to reduce 
dependency on partner/donor funds; and to provide equitable and predictable sources of 
financing.829 
The AU sustainable financing model has two significant features. Firstly, that a 0.2% levy 
on eligible imports be effected by all African states. Secondly, that a committee of fifteen African 
Finance Ministers are to be nominated to spearhead the process and oversight of the budget, the 
reserve fund and the development of a set of “golden rules”.830 The reserve fund is to be used for 
continental priorities. This research suggests that one of the AU’s priority is to benefit from the 
fund through the implementation of the AEC and by extension, through the ACJ&HR. 
The financial sustainability plan of AU operations is still at its nascent stages. The initial 
resistance to the plan has since waned and 24 countries are currently at various stages of 
implementing the aforementioned 0.2% levy.831 However, it should be noted that the 2019 AU 
                                                          
827ibid. 
828AU report titled “Imperative to Strengthen Our Union: Report on the Proposed Recommendations on Institutional 
Reform of the African Union”, also simply known as the “Kagame Report” 
<https://www.au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34871-file-report-20institutional20reform20of20the20au-2.pdf.> 
accessed on 19th September 2019. The report is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.2.4 of this thesis. 
829ibid. 
830ibid. 
831K Pharatlhatlhe and J Vanheukelom, (n) 395 15. <https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/DP240-Financing-the-
African-Union-on-mindsets-and-money.pdf.> accessed on 21st September 2019. For further discourses on this levy, 
see P Apiko and A Faten, “Can the 0.2% levy fund Peace and Security in Africa?  A Stronger AU-UN Partnership in 
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budget has been significantly cut by 19%.832 The AU Commission still relies on external donors, 
such as the EU to finance its operations and programmes.833 The merger of the ACJ and the 
ACH&PR to birth the ACJ&HR was justified on the grounds of financial constraints of the AU 
and its inability to sustain multiple judicial organs.834 It remains doubtful whether the AU is 
mandatorily required to make specific annual allocations to its Commission and the Court.835 Some 
member states are currently struggling to meet their annual subscriptions to the AU. Many sub-
Saharan African states’ national budgets are financed through foreign aid, some up to eighty 
percent.836 These countries are likely to default on their additional obligation to levy and remit the 
levy.  
The success of the Court therefore largely depends on a well-resourced approach to its 
establishment and operations. 
4.4. Summary 
This chapter has explored the jurisdictional, structural and institutional aspects of the ACJ&HR. 
The first section of this chapter discussed the various aspects of jurisdiction of international courts 
and tribunals. It made particular reference to trade and investment dispute resolution; including 
subject matter or express and implied jurisdiction; and the direct access to the Court by individuals, 
                                                          
Accordance with WTO Rules” (2010) European Centre for Development Policy 
<https://ecdpm.org/publications/levy-fund-peace-africa> accessed on 23rd September 2019; Also, P Apiko and A 
Faten (2018) “Analysis on the Implementation of the Africa Union’s 0.2% Levy: Progress and Challenges” (2010) 
European Centre for Development Policy <https://ecdpm.org/publications/analysis-of-the-implementation-of-the-
africa-union-levy/.> accessed on 23rd September 2019. 
832ibid, K Pharatlhatlhe and J Vanheukelom, 15. 
833G Bekker, “The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights: Safeguarding the Interest of African States” (2007) 
5(1) Journal of African law 157. 
834Article 25(2) of the Statute of the ACJ&HR seems to acknowledge the need to consolidate budgetary requirements 
of the African Union. 
835Article 26 of the ACJ&HR Treaty does not specifically require that a budget for the Court be set aside in the AU 
organs’ annual allocations. 
836MK Jallow, “Foreign Aid and Underdevelopment in Africa” (2010) 
<https://www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/84592/foreign-aid-and-underdevelopment-in-africa.html.> accessed on 
14th December 2018. 
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ADR and Appellate jurisdictions. It was noted that for the Court to effectively discharge its 
mandate, under its general section, it is imperative that fundamental aspects of its normative, 
jurisdictional and institutional framework be addressed. A key point in this respect is the need to 
root the architecture of the court within an efficacious rule-based regime.  
The chapter also examined the structure of the general section of the ACJ&HR, with 
respect to its trade and investment disputes mandate. It was identified that challenges such as lack 
of a clear supremacy or subsidiarity in the relationship between the ACJ&HR and national and/or 
sub-regional courts may lead to an overlapping jurisdictional mandate. This portends a possible 
problem that may eventually undermine the Court’s effectiveness. Reliance on national courts for 
enforcement of decisions of the ACJ&HR was also found to be a critical problem, particularly 
since the very same state parties are the primary subjects of the ACJ&HR. Financial constraints of 
the AU and how these may affect the Court’s operations were also addressed. The next chapter 
addresses these salient matters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
165 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CASE FOR THE AFRICAN SINGLE COURT AS AN OVERARCHING 
SUPRANATIONAL CONTINENTAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT MECHANISM  
5.1. Introduction 
In Africa’s march towards continental economic integration of trade and markets under the 
AfCFTA and eventually the AEC, it is imperative that the facilitating institutions of the AU also 
integrate. Specific to this discourse is the integration of continental and sub-regional trade and 
investment dispute resolution mechanisms. A brief background will put the discussion undertaken 
in this chapter into a proper framework.   
 
The 1990s heralded a remarkable increase in international dispute settlement mechanisms 
the world over.837 This phenomenon led to what is now referred to in international law parlance as 
the fragmentation of the international legal system or order.838 The phenomenon was characterised 
by a proliferation of international dispute resolution mechanisms, with overlapping and sometimes 
competing, mandates.  In this period, both permanent and ad hoc judicial organs meant for the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes were established. Specialised permanent UN tribunals 
such as the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
                                                          
837A Reinisch, “International Courts and Tribunals, Multiple Jurisdiction” (2011) in Max Planck Encyclopaedia of 
Public International Law <https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e41> accessed on 1st April 2019, 1-11, at 1. 
838 ibid. 
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were created.839 The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism also came into being in 1995.840 Ad 
hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were also established.841 On the African 
continent, various courts and tribunals were also established. The ACJ, the ECOWAS Court of 
                                                          
839 The ITLOs was conceived following the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea and was established by Article 30 
of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on December 10, 1982.  The full text of 
the Convention <https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.> accessed on 1st 
April 2019. The ICC is established under the ICC Rome Statute of 1998. It is a complementary mechanism to national 
and regional mechanisms with jurisdiction to prosecute persons with the highest criminal responsibility over the 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression; particularly where national and 
regional courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute such individuals. The ICC Rome Statute came into force in 2002 
after achieving the required number of ratifications.  The full text of the ICC Rome Statute is available at 
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/Documents/RS-Eng.pdf.> accessed on 1st April 2019. 
840 The WTO is a multilateral global organisation of states and is primarily charged with the creation of rules of trade 
between nations. The organisation came into existence in 1995 when the 1945 General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATTS) was succeeded by the WTO.  The WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) deals with disputes between 
WTO members and has authority to establish dispute settlement panels, refer matters to arbitration, adopt decisions 
of panels and the Appellate body, and adopt arbitration awards and reports; and to generally maintain surveillance 
over implementation of those decisions. A description of the WTO-DSB 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_body_e.htm.> accessed on 1st April 2019.  See, generally, J 
Paine, “The Functions of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body:  A Distinctive Voice Mechanisms” (2018) Society of 
International Economic Law (SIEL), Sixth Biennial Global Conference paper 
<http://ilreports.blogspot.com/2018/07/paine-functions-of-wtos-dispute.html.>1st April 2019. 
841The international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of International 
Humanitarian law (IHL) committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, more commonly referred to 
as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created by the UN to prosecute serious 
crimes committed during the period. It was an ad hoc court established on 25th May 1993 and located at The Hague.  
The Court was dissolved on 31st December 2017.  The Court’s statute   
<http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf. accessed> on 1st April 2019.  The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established in November 1994 by the UN Security Council 
by Resolution 955 in order to prosecute people responsible for the Rwandan Genocide and other serious violation of 
international law in Rwanda, or by Rwandan Citizens in nearby states.  It was an ad hoc Court established on 8th 
November 1994 and was dissolved on 31st December 2015.  The Court was seated at Arusha in the United Republic 
of Tanzania. The rules, structure and jurisdictional mandate is available at https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal. accessed 
on 1st April 2019.   
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Justice, the EACJ and the SADC tribunals, are examples of continental and sub-regional judicial 
organs which emerged in the 1990s.842 
 
This proliferation came with its own challenges, principal of which was the fragmentation 
of international law and competition of dispute resolution bodies, in a crowded playing field. These 
challenges were compounded by a multiplicity of member countries to regional, bilateral, 
multilateral and sub-regional organisations, with similar or near similar objectives. This 
consequently led to divided loyalties and confusion in the implementation of programmes. The 
fact that most of these sub-regional organisations created dispute resolution mechanisms led to 
jurisdictional overlaps with the potential of creating further confusion. Judicial and arbitral organs 
created by regional organisations formed by countries with diametrically divergent legal systems, 
underpinned by different philosophical and cultural influences emerged. Additionally, difficulties 
in developing coherent, consistent jurisprudence and normative values cut across the 
organisations’ membership. 
 
Despite these challenges, the merged single AU Court, the ACJ&HR, offers a viable 
proposition in converging the continental and sub-regional dispute resolution mechanisms, thereby 
eliminating most of the challenges of fragmentation of the international legal system, with respect 
to economic regionalism in Africa.  
 
It is understood, from the afore-analysed chapters of this thesis, that the AfCFTA proposes 
a dispute resolution mechanism that mirrors the WTO disputes settlement procedure. Both the 
WTO and AfCFTA mechanisms are only available to state members and not to individuals. The 
two mechanisms also deal exclusively with trade disputes as opposed to investment disputes. This 
chapter, therefore, explores viable prepositions for expanding the ACJ&HR’s mandate to include 
a trade and investment chambers to cater for intra-African commercial disputes 
                                                          
842The ACJ was established under Article 28 of the AEC Treaty of 1991 (commonly referred to as the Abuja Treaty); 
The ECOWAS Court of Justice was established in 1999 under the additional Protocol on the ECOWAS Court of 
Justice, while the EACJ is established under chapter 8 of the EAC Treaty.  The various Courts’ structures and 
jurisdiction are addressed in detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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This chapter, firstly, identifies the challenges associated with the multiplicity of 
international trade dispute resolution in Africa. Secondly, it explores the role that the AU single 
court can play in consolidating the various regional and sub-regional dispute resolution efforts that 
are crucial in navigating the challenges identified. The chapter also examines the causes and effects 
of fragmentation of regional courts, investment arbitration and investment codes, as well as the 
possible role the African single court can play in harmonising trade and investment dispute 
resolution in Africa’s continental economic regionalism. 
5.2. Fragmentation and Overlapping Juridical Mandates of International Dispute 
Resolution Mechanisms in Africa 
5.2.1 Background and Conceptual Basis 
Fragmentation of international law implies, in essence, the competition of normative orders.843 The 
terms “fragmentation” and “proliferation” of dispute settlement mechanisms are used 
interchangeably to refer to the rapid increase of international tribunals addressing similar 
questions.844 At the global level, it is a subject that has received considerable attention and attracted 
quite some discussion.845 Despite this attention, states and active participants, in the process of the 
development of international law, seem either oblivious of this phenomenon, or, are not overly 
concerned with it and perhaps even promote it, consciously or unconsciously.846  
 
The problems concerning the multiple dispute settlement fora and the related substantive 
issue of an increased fragmentation of international law have been the subject of not only academic 
                                                          
843SP Rao, “Multiple International Judicial Forums:  A Reflection of the Growing Strength of International law or its 
Fragmentation?” (2004) 25(4) Michigan Journal International Law 929-961, 929. 
844 See, for example, B Kingsbury, “Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?” 
(1999) 31 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 679.  See also, K Oellers-Frahm, “Multiplication of 
International Courts and Tribunals and Conflicting Jurisdictions: Problems and Possible Solutions” (2001)5 Planck 
Yearbook of UN Law, 67. 
845 See for example, Y Shany, “The Competing Jurisdiction of International Courts and Tribunals” (2005) 52(2) 
Netherlands International Law Review 10. See Also D Prager, “The Proliferation of International Judicial Organs:  
the Role of the International Court of Justice” in NIH Blokker and HG Schemers (eds.) Proliferation of International 
organisation in Legal Issue (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001) 279. 
846 S P Rao, (n) 843, 929.  
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attention but also of the International Law Commission (ILC). The risks ensuing from the 
fragmentation of international law formed the basis of a 2002 ILC study group, while a 2006 ILC 
report addressed the difficulties arising from the fragmentation of international law.847 A 
discussion of these risks as identified and elaborated by the ILC will shortly follow.  But first, it 
would be fair to also briefly highlight some of the benefits of fragmentation of international dispute 
settlement systems. 
5.2.2 Benefits of Fragmentation  
Scholars have argued that the proliferation of international dispute settlement mechanisms is not 
always negative as it has some positive effects. 
 
Firstly, it should be acknowledged that the increase in international courts and dispute 
resolution mechanisms is an obvious acknowledgment of the increasing acceptance and 
importance of international law and its disputes settlement fora. Even more importantly, this 
increase in fora has led to variety in international jurisprudence.848 The various dispute settlement 
                                                          
847In 2000 the ILC decided to include the topic of “Fragmentation of International Law” in its long term working 
programme after an initial feasibility study.  See the text of the feasibility study, G Hafner, (1999) Risks Ensuing from 
Fragmentation of International law. Available at 
<https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1272&context=mjil.> accessed on 1st April 2019. The 
2002 ILC working group report dealt with the topic “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law,” also available at <http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_9.shtml> 
1st April 2019. The views in the two reports are extensively reviewed in G Hafner, “Should one Fear the Proliferation 
of Mechanisms for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes?” in L Gaflish (ed) The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between 
States (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1998) 4, 25-41. The 2006 ILC Report by M Koskenniemi, 
“Fragmentation of International Law:  Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law” (2006) <http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_9.shtml> accessed on 1st April 2019. Koskenniemi and Leino had earlier 
authored an article addressing contemporary problems associated with fragmentation of international law. M 
Koskenniemi and P Leino, “Fragmentation of International law?  Postmodern Anxieties” (2002)15 Leiden Journal of 
International law 553-579.  See also Symposium, “Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a 
Systemic Problem?” (1999) New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 679. 
848A Reinisch, “The Proliferation of International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The Threat of Fragmentation vs 
The Promise of a More Effective System?  Some Reflections from the Perspective of Investment Arbitration” in 
Buffard, Crawford and Pellet and Wittich (eds) International Law: Between Universalism and Fragmentation 
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tribunals are churning out more international case law, eventually replacing the traditional scarcity 
of international law precedents previously embodied in the scarcely celebrated ICJ and PCIJ 
cases.849 Today, specialised courts in human rights, international criminal law, and regional trade 
law, develop jurisprudence that is specialised to the region’s circumstances and/or the specialised 
area.850 This has invariably led to growth of the body of international law and scholarship in the 
specific areas of interest. In turn, a better focused discourse and scholarly engagement has 
improved the quality of regional international law and other specialised areas of international law. 
This is a significant contribution of the proliferation of international tribunals, both ad hoc and 
permanent, to the body of international law. Rao has aptly observed that the creation of multiple 
international judicial tribunals is a function of the ever-expanding nature of international law, and 
is a sign of its growing maturity.851 
 
The second significant contribution of the expansion of international dispute resolution 
mechanisms, relating to economic integration, has been seen in international investment law and 
commercial arbitration. The remarkable growth of international arbitration has in turn led to the 
development of a normative international economic law or Lex mercatoria (law merchant).852 This 
                                                          
Festchnft in Honour of Gerhard Hafner (Koninklijke Brill NV, Netherlands 2008) 107-126, at 107. Hafner discusses 
the positive attributes that come with the specialisation of international organisations, including courts, and the 
problems that have arisen out of specialised international law or lex specialis. The benefits and problems identified by 
Hafner are discussed in this part of the thesis, in the context of African Continental economic integration. See, G 
Hafner “Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law” (2004) Michigan Journal of International 
Law 25(4) 849-862, at 856-860.  
849ibid. 
850ibid. 
851SP Rao, (n) 843, 930. 
852 H Booysen discusses the evolution of private international commercial law or Lex mercatoria, its subjects, actors, 
normative elements (or lack thereof); and its codification in H Booysen “Is International Law Relinquishing its 
Exclusively Public Law Nature?” (1997) 2(2) Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law 219-231, at 222, 
223 and 231.  See also JHH Dalhuisen, “The New Lex Mercatoria: An Emerging Challenge to Legal Systems in 
Cross-Border Transactions” (2016) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2871354.> accessed on 1st 
April 2019.  SA Stone, “The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance” (2010) 13 Journal of European 
Public Policy, 627-46. Dalhuisen and Stone discuss features, players and the impact of the new private international 
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body of law has two unique attributes.  The first quality is that it is a complete code being applied 
to transnational commercial transactions and disputes.853  Secondly, it has international arbitration 
as its central dispute resolution feature.854 In turn, international arbitral tribunals such as the ICSID 
have led in the shaping of this body of law into a recognisable and applicable form.  International 
investment arbitration has been viewed, in many respects, as a test laboratory of international 
economic law where many of its pertinent problems have appeared in a particularly visible form.855 
5.2.3 Negative Effects of Fragmentation of International Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms 
Fragmentation leads to at least three problems: incoherence of international law, forum shopping 
and damage to the unity of international law. This next section will therefore highlight these 
problems. 
5.2.3.1 Incoherence and Inconsistency of International Law Norms 
The notion of fragmentation of international law proceeds from the presumption that the basic 
unity and integration of international law is vital for the efficient governing of international or 
transnational relations.856  Noting the wide breadth and complexity of this phenomenon and the 
issues that attend it, the ILC commissioned an initial feasibility study of the phenomenon.857 This 
feasibility study was undertaken and in a report published in 2000, Hafner identified the following 
aspects as the key causes and effects of the fragmentation of international law:858 
 
(i) The lack of centralised organs that would ensure homogeneity of and 
conformity with legal regulations; 
                                                          
law norms to the traditional understanding of international law.  They observe that the growth of the EU has helped 
shape the “new” mercantile law that has now found itself in national courts, with increasing use and new players. 
853 H Booysen and JHH Dalhuisen, ibid. 
854 H Booysen, “International Law and a Legal System; The Quest and the need for a Private Law Leg” (1996) 21 
SAYIL 60. 
855A Reinisch, (n) 848, 109. 
856 SP Rao, (n) 843, at p.930. 
857 G Hafner Report (2000), (n) 847. 
858 ibid. 
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(ii) Specialisation leading to topic autonomy; 
(iii) Political divisions on particular issues; 
(iv) Differing legal structures; 
(v) Parallel regulations; 
(vi) Competitive regulations; 
(vii) Enlargement of the material scope of international law; 
(viii) Multiplication of actors; and 
(ix) Establishment of monitoring bodies and different regimes of secondary rules. 
 
Following Hafner’s feasibility study, the ILC commissioned a study which resulted in the 
2006 Koskenniemi Report.859 The report identified “new” and “special types” of “self-contained 
regimes” and “geographically or functionally limited treaty systems” as creating problems of 
coherence in international law.860 The report established that fragmentation often resulted in 
conflict of normative principles in international law and its application.861 The report adopted the 
rather wide notion of “conflict” as being a situation where two rules or principles suggest different 
ways of dealing with a problem.862 
 
Fragmentation, by itself, is not a new phenomenon. Writing over sixty years ago, Jenks 
drew attention to two aspects that may in future lead to the fragmentation of international law.863  
Firstly, unlike domestic law, there is the general absence of a legislative body for international 
law. Secondly, is the creation of laws to answer or attend to geographical (regional) or functional 
(specific) objectives of states.864 These two fears by Jenks came to pass in the 1990s as regional 
and specialised courts took root. 
 
                                                          
859M Koskenniemi Report (2006), (n) 847, 14. 
860 ibid. 
861 ibid, 17. 
862 ibid, 19. 
863WC Jenks, “The Conflict of law-making Treaties” (1953) 30 BYBIL 403. 
864 ibid. 
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Fragmentation of international legal norms is, therefore, feared if rights and obligations 
under one regime of international law are not uniform and vary from another group or 
organisations of states.865 For example, this scenario could occur if different standards of 
compliance are prescribed under similar obligations in different international organisations with 
the same membership. This is also possible where obligations conflict with one another in 
organisations with common membership.866 For example, regional treaties may conflict with UN 
obligations or even the UN Charter.  At the continental and sub-continental level, many African 
states subscribe to several RECs with similar obligations.  In the absence of clear hierarchical 
preference or order of norms, conflict is bound to arise.867  The likely effect of this multiplicity, in 
the African context, will be discussed later in this chapter. 
5.3.2 Forum Shopping and Duplicity of Proceedings 
The second danger of fragmentation of international dispute settlement systems is forum shopping 
and the likelihood of duplicity of proceedings. Although a multiplication of available judicial and 
quasi-judicial fora has admittedly enlarged international case-law and strengthened international 
law, the danger of providing opportunity for forum shopping still looms large.868 There is also, 
equally, the danger of duplication or multiplication of proceeding before different fora with equal 
or competing competence, leading to a waste of judicial resources.869 If litigated to the end, 
multiple proceedings may result in divergent or contradictory outcomes.870 
 
A few examples might help put the gravity of this problem into context. In international 
investment dispute settlement, two tribunals of equal competence have sharply disagreed over 
similar issues of law within a relatively short span of time.  In the case of SGS Société Générale 
de Surveillance SA v Islamic Republic of Pakistan (SGS v Pakistan) and SGC Société Générale de 
Surveillance SA v Republic of Philippines (SGS v Philippines), two ICSID arbitral tribunals came 
                                                          
865SP Rao, (n) 843, 934. 
866D Shelton, “International Law and Relative Normativity” (2003) in MD Evans (ed), International Law 145,146. 
867SP Rao, (n) 843, at 934.  
868A Reinisch, (n) 848, 1. 
869A Reinisch, (n) 848, 114. 
870A Reinisch, (n) 848, 1-2.    
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to remarkably different results concerning the interpretation of jurisdictional provisions in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs).871 In the 2003 SGS v Pakistan decision, the panel held that it lacked 
jurisdiction to adjudicate on mere contract claims, this is despite the tribunal basing its decision on 
the applicable BIT which broadly provides for settlement of “disputes with respect to investment 
between a contracting party and an investor of the other contracting Party”.872 This interpretation 
was rejected by another ICSID tribunal in the 2004 SGS v Philippines decision on jurisdiction, 
where an identical dispute settlement provision was considered. The tribunal also expressly 
renounced any system of binding precedence under the ICSID Convention or international law in 
general.873 
 
Trade dispute resolution also faces similar problems but mostly where both regional and 
global dispute settlement mechanisms may be available at the same time.  A prominent example 
of this jurisdictional overlap is in the dispute between the USA and Canada before the NAFTA 
panels, on the one hand, and before the WTO panels, on the other hand.874 By the end of 2005, the 
inherent danger of contradictory outcomes had apparently materialised when a WTO panel found 
that certain lumber imports from Canada threatened to cause material injury to USA competitors, 
while a NAFTA committee found that a threat of such material injury could not be ascertained.875 
 
                                                          
871SGS v Philippines (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6) and SGS v Pakistan ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13.  Decisions on 
jurisdiction: SGS v Pakistan 18 ICSID Review – FILJ 301(2003) 42ILM 1290(2009) SGS v Philippines – 29th January 
2004, 8 ICSID Review p. 515. 
872 Article 9 (1) of the BIT between the Swiss Confederation and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Concerning the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 1995 <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-
investment-agreements/treaties/bilateral-investment-treaties/2721/pakistan---switzerland-bit-1995-.> accessed on 5th 
May 2019.  
873 SGS v Philippines, (n) 871 [97]. 
874 The WTO panel case: United States – Investigation of the International Trade Commission on Softwood Lumber 
from Canada (2001-2006) Canada vs US, <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds277_e.htm.> 
NAFTA Committee case: Re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada.  See generally, DA Gantz, “Dispute 
Settlement under the NAFTA and the WTO: Choice of Forum Opportunities and Risks for the NAFTA Parties” 
(1999) 14(4) American University International Law Review 1025-1106. 
875ibid. 
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A good example of forum shopping and duplicity of proceedings was seen in what is 
commonly referred to as the “swordfish dispute” between Chile and the EU.876 The dispute 
concerned fishing rights and conservation measures regarding this highly migratory fish species. 
The controversy led to the parallel establishment of a WTO panel and an ITLOS chamber – both 
in 2000.  While the EU alleged a GATT violation on the part of Chile, Chile considered the 
European fishing practices to be contrary to provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).  Both claims seemed meritorious and, in the end, potentially 
contradictory outcomes were averted by an agreement in 2001 to suspend both proceedings. 
 
Two other examples that merit a brief discussion, because of the extreme conflicting 
dispute settlement outcomes that occurred, are:  Lauder v The Czech Republic and CME Czech 
Republic v The Czech Republic (CME v Czech Republic).877 These were arbitration proceedings 
involving the same disputes between the Czech Republic and a foreign investor who claimed that 
various acts and omissions of the Czech Media Council, during the 1990s, constituted violations 
of investment protection standards.878 Such standards included issues of fair and equitable 
treatment, full protection, security, and the prohibition of expropriation.879 In the first arbitration 
between Mr Lauder and the Czech Republic, in accordance with UNCITRAL Rules, provided 
under the U.S.-Czech BIT, the tribunal unanimously held that Czech Republic had committed a 
breach of its obligations under the U.S.-Czech BIT in relation to some of the alleged events, 
although this breach did not give rise to liability on the part of the Czech Republic.880 In a matter 
                                                          
876DS, WTO panel case: Chile –Measures affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish, DS 1993 (2000). 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds193_e.htm.> accessed on 1st April, 2019.  ITLO case no. 7 
of 2003 (Chile vs EC).  These cases are discussed in detail in terms of the conflict between international law of sea 
and trade law dispute resolution.  Tobias and Voveky “The Swordfish Case: Law of the Sea v Trade” (2002) 
<https://www.zaoerv.de/62_2002/62_2002_1_a_21_36.pdf.> accessed on 1st April. 2019, 21-35.  
877Lauder v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL 3 September 2001, 9 ICSID Reports 66. 14 world Trade and Arbitration 
Materials, (2002) at p.35 and CME Czech Republic BV v the Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award of 13 
September 2001, 9 ICSID Reports 121; 14 World Trade and Arbitration Materials (2002) at p. 109. 
878A Reinisch, (n) 848, [15]. 
879ibid. 
880 See CN Brower and JK Sharpe, “Multiple and Conflicting International Arbitral Awards” (2003)4 The Journal of 
World Investment and Trade 211. 
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of days, in a second subsequent ICSID arbitration launched by a company controlled by Mr 
Lauder, against the Czech Republic, pursuant to the Netherlands–Czech BIT, claiming the same 
violations and relying on the same facts as Mr Launder had in the earlier proceedings, another 
award was rendered.881 The Award rendered in September 2001, in the CME v Czech Republic, 
was in the nature of a partial award.882 It made a conclusion that was diametrically opposed to the 
Lauder v Czech award, and particularly reached a finding of liability against the Czech Republic.883 
 
The reactions that followed the Lauder v Czech and CME v Czech arbitrations were mostly 
negative.884 Most legal commentators considered conflicting arbitral awards as being a serious 
threat to the stability and predictability of international law in general and international dispute 
settlement in particular.885 These two decisions, read together with the conflicting outcomes in the 
two SGS v Philippines and SGS v Pakistan decisions may have motivated treaty-makers to 
seriously consider the establishment of an appellate mechanism in international investment 
arbitration as is currently discussed within the ICSID framework.886 
 
Investment arbitration and its increased use owes much of its attractiveness to the 
likelihood of compliance with its outcomes.887 With the risks that come with the proliferation of 
investment disputes settlement mechanisms, this attractiveness is not guaranteed. The concurrent 
                                                          
881ibid. 
882 CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech Republic, UNICITRAL, Partial Award of 13 September 2001, 9 ICSID 
Reports 121; 14 World Trade and Arbitration Material, 109 (2002). 
883ibid. 
884A Reinisch, (n) 848 [16]. 
885ibid. 
886A proposal is under discussion on the establishment of an appellate institution within ICSID system.  The present 
ICSID Convention only provides for annulment of awards by special ad hoc committees.  The grounds for annulment 
are, however, limited to extreme procedural defects of the arbitration proceedings and, therefore, do not give rise to 
wide powers of substantive review. Articles 50-52 of the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of other States (1965 ICSID Convention). The Convention is available at 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/ICSID%20Convention%20English.pdf.> accessed on 6th May 
2019.  
887A Reinisch, (n) 848, 114. 
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availability of different investment disputes settlement systems may lead to parallel proceedings, 
or the re-litigation of already decided cases.888  This phenomenon is not limited to investment 
arbitration but is a general problem in the global environment of an increased availability of 
international dispute settlement mechanisms.889 
 
Forum shopping, duplication and multiplication of proceedings lead to a waste of judicial 
resources as well as the threat of divergent, or even conflicting outcomes. They may, ultimately, 
contribute to the further fragmentation of international law and weaken both the coherence and 
credibility of international law.890  In the long run, these problems may undermine the confidence 
of investors and states in the system.891  
5.2.2.3 Threat to the Unity of International law 
The third threat posed by the proliferation of international dispute settlement systems is the 
disintegration of the unity of international law.892 This concern has been raised at no less than the 
highest echelons of international dispute resolution, the ICJ. 
 
Gilbert Guillaume, a former President of the ICJ, is on record as having stressed that the 
fragmentation of the international law, is a direct result of multiple judicial fora on the international 
plane.893 He interrogated the role of ITLOS; international criminal courts, both ad hoc and 
permanent tribunals; and arbitration as viable methods of dispute resolution in the body of 
international dispute settlement.894 Guillaume reached the conclusion that although the 
contribution of these systems to the creation of international peace and good order in their 
respective limited spheres is commendable, they pose imminent “dangers for international law, 
                                                          
888ibid. 
889ibid. 
890A Reinisch, (n) 848, 114. 
891ibid, 119. 
892 Koskenniemi and Leino, (n) 847, 555. 
893In his address to the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly in 2000, in his capacity as the President of the 
ICJ, Judge Gilbert Guillaume emphasised that the dangers of fragmentation of international law were a product of 
multiple judicial fora.  His concerns are captured in SP Rao, (n) 843, 938. 
894ibid. 
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resulting from the increasing number of judicial institutions in the modern world.”895 In his view, 
the risk of these different tribunals delivering divergent opinions on the same point of international 
law was real and damaging to the unity of international law.896 
 
Guillaume observed that a divergence of opinion between two international tribunals 
showed that proliferation of tribunals was accompanied by “a serious risk of loss of control.”897 
He reiterated these concerns in his address to the UN General Assembly in 2001 by arguing that 
the proliferation of international courts could jeopardise the unity of international law and, as a 
consequence, undermine its role in inter-state relations.898 
 
Guillaume is not alone in this view. Two other Presidents of the ICJ, Stephen Schwebel 
and Robert Jennings, have echoed Guillaume’s sentiments.899 Schwebel went even further to 
propose that other international tribunals should seek advisory opinions from the ICJ “on issues of 
international law that arise before those tribunals that are of importance to the unity of international 
law,” as a possible solution to the emerging problem of disunity of international law.900 This 
suggestion was also made by Guillaume.901 
 
Some may argue that the suggestions, guised as advancing the unity of international law is 
nothing but a veiled attempt at elevating the ICJ to a supervisory organ of other international courts 
and tribunals, and is aimed at creating a hierarchical order of courts on the international plane. 
However, the undeniable fact is that fragmentation of the international dispute settlement system 
is a cause for genuine concern.  
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896G Guillaume, “The Future of International Judicial Tribunals” (1995) 44 Journal of International Law Quarterly 
848, 861-862. 
897M Koskenniemi and P Leino, (n) 847,555. 
898ibid. 
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5.3. Fragmentation in the Context of African Economic Regionalism  
5.3.1 The “Spaghetti Bowl” Problem 
“Spaghetti Bowl” is a term coined by Bhagwati.902 He argues that the multiple membership of 
countries in RECs has resulted in overlapping of tariff regulations, objectives, divided loyalty and 
other obligations.903 This phenomenon has the undesirable effect of “a limb and spoke” system of 
RECs with complex and multiple regulation. 904 This has in turn led to the weakening of the global 
trade system.905 It equally creates an enforcement nightmare to customs officials and observance 
difficulties to traders. This is a situation whose consequences even the WTO secretariat has warned 
of.906 
 
Bachinger and Hough observe that every African country is currently a member of 
averagely four different trade blocs, creating the famous spaghetti bowl of RIAs.907 They further 
noted that the plan of the AU is to integrate the various RIAs into one large economy with the 
ultimate goal of unifying the continent and creating a United States of Africa by 2030.908 
                                                          
902J Bhagwati, “US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with FTAs” (1995) Columbia University Discussion Paper Series 
No.728 4. The phenomenon was also subsequently discussed in J Bhagwati and A Panagariya (eds) The Economics of 
Preferential Trade Agreements (AE press Washington DC 1996) 8-27. 
903 Ibid. see also, J Bhagwati and D Greenaway and A Panagriya, “Trading Preferentially: Theory and Policy” (1996) 
108 The Economic Journal 1128-1148.  
904This is Gantz’s description of the “spaghetti bowl” problem. D Gantz, “Regional Trade Agreements” (2009) in D 
Bethlehem and others (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of International Trade (Oxford University Press Oxford 2009) 
244. See also, Bachinger and Hough, (n) 23, 43-44. 
905ibid. 
906ibid. 
907 Bachinger and Hough, (n) 23, 43-44. The AU Agenda 2063 is an ambitious plan for a prosperous Africa building 
on the African RECs based on a 25, 10, 5 year and short term plan for integrating the continent. The agenda envisages 
political Unity of the Africa will be culmination of the Economic and Political integration process characterised by a 
continental government and institutions by 2030. With the coming into force of the AfCFTA Agreement and the TFTA 
Agreements, the average membership of African nations in RECs may now be six. See also the Africa Regional 
Integration Index Report 2016 <https://www.tralac.org/documents/news/2771-com2019-africa-regional-integration-
index-report-arii-2019-presentation/file.html.> accessed on 8th May 2019. 
908ibid.  
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For instance, most SADC members are also parties to an EPA with the European Union 
(EU) through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). 909 South Africa is also a party to a 
free trade agreement with the EU.910 The parties to SADC are also members of the COMESA, 
while some member of the EAC are also members of the SADC and COMESA.911 The EAC, on 
its own, is also negotiating trade agreements with the EU.912 SADC, EAC and COMESA members 
are also member states of the TFTA. 
 
The conclusion drawn from this complex web of a multiplicity of multilateral and bilateral 
trade agreements, involving the very same parties, is that it has become a source of divided 
loyalty.913 It has created expensive engagements for poor African economies to maintain and 
confusion for transnational business people as to the applicable regime.914 It has also encouraged 
trade deflection and negatively affected the attainment of multilateral trade in Africa, and as a 
                                                          
909 R Kirk and M Stern. “The New South African Customs Union. Agreement 2005” The World Economy 28(2) 169. 
910 The SADC –EU Economic Partnership Agreement legal texts available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153915.pdf . Accessed on 5th May 2019. 
911 For example, Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe are members of both SADC and COMESA. Tanzania is also a 
member of EAC. 
912 On the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the EAC, see the status report at  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/620218/EPRS_BRI(2018)620218_EN.pdf . Accessed on 
5th May 2019. Ouma views the current deadlock in negotiating a new agreement as having been caused by matters 
“deeper than the merits of the Agreement concerned”. She sees the ineffectiveness of the decision-making process, as 
well as the lack of proper constitution of a representative body in the negotiations, as having facilitated the 
advancement of national interests over the collective interests of the East African Community, hence the stalemate. 
See, P Ouma, “The EU – EAC Economic Partnership Agreement Standoff: The Variable Geometry Question” (2019) 
<http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/05/30/the-eu-eac-economic-partnership-agreement-standoff-the-variable-
geometry-question/>  accessed on 30th September 2019 [1]. 
913UO Uzodike, (n) 88, 36. Jelle argues that the AfCFTA presents African states with an opportunity for a better 
structured economic Agreement with the EU. A prospect the EU is already warming up to. With a larger market, it is 
hoped that the negotiating scales will tilt, or at least sway, in favour of Africa. See A Jelle, “With AfCFTA in Mind: 
New Dawn for Afro-EU Relations?” (2019) <http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/05/27/with-afcfta-in-mind-new-
dawn-for-afro-eu-relations/>   accessed on 30th September 2019.  
914ibid. 
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ripple effect, on the global plane as well. 915 Mistry observes that dual or multiple membership of 
RECs creates complications and retards progress, as a country may become a conduit for leakage 
from one [regional] arrangement to another. 916 
 
A further layer of multilateral trade integration is in the form of the AfCFTA. The AfCFTA 
Agreement, the AEC, and the TFTA, all propose that member states should maintain memberships 
in COMESA, EAC and SADC while still pursuing integration at the continental level.917 This may 
end up complicating and entangling the “spaghetti bowl” even further, so that one may not be able, 
at the end of the day, to tell the true existence, value or even difference between any of the RECs. 
They may all be lost in the complex web and drowned in the swamp of treaties and the myriad of 
protocols attendant thereto, both at the continental and sub-regional REC levels.  
 
The maintaining of parallel REC structures while developing the AfCFTA and AEC may 
have been well meaning, mainly due to efforts at ensuring seamless transition at the end of the 
integration process. However, in the intervening period, the existence of several integration efforts 
pulling in different directions does not augur well for the timeous fusion and integration of the 
merging RECs into the AfCFTA and AEC. 
 
Articles 4(2) (a), 6 (2) (a) of the AEC Treaty, the preamble TFTA Agreement, and Article 
19(2) of the AfCFTA Agreement, expressly encourage the continued existence of and/or 
establishment of “future” RECs. Yet, the essence of the TFTA Agreement and AEC Treaty is to 
build a multilateral trading and economic system that cuts across the entire continent, as opposed 
to sub-regional trading blocs. It is, therefore, tempting to conclude that in their to attempt sell the 
idea of the AEC and the TFTA, the drafters of both instruments sought to appease states’ fixations, 
investment (in time, money and systems) and sentimental attachment to their respective RECs. 
The TFTA and AEC may have found acceptance but at the same time sacrificed and undermined 
the very objectives for which they were set up.  
                                                          
915ibid.  
916 PS Mistry, “Africa’s Record of Regional Cooperation and Integration” (2000) 99(397) African Affairs 570. 
917Articles 4(2) (a), 6 (2) (a) of the AEC Treaty; the preamble TFTA Agreement and article 19 (2) of the AfCFTA 
Agreement.  
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To allow and actively encourage the setting up of new sub-regional trading blocs will, 
invariably, regress the realisation of both the AEC and TFTA. This is tantamount to taking three 
steps forward and two backwards so as to allow the new RECs to catch up with the integration 
process. In the end, the process will inevitably stall or run on the spot. The permissive language 
used in the AEC Treaty and the TFTA with respect to maintaining the existing sub-regional RECs 
while at the same time establishing new RECs is injudicious, misconceived and inconsistent with 
their overall continental integration objectives.  
 
The cost of administering trade agreements and their dispute settlement organs is another 
significant hurdle. For example, all the TFTA members belong to at least 4 RECs, excluding 
bilateral and multilateral trade arrangements.918 These arrangements require administration both 
internally (within the state), at the REC and the WTO levels. Additionally, the need to fund the 
operational costs of the trade arrangements, its secretariats and the bureaucracies’ attendant 
thereto, is unsustainable particularly for frail foreign aid weaned and dependent sub-Saharan 
Africa states, which form the bulk of the AfCFTA.919 Furthermore, these countries have to juggle 
their priority expenditure with the meeting of its many subscription obligations arising from the 
multiple trade arrangement memberships.920 Consequently, many states are serial and chronic 
defaulters in meeting their treaty subscription obligations and as a result, the integration organs 
are poorly funded, slowing down the integration process. This is a reality which faces the AfCFTA 
Agreement and its organs including its dispute settlement mechanisms. 
 
The Draft Protocol on the AU Relations with RECs is meant to offer a proposition that will 
either eliminate or at least ameliorate fragmentation and its effects as witnessed in economic 
integration.921 The Draft Protocol seeks to advance the theme of harmonisation of the policies, 
                                                          
918Bachinger and Hough, (n) 23, 43-44. 
919UO Uzodike, (n) 88. 
920ibid. 
921Draft Protocol on the Relations between the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities 
<https://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/annexes/AEC_protocols.pdf.> accessed on 9th May 2019. According to O 
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operations, objectives and programmes undertaken by sub-regional RECs on the continent.922 To 
this end, an entire structure, complete with a secretariat and technical committees, is set up to 
oversee the implementation of the Protocol.923 
 
Though still at the draft stage, several concerns are apparent, even from a cursory reading 
of the text of the proposed Protocol. Firstly, the Protocol rightly notes that both the AEC Treaty 
and the AfCFTA Agreement are primarily meant to harmonise, coordinate and consolidate 
economic regionalism in Africa.924 The AfCFTA Agreement also defines, in fairly clear terms, the 
relationship and hierarchical order of AU and REC norms.925 The AEC Treaty is, in fact, succinct 
to this end by providing, in Article 6, the step-wise harmonisation process complete with 
milestones to be achieved within set timelines. Article 6 of the AEC Treaty contemplates the 
establishment of a FTA within ten years of the Treaty. Although the AfCFTA came into being 
more than fourteen years after the AEC Treaty contemplated, it marked an effort to put in place 
the FTA envisioned under Article 6 (2) (c) of the AEC Treaty. However, the problem is that this 
critical step towards the AEC is coming at least 8 years late.926 Furthermore, the Draft Protocol 
that is supposed to harmonise the relationship between the AU and RECs is coming midstream to 
the implementation of Article 6 of the AEC Treaty, and 10 years to the date earmarked for 
realisation of the continental economic community.927 It does not help matters that the Protocol is 
still in draft. The stark reality is that, at the current pace, it is unlikely that the AEC will be realised 
by 2030 as planned.  
 
                                                          
Kaaba and B Fagbayibo, this Draft protocol is unhelpful in advancing the rule of law on the continent since it is yet 
to be adopted and is largely ambiguous. See O Kaaba and B Fagbayibo, (n) 107.  
922 See the Preamble, Articles 2 and 3 of the Draft Protocol. 
923 Chapter Two of the Protocol sets out its institutional framework. 
924 Articles 3 and 4 of the AEC Treaty; and the Preamble Article 3 and 4 of the AfCFTA Agreement. 
925 Article 19 of the AfCFTA Agreement provides that the Agreement shall prevail in the event of any inconsistency 
between it and any regional agreement. 
926 According to Article 6 (2) (c) of the AEC Treaty, a FTA should have been established within 10 years of the coming 
into force of the Treaty (1994), i.e by 2004. 
927According to Article 6 (2) (a) of the AEC Treaty, the harmonisation of RECs should occur within 5 years of the 
1994 (when Treaty came into force) treaty, i.e by 2000. The Protocol remains a draft 10 years since it was mooted. 
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Secondly, while the Protocol is detailed on the socio-economic areas of cooperation and 
harmonisation, it is silent on the harmonisation, coordination and hierarchical relations between 
AU and REC dispute settlement mechanisms.928 This is with particular reference to economic 
integration. On dispute resolution, the Protocol says nothing more than to confer jurisdiction upon 
“the Court of Justice of the Union” over disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of 
the provisions of the Constitutive Act of the AU, the AEC Treaty, the Protocol itself and the treaties 
establishing RECs.929 
 
Thirdly, the Protocol will come into force upon endorsement by the AU Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government; and also when signed by the Chairperson and Chief Executives of at 
least three (3) RECs.930 While it is appreciated that a minimum threshold for accession to the 
Protocol is necessary, a process meant to harmonise the economic communities of Africa into a 
continental vehicle must, out of necessity, carry along all the RECs. If not, there is always the 
lurking danger of sectional continental integration, which is inimical to the establishment of the 
desired continental market. 
 
There have been significant developments since the Draft Protocol on AU Relations with 
RECs was prepared, and whose effect must be taken into account in the final or future versions of 
the Protocol. For instance, the 26-member TFTA Agreement was concluded in 2015.931 The TFTA 
                                                          
928Article 2 of the Protocol defines the scope of its application to include implementation of measures in the economic, 
social, political and cultural fields including gender, peace and security. Article 2 (b) provides for the harmonisation 
and coordination of macro-economic policies in peace and security policies, agriculture, industry, transport and 
communication, energy and environment, trade and customs, monetary and financial matters, integration legislation, 
human resources, gender, tourism, science and technology, cultural and social affairs, democracy, governance, human 
rights and humanitarian matters. 
929 Article 32, the dispute resolution clause of the Protocol. Curiously the drafters of the Protocol seem to be oblivious 
of the merger of the AU courts and the creation of a single court hence their erroneous reference to the “Court of 
Justice of the Union”, a non-existent entity.  
930 Article 33 of the Protocol. 
931 The TFTA; its objectives, structure and dispute resolution system; is discussed in Chapter 3.4.4 of this thesis. 
Nalule observes that the complete absence or even mere mention of the Draft Protocol in AfCFTA Agreement is 
telling of the commitment of AU member states towards continental economic integration. The AfCFTA being an 
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is by far the largest sub-continental REC in Africa. The current draft of the Protocol only 
recognises 8 RECs in Africa.932 A more current version of the Protocol should identify and 
appropriate a more central role to the TFTA, particularly  with regard to the economic integration 
of the continent. Significantly, the TFTA, a conglomerate of three established RECs in Africa, 
provides a viable and less protracted proposition to bringing together 26 African states at one go 
and through one REC.  
 
Fourthly, the Protocol presents yet another example of top-to-bottom approach to economic 
integration in Africa. This approach is characterised by the creation of continental and sub-
continental integration bodies. These were created by governments and technocrats without the 
input of the common people on the streets, whom these efforts are supposed to serve or benefit.933 
It has, therefore, been suggested that this approach has always spelt doom to the integration of 
markets in Africa because the common people do not own the process and hence feel far removed 
from it.934 Fagbayibo aptly addresses this criticism, by suggesting that the debate and processes of 
regional integration should be moved from an elitist framing to the grassroots:  
 
In addition, there is a need to “privatise” the process of regional integration by ensuring 
popular participation and an ample support base. For the success and sustainability of this 
process, it is imperative that the debate surrounding regional integration is moved from the 
elitist realm of technocrats, civil societies and the academia to a forum that seeks to inform 
the African populace about the benefits and the drawbacks of integration and to garner their 
                                                          
effort at harmonising RECs in Africa should have specifically mentioned and related itself with the Draft Protocol. 
See, Nalule, “The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community and the Agreement establishing the African 
Continental Free Trade Area: Some Relational Aspects and Concerns” (2019) 
<http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/08/14/the-treaty-establishing-the-african-economic-community-and-the-
agreement-establishing-the-african-continental-free-trade-area-some-relational-aspects-and-concerns/>  accessed on 
23rd September 2019 [8].  
932 The Protocol seems to only make provision for eight RECs in Africa, namely: ECOWAS, COMESA, ECCAS, 
SADC, IGAD, CEN-SAD, AMU and EAC. See also the commentary by the AU <https://au.int/en/organs/recs> 
accessed on 23rd September 2019 in which only 8 RECs are named as being the subjects of the Protocol. 
933B Fagbayibo, (n) 114, 503. 
934ibid. 
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opinions. The “common man or woman” in the streets of, inter alia, Kigali, Arusha, 
Kumasi and Maputo should be given an opportunity to contribute to this debate. The fact 
the majority of the continent’s population is illiterate and impoverished makes the issue of 
popular mobilisation more important.935 
5.3.2 Fragmentation of International Investment Arbitration in Africa  
At least sixty-four arbitration institutions exist in Africa.936 Most of these are moribund institutions 
struggling to survive or even break ground.937 However, some centres are up and running and have 
shown positive signs of growth. Some of the prominent African Arbitral institution include: the 
Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA),938 the Lagos Regional 
Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (LRCICA),939 Arbitration Foundation of South 
                                                          
935ibid. 
936 EN Torgbor, “Privatisation of Commercial Justice through Arbitration; The Role of Arbitration Institutions in 
Africa” (2015) Alternative Dispute Resolution 109-121, 114. 
937ibid.  
938 CRCICA was established in 1979 by an international agreement signed between the Egyptian government and the 
Asian African Legal Consultative Organisation (AALCO). It offers arbitration administration services for both 
international and domestic arbitration under its own rules and the ICC, ICSID, Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 
and Court for Arbitration for Sports (CAS) Rules.  It is based in Cairo, Egypt.  It has so far dealt with over 1000 
disputes and is a popular seat for arbitration in the North Africa-Arab-Middle East region. See, 
<https://globalarbitrationreview.com/insight/the-middle-eastern-and-african-arbitration-review-
2019/1190107/crcica-overview> accessed on 8th April 2019. AALCO is an intergovernmental organisation 
comprising 48 counties and was established for purpose of advancing the said economic and political interests of 
Asian and African Countries.  For details see, <http://aalco.int/scripts/view-posting.asp?recordid=10> accessed on 8th 
April, 2019. 
939 The LRCICA was established under the AALCO framework in 1989.  It commenced operations in 1999 after the 
agreement establishing it was ratified in accordance with Nigerian law.  It is based in Lagos-Nigeria. See, 
<https://rcical.org/index.php/corporate-profile/> accessed on 8th April 2019. 
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Africa (AFSA),940 the Uganda Centre for Arbitration and Dispute Resolution (CADR),941 the 
Kigali International Arbitration Centre (KIAC),942 the Lagos Court of Arbitration (LCA),943 the 
Nairobi Centre for International Arbitration (NCIA),944  the African Arbitration Association 
                                                          
940AFSA was founded in 1996 and is a joint venture between business community, legal and accounting professions.  
It administers both domestic and international arbitrations.  It also offers training in ADR.  It is based in Sandton, 
South Africa with branches in major cities in the Country. See, https://arbitration.co.za/a-brief-history/. accessed on 
8th May 2019. 
941 CADR was formed in 1989.  It is based in Kampala Uganda and provides both ADR training and administrator of 
dispute resolution mechanisms.  It has memberships at both corporate and individual level, and is the premier ADR 
organisation in Uganda.  It is a non-profit member organisation that is independent of the state in its operations.  See 
<http://www.monitordirectory.co.ug/listing/centre-for-arbitration-dispute-resolution-53f5414822f67.html.> accessed 
on 8th April, 2019. See also, generally, AC Kakooza, “Arbitration, Conciliation and Mediation in Uganda: A Focus 
on the Practical Aspects” (2009) 7(2) Uganda Living Law Journal, 268-294. 
942 KIAC was launched on 31st May 2012 but had been established earlier by an Act of Parliament (Law No. 
51/2010) promulgated on 10th January 2010.  It is involved in the promotion of ADR both in the domestic and 
international spheres.  It also facilitates training of ADR practitioners.  The Centre has rapidly grown, and in only 6 
years of operations it has administered over 108 disputes valued at over US$ 40m.  See 
http://kiac.org.rw/IMG/pdf/kiac_annual_report_2017-2018.pdf accessed on 8th April 2019. 
943 Located in Lagos, Nigeria offers both neutral appointment of dispute resolvers, administration and dispute 
management, and hosts other ADR institutions such as the CIArb (UK) Nigeria Branch, Lagos Chamber of Commerce 
International Arbitration Centre (LACIAC) and the Maritime Arbitration Association of Nigeria.  It also offers training 
in ADR (Arbitration, Mediation and Conciliation).  The LCA was established under a Lagos State Statute: The Lagos 
Court of Arbitration Law No. 17 of 2009 to provide institutionalised arbitration and ADR. It is a private sector driven 
body independent of state control. See <https://www.lca.org.ng/about/> accessed on 8th April, 2019. 
944 NCIA was established in 2013 by an Act of the Kenyan Parliament, NCIA Arbitration Act No. 26 of 2013, for 
purposes of promoting of international commercial Arbitration and other forms of ADR. It is mandated to offer 
training, administer both domestic and international Arbitration, and develop a national policy on ADR.  The Centre 
has so far dealt with about 20 disputes valued at over 20 million US Dollars; in a period of less than 3 years of full 
operation.  See, <https://www.ncia.or.ke/our-services/> accessed on 8th April 2019. For an analysis of the NCIA Act 
2013 see, generally, WA Mutubwa, “The Making of an International Arbitration Hub: A Critical Appraisal of the 
Nairobi Centre for International Arbitration Act 2013” (2016) 82(2) The International Journal of Arbitration, 
Mediation and Dispute Management 82 Issue, 135-145. 
188 
 
(AfAA),945 the OHADA Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA),946 the  Arbitration 
Tribunal of ECOWAS (AT),947 the COMESA Court of Justice and EACJ which incorporate 
arbitration jurisdiction in  the respective Courts’ Architecture.948 
 
Most of these arbitration institutions are private-sector driven while some are either set up 
or supported by government. Despite this difference, the common problems suffered by most of 
these centres include: lack of financial and material resources, equipment, personnel, and technical 
capacity.949 The CRCICA, NCIA, OHADA CJJA and the KIAC have, however, shown resilience 
and a will to prosper. This is, perhaps, attributable to state support (including funding). As a result, 
these centres have demonstrated impressive results and remarkable organisation, competence and 
independence, which factors have in turn won over investor confidence.950 
 
Most, if not all, African international arbitration centres suffer similar bottlenecks. Firstly, 
there are the general uncoordinated efforts towards promotion of regional centres, with each 
geographical sub-region having established its own arbitration centre.951This has translated into a 
                                                          
945AfAA was established in June 2018 and is hosted in Kigali, Rwanda.  It is a membership organisation consisting 
both individual leading African Arbitrators and arbitration Institutions. Its role is to support the development of 
international arbitration in Africa and to promote its members and their activities in international dispute resolution.  
See https://afaa.ngo/page-18071 accessed on 8th April 2019. 
946 For a discussion on the arbitral jurisdiction and structure of the OHADA CCJA see Chapter Three of this thesis. 
947 The ECOWAS Court currently bears the arbitration jurisdiction pending the formal establishment of the ECOWAS 
Arbitration Tribunal. See Article 3(5) of the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on the Community Court of Justice. 
948 See Chapter Three of thesis on the arbitral jurisdiction of the COMESA Court of Justice and EACJ. 
949 EN Torgbor, (n) 936, 114. 
950ibid, 115. CRCICA, for example, is a leading arbitration centre in North Africa-Arab-Middle East region and was 
recognised as the Regional Institution of 2013 by the Global Arbitration Review. Torgbor notes that Government 
support in setting up the Kigali and Cairo Centres not only facilitated the Centres’ growth but ensured that the Centres 
had adequate facilities and references necessary for them to operate. 
951 C Namachanja, “The Challenges facing Arbitral Institutions in Africa” (2015) 3(2) Alternative Dispute Resolution 
138-169, 148. 
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low volume of references to the institutions and most are without significant international 
caseloads.952 
 
The second issue is the problem of language barrier. Ideally, language should not be a 
barrier to effective dispute settlement, especially in the age of technological advancements, where 
the world is now regarded as a global village. However, in practical terms the continent is still 
divided into sub-regions with legal preferences drawn along the lines of the languages of the states’ 
erstwhile colonial masters. Some arbitration institutions operate only in French speaking countries. 
Parties from such states are unlikely to, therefore, refer disputes to institutions which conduct 
arbitrations exclusively in English. For example, CRCICA in Egypt only administers cases in 
English and Arabic, it neither handles nor avails arbitral rules and proceedings in French.953 
Similarly, the OHADA CCJA in Cote d’Ivoire only accepts French as the language of arbitration, 
thereby posing challenges to English speaking parties.954 
 
Thirdly, the public or investors’ low confidence in African arbitral institutions also reflects 
on the region’s arbitral institutions. It has been observed that African states prefer referring 
disputes to arbitration centres in Europe and appointing arbitrators based in European capitals.955 
Statistics from the ICSID paint this grim picture more clearly. Out of all the arbitrations recorded 
by ICSID since its inception in 1972, cases involving sub-Saharan African countries represent 15% 
                                                          
952ibid, 149. See also, Finizio and Fuhrich, “Africa’s Advance” (2014) Expert view: Surveying Africa (Commercial 
Dispute Resolution) 27-29. 
953W Jahnel, “Assessment Report of Arbitration Centres in Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt and Mauritius” (2014) African 
Development Bank https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Procurement/Project-related-
Procurement/Assessment_Report_of_arbitration_centres_in_C%C3%B4te_d%E2%80%99Ivoire__Egypt_and_Mau
ritius.pdf  accessed on 8th April, 2019, 47.  
954ibid. Fagbayibo observes that within the Francophone dominated OHADA, tensions between English and French 
speaking states exist. A practical example of the effect of this tension is seen in the case of Cameroon. According to 
Article 1 of the Constitution of Cameroon, French and English are the official languages of the state. However due to 
the dominance of French speaking countries in the OHADA, there has been resistance in accepting the OHADA 
uniform Acts in the English Speaking provinces of Cameroon. See, Fagbayibo, (n) 531, 317. 
955C Namachanja, (n) 951, 152. 
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of the Court’s entire Caseload.956 Yet, only a partly 2% African arbitrators were appointed by the 
parties in the period.957 
 
The statistics on international arbitration paint a disturbing picture of the African continent. 
There is, therefore, a need to grow investor and commercial arbitration from the roots. The 
beginning point would be to focus on intra-African multilateral and bilateral trade and investment 
arbitration as a launching pad into transcontinental arbitration. The AfCFTA and AEC, therefore, 
become important tools in this regard. 
 
Fourthly, African arbitral institutions are facing competition from more established 
arbitration seats such as London and its London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) as well 
as Paris with its International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Court of Arbitration. The two are the 
most popular venues for resolution of investment disputes, and are often preferred by investors 
and states, including African states. These centres have existed for over a century and have gained 
unparalleled reputation as centres of excellence in commercial dispute resolution, with the 
necessary expertise, culture and experience.958 African centres are still nascent, most are hardly 10 
years old with the oldest being no more than 20 years old.959 African investment arbitration centres 
are therefore still playing catch up in this arena, and so are African Arbitrators. As Torgbor 
pointedly put it: 
 
Now is the time for Africa to be more visible, confident and assertive in the world of 
arbitration. If we meet the challenge, disputes emanating from Africa may still continue to 
be submitted to arbitration under the auspices of international arbitration organisations, but 
                                                          
956ICSID web statistics 2019 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202019-1(English).pdf> accessed 
on 8th April 2019. 
957ibid. 
958 The LCIA was set up in 1883, 135 years ago.  The ICC Court of Arbitration was established in the year 1923, 
over 96 years ago.  See, <https://www.lcia.org/> and <https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/icc-
international-court-arbitration/> accessed on 24th September 2019. 
959 See notes 938-950 above. The oldest African Arbitration Centre is about 40 years old (CRCICA) while the 
youngest is hardly two years old (AFAA). 
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at the same time African disputes will increasingly be heard in Africa by African 
arbitrators.960 
 
The fifth impediment to the growth of investment arbitration in Africa has been identified 
as political uncertainty. Many African countries have an unfavourable political environment.961 
Disputants generally favour politically stable countries as seats of arbitration.962 Parties to large 
transnational disputes would prefer arbitral institutions in politically stable countries to administer 
the process because such countries offer greater certainty in the efficient conduct of the 
proceedings.963. 
 
Africa has had its own share of experience in political instability, which has in turn diverted 
the attention of parties in international arbitration away from the continent. Civil unrest in the 
aftermath of the 2011 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) uprising (the Arab spring) affected 
countries such as Egypt and Libya. This became a major dissuading factor leading disputant to 
resorting to European countries with more established arbitration institutions away from the 
region’s arbitration centre.964 Threats of government destabilisation, coups, extremist action and 
civil disorder dissuade any well-meaning investor from African arbitration centres. Conversely, 
certainty, safety and political stability would draw disputants to African seats of arbitration.965 
 
The problem of political uncertainly is not unique to Africa. Developing countries from 
other continents also experience political instability and civil unrest. For example, Namachanja 
observes that in Latin America, there is significant pressure from parties to appoint European 
                                                          
960 Torgbor, (n) 936, 121. 
961C Namachanja, (n) 951, 153. 
962ibid. 
963K Sarkodie, “International Arbitration in the Sub-Saharan African Countries” (2014) Mayer Brown 
<https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2017/02/international-arbitration-in-sub-
saharan-africa> accessed on 6th April, 2019, 1. 
964S Finizio and A Skeirka (2015) “Arbitration in the Shadow of old Empires” (2015) Wilmer Hale 
<https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/publications/arbitration-in-the-shadow-of-old-empires> accessed on 6th 
April, 2019, 4. 
965C Namachanja, (n) 951, 154. 
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arbitrators to handle matters at the expense of local arbitrators due to instability in the region.966 
Belloul captures this concern in the following terms: 
 
Political uncertainty may well be the benchmark that makes people cautious, especially if 
they have been bitten once before in a number of jurisdictions… Countries with stronger 
institutions, legal certainty and better economic performance… are attracting more and 
more capital.967 
 
The sixth problem affecting the growth of investment arbitration in Africa is the perception 
of corruption and government interference in judicial and arbitral matters. The 2018 Transparency 
International (TI) corruption perception index indicts most African Nations.968 African countries 
have also been blamed for interference with judicial independence of Court’s or quasi-judicial 
organs.969 These perceptions pose a great threat to investment arbitration on the continent. 
 
African countries set up arbitration centres, whether individually or as a group of countries 
in a region but proceed to populate the tribunals with state appointees. Two examples will help 
illustrate this point. The NCIA is a government body established by statute in Kenya, yet most of 
its leadership is drawn from government appointees.970 The EACJ, ECOWAS and COMESA 
                                                          
966ibid, 153. 
967D Belloul, “Arbitration Migration” (2014) International Arbitration 53-55, 54. 
968According to the 2018 TI Corruption Perceptions index, most African Countries lie in the bottom half of the ranking 
and are classified as being perceived “Highly Corrupt” <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018> accessed on 8th April 
2019. 
969  The World Economic Forum Report 2018 on judicial independence ranks only 4 sub-Saharan countries in the top 
50, of the 137 countries surveyed, as having independent judiciaries. The Report is available at 
http://reports.weforum.org/pdf/gci-2017-2018-scorecard/WEF_GCI_2017_2018_Scorecard_EOSQ144.pdf. 
Accessed on 23rd September 2019. 
970 Under Section 6(1) of the NCIA Act, 2013, the board of the Centre is appointed by the Attorney General of the 
Republic of Kenya on the recommendation of various bodies including the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) and the 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (CIArb) Kenya Branch. The Board in turn appoints members of the arbitral Court.  
It is unlikely in practise, therefore that one would be appointed to the board or court of the NCIA if the Attorney 
General, himself an appointee of the President of the Republic, does not agree with the recommendation.  For a critique 
of the NCIA Court and its effect on the centre’s independence, See W Mutubwa, “The Making of an Arbitration Hub:  
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Courts of Justice have arbitration mandates, which mandates are to be exercised by Judges of the 
respective Courts, who are all appointees of Heads of State and Government of the member 
states.971This approach invariably erodes the confidence of foreign investors in the arbitral 
institutions. Coupled with the negative attitude of domestic courts towards arbitration, and the 
general aversion of African states towards independent judicial or arbitral institutions, the state of 
investment arbitration through regional bodies seems less than impressive. 
 
Torgbor sums up the problems associated with the proliferation and fragmentation of 
African regional arbitration centres as follows: 
 
While these centres and institutions are indicators of continental progress and achievement 
in the management and administration of dispute resolution with varying degrees of 
success, we must be mindful that proliferation of institutions is not akin or tantamount to 
progress or excellence in operations or service delivery. On the contrary, proliferation is 
often accompanied by fragmentation, staff shortage, inadequate professional performance 
and poor service delivery. The proliferation of institutions with sub-standard and carefree 
orientations or whose only justification for existence is the business of seeking new 
members and sustenance from membership subscription fees will not be a rewarding trend 
for African users.972 
 
It is against the foregoing backdrop that the AfCFTA dispute settlement system should be 
seen. The AfCFTA dispute settlement system includes a provision for arbitration.973 The 
expectation is that as the continent harmonises and consolidates its trade and investment regulation 
through the AfCFTA and ultimately the AEC, the investment dispute settlement system will also 
                                                          
A critical Appraisal of the Nairobi Centre for International Arbitration Act, 2013” (2015) The International Journal 
of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management 135-145, 139-140. 
971Article 32 of the EAC Treaty; Article 11(2) of the ECOWAS Court Supplementary Protocol; and Article 28 of the 
COMESA Treaty. 
972EN Torgbor, (n) 936, 116. 
973Article 27 of the AfCFTA Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the settlement of Disputes.  See Chapter Three of 
this thesis far a detailed analyse of the dispute resolution mechanisms under the AfCFTA.   
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be re-aligned and consolidated under an overarching continental arbitration mechanism. This is in 
order to avoid duplicity, proliferation and fragmentation, and its attendant problems. Proposals and 
recommendations on how this can be achieved will be made in the next chapter of this thesis. 
5.3.3 Proliferation and Fragmentation of Investment Codes in Africa 
Closely related to international investment arbitration is the viability of the various investment 
codes conceived and promulgated on the continent. Investment codes are meant to be blueprints 
for spurring economic activities through strategies that encourage foreign direct investment within 
the member states who subscribe to these codes. International arbitration is the most preferred 
mode of settling international commercial and investor-state disputes, hence the co-relation. 
 
The EAC, SADC, ECOWAS and COMESA all have Investment Codes, Acts or 
Protocols.974 The objective of these codes and protocols is to harmonise member states’ investment 
policies and laws in alignment with the common regional codes. For example, Article 19, Annex 
1 of the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment (SADC-FIP) enjoins member states to 
harmonise their investment policies, laws and practices with the objective of creating a SADC 
investment zone.975 To this end, Article 2 of the SADC-FIP elaborately provides that one of the 
key objectives of the Protocol is:  
 
                                                          
974The EAC has a model Investment Treaty concluded in 2016 
<https://www.eac.int/documents/category/investment-promotion-private-sector-development> accessed on 6th 
April, 2019;  ECOWAS has a Supplementary Act on Investments (supplementary Act A/SA 3/12/08; 
<https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaties/treaties-with-investment-
provisions/3547/ecowas-supplementary-act-on-investments> accessed on 6th April, 2019. COMESA has a Common 
Investment Agreement, <https://www.iisd.org/toolkits/sustainability-toolkit-for-trade-negotiators/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/rei120.06tt1.pdf> accessed on 6th April, 2019. SADC has the SADC Finance and 
Investment Protocol (FIP), available at 
<https://www.sadc.int/files/4213/5332/6872/Protocol_on_Finance__Investment2006.pdf.> accessed on 6th April, 
2019.   
975 The SADC-FIP discussed in detail in L Ngobeni and B Fagbayibo, “The Investor-State Dispute Resolution 
Forum under the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment: Challenges and Opportunities for effective 
Harmonisation” (2015) 19 Journal of Law and Development 175-191.  
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Harmonisation of the financial and investment policies of the state parties in order to make 
them consistent with the objectives of SADC and ensure that any change to financial and 
investment policies in the state party do not necessitate undesirable adjustments in other 
state parties. 
 
Several issues arise with respect to the proliferation of investment codes in Africa.  The 
first and most obvious one, is that most member states of African RECs also have domestic 
investment laws and policies. Some of these are inconsistent with or in direct conflict with the 
regional codes or policies. For example, Mhlongo notes that the scope of definition, and 
exceptions, of “an investment” in the SADC-FIP and South Africa’s Protection Investment Act 22 
of 2015 are capable of multiple interpretations.976 This is primarily with respect to the following 
cardinal principles of investment law: the right of establishment of investment,977 fair and equitable 
treatment, 978 and legal protection of investment.979 
 
                                                          
976L Mhlongo, “A Critical Analysis of the Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015” (2019) Forthcoming in South 
Africa Public Law Journal 1-25, at 8-18. 
977L Mhlongo observes that Section 7 of the South African Protection of Investment Act provides that all investments 
must be established in compliance with the laws of South Africa. However, section 7(2) of the Act does not, however, 
create a right for a foreign investor or prospective investor to establish an investment in South Africa. While the State 
retains the sovereign right to regulate investments in its territory, general international law on foreign investment 
places obligations on states not to place unreasonable restrictions to foreign investment. Article 2(3) of the SADC FIP, 
in line with this general principle, prohibits member states from amending or modifying, without good reasons, or 
arbitrarily, the terms, conditions and any benefit specified in the code.  See L Mhlongo, ibid, 10-11. 
978 While both the South African Investment Act and Annexure 1 of the SADC FIP provide for the National Treatment 
Standard (NTS), they do not directly provide for the Most Favoured Nation (MFN).  Article 6 of the Annexure 1 of 
the SADC FIP provides that investors “shall enjoy fair and equitable treatment in the territory of any member state”, 
on the other hand, South Africa’s Investments Act requires that administrative, legislative and judicial process do not 
operate in a matter that is arbitrary or that denies administrative and procedural justice to an investor, L Mhlongo, 
ibid, 11. 
979 L Mhlongo underscores that section 2 of the Constitution of South Africa affirms its supremacy. This means that, 
in South Africa, the validity of international law is not measured against the rules of international customary law, but 
by the Constitution. As a result, she further observes, it will be difficult for foreign investors to invoke international 
investment law which may be seen to offend the South African Constitution. See, L Mhlongo, ibid, 13. 
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The second problem is one associated with the multiple memberships by African countries 
of RECs with similar objectives. For instance, all the COMESA member states are either members 
of EAC or SADC.980  All member states of SADC and EAC are also members of the TFTA, while 
Tanzania is a member of both SADC and EAC and is, therefore, subject to both the SADC-FIP 
and EAC Investment Code. All these regional organisations promote economic regionalism with 
very similar objectives, including the desire for a common investment policy throughout their 
respective regions. This leads to the problem of states being required to adopt several codes and 
protocols on the same subject and sometimes with conflicting objectives and provisions. 
5.3.4 The Possible role of the PAIC in redressing Fragmentation of Investment Codes 
in Africa  
According to UNCTAD, 99   investor – state dispute claims have been filed against African States 
since 1987.981 In most of these cases, African states have lost and been ordered to pay huge 
compensatory damages.982 African countries have in turn raised several concerns about the 
traditional ISDS system, including the lack of legitimacy and transparency, exorbitant costs, and 
inconsistent and flawed awards.983 
In response to what they view as a system skewed against them, African countries have 
either attempted to backtrack from ISDS Treaty obligations, or to establish their own ISDS 
                                                          
980M Kane, “The Pan African Investment Code: A good First Step, but more is Needed” (2018) Perspectives on 
Tropical Foreign Direct Investment Issues (Columbia Centre on Sustainable Investment) 1–3, 1. 
<http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2016/10/No-217-Kane-FINAL.pdf> accessed on 23rd September 2019.  
981Investment Policy Hub <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/iia-mapping> 
accessed on 7th April 2019. 
982ibid. See also World Bank 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/2018ICSIDAnnualReport.ENG.pdf> accessed on 7th April 
2019. 
983T Chidede, “Investor – State Dispute Settlement in Africa and the AfCFTA Investment Protocol” (2018) at p.1-2. 
<https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/13787-investor-state-dispute-settlement-in-africa-and-the-afcfta-investment-
protocol.html >accessed on 7th April 2019. See, for example the key findings and recommendations of South Africa 
in G de Carvalho “At the Table or on the Menu? Africa’s Agency and the Global Order” (2019) Institute for Security 
Studies available at https://issafrica.org/research/africa-report/at-the-table-or-on-the-menu-africas-agency-and-the-
global-order   accessed on 20th November 2019. 
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systems. Tanzania, for example, has enacted legislation that requires the use of domestic courts as 
the forum for ISDS to the exclusion of international arbitration.984 The South African Protection 
of Investment Act, 2015 and the SADC FIP now require exhaustion of local remedies before 
engaging in international arbitration, be it under the UNCITRAL Rules or ICSID.985 
 
While concerns over the ISDS system are not confined to Africa, most African countries 
are still parties to, and still conclude, BITs (with other African countries or external partners) which 
prescribe ICSID, UNCITRAL, ICC, ICA, LCA, PCA and LCIA as the ISDS fora.   
 
                                                          
984 In 2014, Tanzania was identified as a top destination for foreign direct investment in East Africa by UNCTAD.  
However, since the new government came into power in 2017, the Country has developed a rather combative stance 
towards foreign investment, particularly in the natural resources sector.  Three controversial pieces of legislation have 
since been passed, namely:  the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2017; the National Wealth and 
Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act 2017 and the National Wealth and Resources (Review and Renegotiation of 
Unconscionable Terms) Act 2017.  Under Section 6(2) of the Review and Renegotiation of Unconscionable Terms 
Act provides that a contract that contains a clause that subjects the “state to the jurisdiction of foreign law and fora” 
is “deemed to be unconscionable.” Under the new law, reference to “foreign fora’ such as international ISDS 
arbitration relating to the Tanzanian government may, therefore, be unconscionable.  Section 11 of the Permanent 
Sovereignty Act prohibits international dispute resolution mechanisms or any court or tribunal from exercising 
jurisdiction over extraction, exploitation or acquisition and use of natural wealth and resources.  Jurisdiction is 
reserved for the domestic Tanzanian judicial or other bodies, established under Tanzanian law.  Section 22 of the 
Public – Private Partnership (Amendment) Act, No. 9 of 2018 prohibits international arbitration and instead prescribes 
“mediation or arbitration adjudicated by judicial bodies or other organs established in Tanzania and in accordance 
with its laws”.  For a detailed discussion on the effect of these statutory amendments on FDI in Tanzania, see, M 
Masamba, “Government Regulatory Space in the Shadow of BITs: Tanzania’s Natural Resources Regulatory Review” 
(2017) <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/12/21/governmentregulatory-space-in-the-shadow-of-bits-the-case-of-
tanzanias-natural-resource-regulatory-reform-magalie-masamba/> accessed on 7th April 2019. 
985L Mhlongo, (n) 976, 17.  Ngobeni and Fagbayibo, note 975 above, at p. 176.  The South African Minister of Trade 
and Industry, a strong proponent of the Protection of Investment Act, argues that doing away with international 
arbitration will increase the protection of investors and the economy. He further states that because of the long line of 
precedents on similar disputes domestically, and its rich heritage, the South African Judiciary is better placed in 
ensuring protection of investors through consistent and, therefore, predictable decisions. See, 
https://www.economywatch.com/features/south-africa-cancelling-foreign-investment.02-01.html accessed on 7th 
April, 2019. 
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There is, however, a discernible shift towards a regional and sub-regional focus in ISDS in 
Africa. For example, the SADC FIP and ECOWAS Supplementary Investment Act do not provide 
a specific ISDS forum but they make provisions for investors to use local remedies.986 The EAC 
Model Investment Code prescribes mediation and investment Arbitration as the preferred state-
state, and state-investor dispute settlement mechanism.987 The COMESA Common Investment 
Agreement incorporates ISDS arbitration through the COMESA Court of Justice, Africa 
arbitration centres, as well as ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitral tribunals.988 The greatest challenge 
is that African countries belong to more than one REC and are, therefore, obliged to subscribe to 
different sub-regional ISDS with different approaches, including whether or not to exhaust local 
remedies before resorting to the regional mechanism. 
 
This is where the PAIC becomes useful. While the PAIC is not a panacea to all the 
problems afflicting ISDS in Africa, it substantially responds to most of the current concerns 
surrounding the subject. First, the PAIC provides for arbitration through African arbitration 
institutions governed by UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, with the consent of the parties.989 This, at 
least, eliminates the different approaches African states have taken on ISDS when concluding BITs 
among themselves. 
 
Secondly, a dispute settlement that is predictable, independent and allows investors to 
enforce their rights remains crucial for foreign investors.990 Legal certainty and respect for the rule 
of law is a non-negotiable minimum for an investor seeking to invest in a country. The AfCFTA 
investment protocol should expand to include disputes by individuals and not only inter-state 
                                                          
986 T Chidede, (n) 983, 2. 
987 Article 23 of The EAC Model Investment Code (2016).  The Arbitration is to be conducted under the ICSID 
Convention and Rules, UNCITRAL Rules, the ICSID additional Facility Rules; or EACJ.  
988 The Amended COMESA Common and Investment Agreement, 2017.  Articles 26, 27 and 28.  
989 Chapter 6.  The 2016 Draft Treaty is available at https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/32844-doc-draft_pan-
african_investment_code_december_2016_en.pdf . Accessed on 7th April 2019. 
990 T Chidede, (n) 983, 3. 
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disputes. 991 This access to ISDS should include non-African investors, otherwise disputes between 
such investors and African states will still be hosted in European capitals. 
 
Like the COMESA Investment Agreement and the EAC approach, the PAIC should 
cascade its ISDS system through the sub-regional judicial organs. A harmonisation of the various 
sub-regional codes will be crucial in achieving this end. To overcome the perception that most 
African domestic courts lack impartiality and independence from their governments, the PAIC 
should provide for a waiver of the rule for mandatory exhaustion of local remedies, where it can 
be shown that it is either impossible or unnecessarily obstructive to procure its compliance. 
 
It is in light of the problems discussed in the preceding part of this chapter that the PAIC 
becomes an important tool in the quest for harmonisation of investment codes and protocols 
throughout Africa. The PAIC was primarily formulated as a tool to promote harmony in the 
investment strategy in Africa. Kane observes that the PAIC was developed by African experts and 
welcomed by policy makers: 
 
as an opportunity to contribute to African industrial and structural transformation through 
a binding instrument that would effectively restore the balance between investors’ rights 
and host states’ obligations, take into account countries’ sustainable development 
objectives, streamline the investor-state dispute settlement system (ISDS), and finally, 
overcome issues with the fragmentation of the international investment regime, due to the 
multiplicity of investment treaties and the diverse interpretive practice of arbitral 
tribunals.992 
 
                                                          
991Article 28 of the AfCFTA Agreement restricts access to the dispute resolution mechanisms to state parties. Article 
1 of the Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the settlement of Disputes defines “Complaining Party”, “Dispute”, 
“Party to a dispute” and “third Party” as state Parties to the Protocol, thus leaving no room for natural and corporate 
individuals. Article 5 as read with Article 6, of the Protocol, also provide that the Dispute Settlement Body 
(AfCFTA DSB) is only accessible by state parties. 
992M Kane, (n) 980, 1. 
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Kane notes that in the course of negotiating the code, the original ambition of having a 
binding investment code to replace intra-African agreements was abandoned in favour of a 
“guiding text.”993 According to Kane, this choice of a soft law instrument will exacerbate the 
fragmentation of the investment law regime in Africa and, hence, impair one of the code’s core 
objectives, that of the harmonisation of investment policy and regulation across the continent.994 
Furthermore, he notes, that the benefit of not including the controversial fair and equitable-
treatment provisions in the code, on the one hand, and excluding dispute settlement procedures 
from the scope of the Most Favoured National (MFN) Clause, on the other hand, is a vexing 
limitation particularly in the absence of a binding text.995 As the PAIC code loses its treaty 
character, there is no guarantee that these two provisions will not be re-introduced in new bilateral 
investment treaties negotiated by African countries.996 
 
Ngobeni perceives the failure to include a post-termination survival clause in the draft 
PAIC as a fundamental weakness thereof.997 Such clauses are meant to protect investors for a 
reasonable period after the termination of an investment agreement.998 He also views the creation 
of double standards, with a lower protection threshold for intra-African investors, as 
discriminative.999 Since the PAIC provides for dispute resolution at the national level, Ngobeni 
rightly advocates for harmonisation of the multifarious approaches in domestic investor 
                                                          
993M Kane, ibid. Article 3 of the Code contemplates a non-binding instrument.  The text of the Code is available at 
<https://au.int/en/documents/20161231/pan-african-investment-code-paic> accessed on 6th April, 2019. 
994ibid, 2. 
995ibid. 
996ibid. 
997L Ngobeni, (n) 446, [2].  
998ibid, L Ngobeni notes, for example, that the South Africa – Mozambique BIT has a 10-year post-termination 
survival. 
999ibid, [6]. He further notes that this may encourage forum shopping by intra-African investors seeking 
establishment of their entities outside Africa so that they can benefit from favourable protection of their investments. 
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protection.1000 The non-binding effect of the PIAC also presents a patent weakness since African 
states generally ignore model or soft laws.1001  
 
Although the PAIC itself is not without normative and structural weakness, it offers a 
beginning point for discussion on the harmonisation and consolidation of continental investment 
policies and ISDS. 
 
The harmonisation of RECs under the AU and the shift towards continental economic 
regionalism offers real motivation for the adoption of the PAIC by all AU member states. The first 
step, and perhaps the clearest sign of Africa’s move towards continental economic regionalism, 
was seen in the establishment of the TFTA in 2015.1002 The TFTA Agreement advocates for the 
harmonising of programmes and polices within and between the three merging RECs.1003 The 
Agreement, in Article 36, also contemplates the conclusion of an investment protocol. Article 14 
of the TFTA Agreement also requires members to design and standardise their trade and customs, 
documentation and information in accordance with internationally accepted standards. The 
AfCFTA Agreement also provides for an investment protocol, which will be finalised by 2020.1004 
According to Ngobeni, this protocol will render the PAIC worthless.1005 Sub-regional protocols 
and codes generally seek to replace or harmonise domestic investment laws. It is, therefore, 
imperative that continental integration efforts under the AfCFTA, PAIC and AEC should proceed 
and harmonise investment protocols across Africa so as to further ease intra-Africa and foreign 
investment without the current fragmentation.1006 The preferred design of the proposed PAIC is 
elaborated in the next chapter of this thesis  
                                                          
1000 For example, he argues that since PAIC does not guarantee access to international arbitration, while most BIT 
do. The indecisiveness on the choice of forum for dispute resolution is therefore viewed as a weak link. L Ngobeni, 
ibid, [2]. 
1001ibid. 
1002A detailed discussion of the TFTA Agreement is made in chapter 2 of this thesis.   
1003 Article 4 and 5 of the TFTA Agreement. 
1004 Article 4 and 7 of the AfCFTA Agreement. 
1005L Ngobeni, (n) 985 [7]. 
1006 ibid [5 and 9]. 
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5.4. Development of International law at the Regional Level: A Panacea to Fragmentation 
on the Continent? 
Regionalism has been defined variously including, as “the pursuit of geographical exceptions to 
universal international law rules.”1007 It, therefore, connotes a rule or principle with a regional 
sphere of validity or a regional limitation to the sphere of validity of a universal rule or 
principle.1008 It is an exclusionary rather than inclusionary approach to international relations. The 
rules or principles of the organisation are binding only on states identified as members of a 
particular region or organisation.1009 According to Schindler, the negative sense of regionalism is 
that it would exempt states within a certain geographical area from the binding force of an 
otherwise universal rule or principle.1010 
 
Regional integration has influenced international law sociologically, culturally and 
politically.1011 These influences are said to remain significant historical and cultural sources of 
international law.1012 However, international law by its very nature is an effort to cut across 
cultures and borders to establish global or transnational regulation. There is, therefore, a strong 
sense that international law should be read through a universal lens.  Jennings, for example, points 
out that: 
…the first and essential principle of public international law is its quality of universality; 
that is to say that it be recognised as valid and applicable in all countries whatever their 
cultural, economic, socio-political, or religious histories and traditions.1013 
                                                          
1007 Koskenniemi Report, (n) 847, 108. 
1008 This understanding of regionalism is theorised, for example, by D Schneider, “Regional International law” in BB 
Rudolf (ed), Encyclopaedia of International Law (Vol. IV Elsevier Amsterdam 2000) 161-165, 161. 
1009ibid. 
1010ibid. 
1011 Koskenniemi Report, (n) 847, 104. 
1012RP Anand, “The Role of Asian States in the Development of International law” in RJ Dupuy (ed), The Future of 
International law in a Multicultural World (Nijhoff The Hague 1983) 105. 
1013R Jennings (1998) “Universal International Law in a Multicultural World” Maarten Bos & Ian Brownlie, Liber 
Amicorum for Lord Wilberforce (Oxford University Press Oxford 1998) and in Collected Essays of Sir Robert 
Jennings (Kluwer The Hague 1998) 341. 
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Yet, Jennings also acknowledges that international law can be modified to fit local 
circumstances. He aptly acknowledges the versatility of regional international law, as follows: 
 
…this is not to say, of course, that there is no reason for regional variation, perhaps even 
in matters of principle… universality does not mean uniformity. It does mean, however, 
that such a regional law, however variant, is part of the system as a whole, and not a 
separate system, and it ultimately derives its validity from the system as a whole.1014 
 
At critical historical epochs that shaped the discourse on integration, influential leaders 
have been faced with the choice between universality and regionalism. On most occasions 
regionalism has always found favour over universality.  As the creation of the UN was being 
debated between the “Great Powers” at the end of the Second World War, the choice between 
regionalism and universality weighed heavily on the planning of the post-war collective security 
system.1015 Winston Churchill, the then UK Prime Minister, for example, originally preferred a set 
of regional systems with “a Council of Europe and a Council of Africa under the common roof of 
the world organisation.”1016 Robert Schuman, the then French Prime Minister, instrumental for the 
realisation of the EU as we know it today, led the European movement through his lectures and 
addresses across Europe that resulted in the establishment of the ECSC.1017 
 
On the African Continent, although taking different approaches, the founding fathers of the 
OAU, Nkrumah and Nyerere, preferred regionalism over universalism. Nkrumah preferred a 
                                                          
1014ibid, 342. 
1015 Koskenniemi Report, (n) 847, 102. 
1016Cited in WG Grewe, “The History of the United Nations” in B Sinima (ed), The Charter of the United Nations.  A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press Oxford 1995) 7. 
1017 What is commonly referred to so as the Schuman Plan which began with the 9th May 1950 Schuman declaration. 
The Plan was primarily to integrate Europe through a joint steel and coal production and marketing organisation.  
For an analysis of the evolution of the EU following the Schuman plan see uni.lu “From the Schuman plan to the 
Paris Treaty” (1950-1952) <https://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/5cc6b004-33b7-4e44-b6db-
f5f9e6c01023> accessed on 1st April 2019. 
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continental supranational African government, while Nyerere preferred a step-wise approach to 
the continent’s integration with priority being given to sub-regional organisations.1018  
 
Regional organisations being privileged fora for international law-making are, therefore, 
ideal incubators of ideas for universal integration.1019 Those who favour this view advance that 
international law should be developed in a regional context because the relative homogeneity of 
the interest or outlook of actors will ensure a more efficient or equitable implementation of the 
relevant norms.1020 To this end Koskenniemi instructively notes that: 
 
The presence of a thick cultural community better ensures the legitimacy of the regulations 
and that they are understood and applied in a coherent way. This is probably why human 
rights regimes and free trade regimes have always been commenced in a regional context 
despite the Universalist claims of ideas about human rights or commodity markets.1021 
 
The traditional judicial approach in domestic courts has been to employ an appellate review 
mechanism, by higher or superior courts, in an effort to secure uniformity in the interpretation and 
application of the law. The Appellate approach is supported by formal or informal obligations to 
follow appellate decisions on the part of lower courts and possibly even by courts of equal 
status.1022  This domestic law model is, however, largely unavailable on the international level. 
The relatively established CJEU, for example, has been able to achieve this through the principles 
of supremacy, use of the preliminary procedure, direct effect of its decisions; and exercise of 
appellate jurisdiction from national courts on community matters.1023 
 
                                                          
1018See chapter 3.2.2 of this thesis on a detailed discussion of the philosophical underpinnings of post-colonial 
integration efforts under the now defunct OAU.  
1019 Koskenniemi Report, (n) 847, 106. 
1020ibid. 
1021ibid. 
1022 Reinisch, (n) 837, [17]. 
1023See the discussion on the CJEU and its jurisdiction in chapter 4 of this thesis and how the court employs the tools 
of preliminary rulings, direct-effect and appeals from national courts on community law so as to ensure consistency 
and coherence in the application and interpretation of EU community law 
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Except for very rare situations, there is hardly any system of appellate review in 
international law. International courts and tribunals are also almost routinely excluded from any 
form of binding precedence as it is known in common law jurisdictions.1024 Although the tribunals, 
including the ICJ, routinely refer to their own previous decisions, there is no formal requirement 
for the Court to follow its precedents nor is there an obligation on other international courts or 
even domestic courts to follow or apply principles settled by the ICJ.1025 The 1995 WTO 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the Settlement of Disputes (WTO-DSU) has 
an Appellate Body (WTO-DSU-AB) to whom questions of law may be appealed from WTO 
panels.1026 This procedure is said to be working so effectively that it has contributed to establishing 
a coherent body of WTO law.1027 This appeal mechanism is, however, only limited to appeals from 
decisions of WTO panels and not from regional trade organisations or national courts. 
 
This predicament is not unique to regional organisations as the ICJ has had to grapple with 
this problem. Rosenne observes that the UN Charter neither expressly nor impliedly provides for 
hierarchical relationship between the various judicial organs established under the auspices of the 
UN.1028 The Charter does not also place limitations upon the powers of the organisation to establish 
regional or special judicial organisations.1029 However, such bodies are not principal organs of the 
charter. The ICJ, therefore, remains the principal judicial organ of the UN. 
 
The AfCFTA Agreement has substantially borrowed from, and largely adopted, the WTO 
dispute resolution approach.1030 Since both the AfCFTA and AEC aim at consolidating economic 
regionalism in Africa into a continental, rather than fragmented sub-regional approaches, a 
                                                          
1024 Reinisch, (n) 837, 18. 
1025ibid. 
1026ibid, [19]. 
1027ibid. 
1028S I Rosenne, The Law and the Practice of the International Court 1920-1996 (Vol 1 Martinus Nijhoff The Hague 
1997) 110-114, 142 
1029ibid. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter expressly recognises the right of its members to create and conclude 
Regional Arrangements.  
1030 See the AfCFTA on Rules and Procedures of the Settlement of Disputes. An elaborate discussion on the AfCFTA 
dispute resolution mechanisms is set out in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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consolidation of the dispute settlement mechanisms will ultimately become necessary. An 
overarching continental court, such as the ACJ&HR sitting at the apex of the continental economic 
regionalism dispute resolution pyramid, will help achieve the coherence and consistency of norms 
on trade and investment law in Africa. 
 
The role of an effective dispute settlement framework in the eventual success of the 
AfCFTA project cannot be overstated. Cofelice notes that AfCFTA’s success will largely depend 
on the establishment of appropriate governance structures which promote harmonisation, 
consistency and predictability of its goals.1031 It will, therefore, be useful if the AfCFTA’s 
institutional architecture adopts a “multi-level” character, and be supported by sub-regional and 
national institutions.1032 The AfCFTA’s principal challenge will be its ability to rationalise and 
harmonise the different, and sometimes conflicting, regimes of African RECs within the time lines 
set in the AfCFTA Agreement.1033 
 
From the foregoing discussion, it is appreciated that the current dispute settlement model 
adopted by the AfCFTA is exclusively intergovernmental. Cofelice proposes a dispute resolution 
framework which is mandatory and binding on member states.1034 The framework, he suggests, 
should also explicitly recognise the possibility of individuals to assert their rights under the 
Agreement.1035 The complaints process should also include appeals from national courts and 
RECs, with the ACJ&HR as the apex court of last resort.1036 This can be practically achieved 
through the establishment of a trade chamber of the ACJ&HR “with a view to creating positive 
synergies between trade law and human rights.”1037 
 
                                                          
1031A Cofelice, n 48, pp.32-35 at p.33. 
1032ibid, 34 
1033ibid, 33. 
1034ibid, 34. 
1035ibid. 
1036ibid. 
1037ibid. 
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The choice of the WTO DSU as the template for the AfCFTA dispute settlement 
mechanism is a fundamental design flaw. Perhaps even a fatal flaw.1038 Akinkugbe argues that the 
transplantation of the WTO system to the AfCFTA presents two main shortcomings.1039 Firstly, is 
the general discontent with regional courts by member states of African RECs.1040 Secondly, is the 
“highly legalised dispute settlement system” which makes it unattractive to African States.1041 The 
WTO itself is undergoing an introspective evaluation.1042 Makane describes the current debate 
around the WTO as “discussions” rather than “negotiations”.1043 He suggests that Africa should 
come up with a strategy during this discussion phase that ensures that it takes a common 
position.1044 In his view, to wait for the proper negotiation stage may be too late.1045 The strategy 
should therefore focus on three critical areas of potential reform which includes the clarification 
on investment and its treatment, the ways in which the multilateral trading system can help combat 
global warming, and the concerns around the current dispute settlement system.1046  
                                                          
1038 Simo, (n) 611, [8-9], argues that the AfCFTA dispute settlement system risks being “a court without cases” 
partly because of its adoption of WTO model which is hardly used by African States. 
<http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/08/19/a-future-court-without-cases-on-the-question-of-standing-in-the-afcfta-
dispute-settlement-mechanism/> accessed on 30th September 2019.  
1039O Akinkugbe, “Dispute Settlement Under the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement: A Preliminary 
Assessment” (2019). <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3403745> accessed on 30th September 
2019, 11. See also, generally, J E Akinyi, “Evaluating the Conciliation Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the 
African Continental Free Trade Agreement through the lens of Timor-Leste Australia” (2019)  
<http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/08/22/evaluating-the-conciliation-dispute-settlement-mechanism-of-the-
african-continental-free-trade-agreement-through-the-lens-of-timor-leste-australia/> accessed on 30th September 
2019. 
1040O Akinkugbe, (n) 1039, 11, 14-16. 
1041ibid.  
1042 In fact, Simo suggests that the WTO is on the verge of collapsing, (n) 611 [3]. 
1043M  Makane, “An African Response to WTO Reform Proposals” (2019) 
<http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/09/03/an-african-response-to-wto-reform-proposals/> accessed on 30th 
September 2019, [1]. 
1044ibid, [2].  
1045ibid.  
1046ibid, [3, 4, 5 and 6]. Makane argues that African states need to be more engaged with the current crisis of the WTO 
dispute settlement system. He cites the example of the tactics employed by the U.S.A in blocking appointments to the 
Appellate Body (AB), contrary to its express treaty obligations (Articles 17.1 and 17.2 of the DSU), which has had 
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Gathii’s assessment of the AfCFTA Dispute Settlement Mechanism and his prescription 
for an effective continental dispute settlement system is instructive.1047 The system must confront 
the perception that African states do not litigate against each other, hence they set up courts and 
dispute settlement systems which they plan to hardly use.1048 Unlike the current AfCFTA Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism, the system should not encourage forum shopping through provisions that 
may be construed to confer non-exclusivity of jurisdiction.1049 Most critically, according to Gathii, 
the system should define the relationship between the continental and sub-regional dispute 
settlement systems in an effort to avoid an overlap of mandates and forum shopping.1050 These are 
some of the issues which the next section of this chapter seeks to address.  
                                                          
WTO Members to sit up and take notice of its concerns in relation to the functioning of the AB. The concerns outlined 
by the United States in relation to the functioning of the AB, namely, (i) the 90-day issue; (ii) the Rule 15 issue; (iii) 
municipal law as fact issue; (iv) advisory opinion issue and the (v) precedent issue, appear to be in the nature of 
procedural objections. He also notes that the current lack of participation of African states in the WTO dispute 
settlement system is indicative, to an extent, of the discomfort that most African states feel towards the system. He 
urges that future reforms of the WTO DSU must necessarily include procedural and substantive aspects to render 
dispute settlement more flexible for African countries. 
1047JT Gathii, “Evaluating the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement” 
(2019) <http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/04/10/evaluating-the-dispute-settlement-mechanism-of-the-african-
continental-free-trade-agreement/> accessed on 30th September 2019. 
1048ibid, [1].  See also, O Akinkugbe, “What the African Continental Free Trade Agreement Protocol on Dispute 
Settlement says about the culture of African States to Dispute Resolution” (2019). 
<http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/04/09/what-the-african-continental-free-trade-agreement-protocol-on-dispute-
settlement-says-about-the-culture-of-african-states-to-dispute-resolution/>  accessed on 30th September 2019 [4, 5 and 
6]. 
1049JT Gathii, (n) 1047 [4]. While Gathii appreciates that non-state actors wish for other forms of dispute resolution 
apart from courts, the danger of multiple processes with overlapping competencies may undermine the integrity of the 
entire system. See also, O Akinkugbe, (n) 1048, 15, where he argues that the AfCFTA Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
should not be seen as an alternative dispute mechanism to sub-regional Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (DSMs). See 
also, the parallels drawn from the SADC dispute settlement system in A Saurombe, “An Analysis and Exposition of 
Dispute Settlement Forum Shopping for SADC Member States” (2011) 23 South African Mercantile Law Journal 
392. 
1050JT Gathii, (n) 1047, [7]. 
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5.5. The ACJ&HR as a Unifying Factor against Differences in Legal Systems and 
Philosophies in Africa 
Legal systems and philosophies in Africa are largely influenced by the colonial roots of states and 
political cultures that still remain firm decades after independence of all African States. The legal 
systems of countries across Africa vary from civil law, common law, Sharia law, Roman-Dutch 
law and hybrid jurisdictions.1051 Due to the different origins of the legal systems, together with the 
legal-cultural differences ranging from Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone backgrounds, 
arbitration, for example, takes diverse forms when international laws and principles are imported 
into each individual country.1052 Sempasa describes the choice of international arbitration as an 
attempt to avoid these diversities: 
 
Arbitration provides certain mechanisms of escape from substantive and procedural rules 
of municipal systems which foreign business scarcely understand and often consider as 
having very little relevance to the issues needing resolution.1053 
 
Procedural aspects of law in civil law jurisdictions differ from those in common law 
regimes. For instance, disclosure, discovery and production of evidence in civil law systems is 
largely inquisitorial while common law favours an adversarial system.1054 Common law 
                                                          
1051 C Albanese, “Ring of Diamonds: Africa’s Emerging Centres of Arbitration” (2015) Africa Law and Business 
Global Legal Group, <https://www.africanlawbusiness.com/news/ring-of-diamonds-africas-emerging-centres-of-
arbitration.> accessed on 1st April. 2019, 4. 
1052 M Rubino-Sammartano, International Arbitration Law and Practice (Kluwer Law International Netherlands 2001) 
1. 
1053 SL Sempasa, “Obstacle to International Commercial Arbitration in African Countries” (1992) 41 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 2 (British Institute of International and Comparative law) 387-413, 388. 
1054Shruti discusses the differences between adversarial and inquisitorial judicial processes and their value in discovery 
of evidence.  He notes that the adversarial model is competitive and relies on precedents while the inquisitorial method 
is slant towards discovery of evidence by the tribunal, suo moto.  R Shruti, “Adversarial verse Inquisitorial System: 
Error and Valuation” (2017) 12(51) in De Gruyter (ed), Journal of Business Valuation and Economic Loss Analysis, 
1-19, 1.  See also, generally, JR Spenser, “Adversarial vs Inquisitorial System: is there still such a difference?” (2016) 
20 Terrorism Investigations and Prosecutions in Comparative Law 601-616. In this article, Spencer argues that the 
traditional differences between adversarial and inquisitorial justice systems are disappearing, or are at least getting 
blurred, largely thanks to international legal interactions.  This is an important view given the nature regional 
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jurisdictions rely heavily on the doctrine of stare decisis or precedent while the same is not used 
in civil law systems. When one takes the EAC as an example, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania follow 
the common law system, largely due to their colonial history. However, their EAC partners, 
Rwanda and Burundi are civil law jurisdictions. This difference in legal systems and philosophies 
can present procedural and substantive challenges in international commercial and investment 
arbitration. Yet, the harmonisation of laws within the sub-region remains one of the EAC’s 
fundamental objectives. Article 126 of the EAC Treaty emphasises the need for member states to 
take steps to harmonise their legal training and certification, as well as to encourage the 
standardisation of judgments of courts within the community.1055 Partner states of the EAC are to 
take all necessary steps to, among other things, harmonise all their national laws (including 
arbitration laws) appertaining to the community.1056 Similarly, Article 47 of the Protocol on the 
Establishment of the East Africa Community Common Market enjoins partner states to 
“…undertake to approximate their national laws and harmonise their policies and systems, for 
purposes of implementing this protocol.” 
 
As Africa gravitates towards sub-regional and continental harmonisation of trade and 
investment laws, the consolidation of fragmented dispute settlement mechanism is now, more than 
ever, necessary. Kariuki aptly summarises this need in the following terms: 
 
In light of the expected increase in international trade in the region, and possibility of 
increased disputes, there is need to harmonise arbitration laws to encourage investments 
by both foreigners and community members. Fostering commerce in the region will go a 
long way in the integration process by fostering a regional identity, strengthening the 
capacity of the region to trade competitively with other parts of the world as well as creating 
a more stable political economy.  However, for all these to be achievable, there is need to 
assure the business community of a legal regime that is predictable and reliable thus 
providing the necessary certainty for long term investment. Part of this assurance is the 
                                                          
integration and international dispute resolution between parties and states from both inquisitorial (civil) and 
adversarial (common law) legal family backgrounds. 
1055Article 126 (1) of the EAC Treaty. 
1056Article 126 (2) (b) of the EAC Treaty. 
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knowledge that there is a clearly established mechanism of dispute resolution including 
that of enforcing international awards within the region.1057 
 
Geographical, cultural and even religious links are important and inspire most regional 
integration efforts in Africa. Writing in the context of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), El Maghur 
describes this motivation and its importance in the following words: 
 
The term Maghreb which means ‘the west’ in Arabic, was generally associated with the 
three states of north western Africa that came under French control during the colonial era. 
These three states are Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, later on Mauritius and Libya joined 
to form the greater Maghreb region. Geographically, the five countries are located at a 
cultural crossroad; they border the western wing of the Arab world, then the Southern shore 
of the Mediterranean, and the north tier of the inter-African diplomatic system.  They all 
share an Islamic heritage with their neighbours to the southwest and east, and this 
transnational link provides the social base for the greater Maghreb idea.1058 
 
Camara contrasts the development of UEMOA and ECOWAS as representing parallel 
efforts in the integration of West Africa; the former being influenced by francophone colonial 
philosophy while the latter by Anglophone colonial philosophy:1059 
 
Two institutions in Africa that specifically symbolise the two parallel integration efforts 
among French speaking nations, on the one side, and Anglophone nations of the region, on 
                                                          
1057 F Kariuki, “Challenges facing the Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards within the East 
African Community” (2015) 4(1) Alternative Dispute Resolution 64-99, at p.69. 
1058 MA El-Maghur “Evolution, Challenges and Prospects of the Arab Maghreb Union 1951-2010” (2009) 
University of Nairobi M.A. Thesis 10. 
<http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/3550/Mohamed_Evolution,%20challenges%20and%20Prosp
ects%20of%20the%20Arab%20Maghreb%20Union,%201951-2010.pdf?sequence=1> 10. Accessed on 1st April 
2019 
1059 S Camara, “Francophone Regionalism and its Impact on West African Integration” (1986) 
<https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=3194
&context=etd> , 52. Accessed on 1st April 2019.  
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the other, are respectively, L’union Economique at Monétiáre de L’Afrique et de I ‘Quest, 
UEMOA (The West African Economic and Monetary Union), and the Economic 
Community of West Africa states (ECOWAS). These two institutions represent the most 
comprehensive integration schemes undertaken in this sub-region. 
 
The geo-political tensions that accrued as a result of post-colonial influence of states by 
former colonial masters have resulted in unease in the ECOWAS region. France’s manipulation of 
Francophone states in the ECOWAS sub-region, which is dominated by Anglophonic Nigeria, is 
aptly captured by Camara in the following terms: 
 
France has played a significant role in the process of West African integration; although 
this role has not always been a positive one. The symbiotic relationship between France 
and the Francophone states has very often been regarded as an obstacle to a larger West 
African integration. Following such reasoning, Nigeria considered it necessary to weaken, 
at least, if not totally break, the existing ties between France and her former colonies in the 
region.  France, on the other hand, encouraged the Francophone states to establish their 
own economic schemes to counterbalance the ‘heavy weight’ of Nigeria in West Africa. 
 
Onwuka and Shaw observe that in the period following colonialism and in the nascent days 
of ECOWAS, there was an active pursuit by France of a “privileged and exclusive” relationship 
with sub-Sahara Francophone states in West Africa.1060 This, they add, was geared towards 
maintaining a zone of influence or “chase gardee” out of the reach of other Western states, and 
also beyond Nigeria’s ambitious regional hegemony.1061 To cast away these colonial and regional 
hegemonic influences and tendencies, a truly non-aligned continental economic integration that 
cuts across the various cultures in Africa is needed.  
 
The OHADA experience offers valuable insights into a possible solution. In an effort to 
find middle ground and perhaps assuage non-civil law member and prospective member states, the 
                                                          
1060 I Onwuka and TM Shaw, Africa in World Politics: into the 1990s (St. Martin Press New York 1989) 188. 
1061ibid.  
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drafters of the revised OHADA Uniform Acts on contracts opted for a model based on the 
International Institute for the Unification of Private law (UNIDROIT) Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts.1062 The UNDROIT principles are neither common nor civil law but a 
genuine synthesis of the contract law principles of the major legal systems of the world.1063 
Fagbayibo believes that this development enhances the prospects of common law jurisdictions 
joining the OHADA.1064 
 
 
5.6. The Role of the African Single Court in Africa’s Economic Regionalism 
The proposed ACJ&HR’s trade and investment chamber can play a pivotal role in the continent’s 
economic integration. This part discusses at least three of its possible contributions. 
i) Harmonisation and Development of an African Community Law 
Trade and investment agreements and protocols, both at the continental and sub- regional levels, 
in Africa directly addresses the need for harmonisation of trade and investment policies as a core 
objectives of their existence.1065 They aim to promote uniformity in trade practices and policies at 
the continental, sub-regional and even national levels.1066 Therefore, as trade and investment 
policies converge, at the continental level, it is imperative that dispute settlement systems are also 
consolidated and aligned with the continental blue print. With increase in cross border trade and 
investment, there is obviously bound to be a concurrent increase in disputes and the need to resolve 
them. 
                                                          
1062M Fontaine, “The Draft OHADA Uniform Act on Contracts and the UNDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts” (2004) 3 Uniform Law Review 573.  
1063S Date-Bah, “The UNDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Harmonisation of the 
Principles of Commercial Contracts in West and Central Africa: Reflections on the OHADA project from the 
Perspectives of a Common Law Lawyer from West Africa” (2004) 2 Uniform Law Review 271. 
1064B Fagbayibo, (n)591, 318. 
1065Article 3 the AfCFTA Agreement; Article 3 and 4(2) (e) of the AEC Treaty; Articles 4 and 5 of the TFTA 
Agreement; Articles 2 and 3 of the ECOWAS Treaty Article 5 of the EAC Treaty Article 5 of the SADC Treaty Article 
7 of the COMESA Treaty. 
1066 Kane, (n) 980, 1. 
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The AEC Treaty contemplates the merger of RECs and provides a six-stage 
implementation of the harmonisation process.1067 Despite this, the treaty is not clear or detailed on 
how continental and sub-regional dispute settlement systems are to be harmonised. However, 
RECs have been identified as critical building blocks for the ultimate realisation of the AEC.1068 
This presents an opportunity for the ACJ&HR to play a pivotal role in the process of continental 
harmonisation of trade and investment dispute resolution. 
 
The ACJ&HR is an effort in the harmonisation of the fragmented continental dispute 
settlement systems set up under the auspices of the AU.1069 The African single Court emerged 
following a merger of the erstwhile ACJ and the ACH&PR. One of its core objectives was to 
centralise continental dispute resolution so as to inculcate efficiency and efficacy in the system.1070 
 
One of the most scathing criticisms of the African dispute resolution system is that the 
continent has failed to develop an identifiable body of law that can be referred to as a continental 
community law.1071 This criticism is of course laced with an element of bias based on a comparison 
of Africa’s integration with the EU. The EU has over the years developed community law that is 
now embodied in statutes and decisions of EU courts (both the CJEU and ECHR).1072 Through its 
courts, the EU has been able to develop principles that have influenced legislation at both the EU 
                                                          
1067Article 6 of the AEC Treaty. 
1068Articles 4 (2) and 6 (2) (b) 0f the AEC Treaty. 
1069 Ogwezzy and Michael, “Challenges and Prospects of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights” (2014) 6 
Jima U.J. L 1. 
1070 GJ Naldi and DM Konstatinos, “The African Court of Justice and Human Rights: A Judicial Curate’s Egg” (2002) 
9 International Organisations Law Review 383-449 at 384. 
1071 RO Frimpong, (n) 44, 62-63 argues that African Regional Courts remain largely under-studied from an academic 
perspective. He attributes this to the courts’ low contribution to the jurisprudence of international law in general, 
international human rights law and regional integration law.  He also observes that the regional courts face concerns 
over their legitimacy or their right to adjudicate over disputes.  See also, G Erasmus, (n) 450. See also, generally, M 
Olivier, “The Role of Africa Union Law in Integrating Africa” (2015) 22(4) South African Journal of International 
Affairs 513-533. 
1072 D Chalmers et. al, The European Union Law (Cambridge University Press 2011) 143, 147-148. 
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and national levels.1073 The CJEU has also utilised its appellate jurisdiction on matters affecting or 
touching on community law, preliminary ruling procedure and the direct effect of its decisions, in 
achieving harmony and consistency in the application European law.1074  
 
Notwithstanding the criticism levelled against African regional courts, it is fair to state that 
each REC in Africa has attempted to develop jurisprudence in the various sets of circumstances in 
which they obtain.1075 This has, however, largely been in the area of human rights with little in the 
area of trade and investments.1076 
 
It cannot be gainsaid that a common trade and investment approach will require a 
predictable, consistent and uniform substantive, procedural and normative legal system for 
resolution of disputes. The ACJ&HR’s trade and investment chamber would not only further this 
aim of achieving certainty in African continental trade and investment normative principles, but 
will also set pace for the development of a unique African continental community law. As an 
overarching tribunal with appellate jurisdiction on matters relating to the interpretation and 
application of African trade and investment treaties and protocols, an ACJ&HR trade and 
                                                          
1073ibid, 158. 
1074AW Green, Political Integration by Jurisprudence: The Role of the Court of Justice of European Community in 
European Political Integration (Amsterdam Nijhoff – Leyden 1996) 9-26, at 21. A detailed discussion of the three 
institutes of Appellate jurisdiction, direct effect and preliminary ruling procedure and how they are employed by the 
CJEU in ensuring uniform application and integration of EU Community Law is discussed in chapter 3.2.2 of this 
thesis. 
1075 RO Frimpong, (n) 44, at 74. See a detailed discussion of some of the landmark cases decided by African RECs in 
chapter 3.4 of this thesis. 
1076 LN Murungi and J Gallinetti, “The Role of Sub-Regional Courts in the African Human Rights System” (2010) 13 
International journal of Human Rights Issue 1-8. They advance that African RECs have introduced a new layer of 
supranational protection of human rights in Africa.  Frimpong, (n) 44, 65, 70, 79 and 80, considers the transformation 
of REC Courts into human rights Courts as unnecessary and an antithesis of their original objective of resolving trade 
and investment disputes.  Besides, Frimpong, (n) 44, 74, observes that this expansion of mandate breeds unnecessary 
tension between member states and reduces the legitimacy and acceptability of the courts. Naldi and Konstantinos, 
(n) 1070, 1, also observe that the merger and expansion of the ACJ&HR’s jurisdiction is a bold demonstration of the 
desire of the membership of the AU to create a modern institution that addresses the issues of modern day Africa and 
the world. 
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investment chamber will effectively lead the way in crafting binding jurisprudence in this area. 
This will ensure certainty and predictability of African Community law. The direct effect of the 
decisions of the Court and a requirement that sub-regional and national courts should refer to the 
Chamber, for preliminary rulings, matters touching on continental trade and investment law, will 
also ensure consistency in the application of the normative principles of African continental 
community law. 
 
Africa’s trade and investment integration is unique and, therefore, the criticism levelled 
against it based on the EU model is sometimes misplaced.  For instance, EU community law 
developed in a less fragmented environment, while a harmonised African continental integration 
system has to contend with well-established sub-regional RECs, whose existence preceded the 
continental economic system. 1077 Africa’s efforts at continental integration have also had to reckon 
with an entrenched web of overlapping sub-regional systems. It is in light of this unique quality 
that the African continental economic integration should be crafted differently from the precedence 
set by the EU. Although the overall objectives of economic integration may be similar in Africa 
and Europe, the circumstances in which both are obtained require different approaches. 
 
In terms of dispute resolution, therefore, the use of sub-regional courts as first instance 
courts of the ACJ&HR, will be useful. This approach will not only make good use of already 
existing physical and human resources, but will also build on existing structures, jurisprudence, 
norms and dispute resolution cultures that have been shaped for decades. After all, one of the AECs 
objectives is to use the sub-regional RECs as building blocks for continental economic 
integration.1078 
 
Despite its uniqueness, the continental integration of trade and investment dispute 
resolution systems in Africa can learn from the CJEU with regards to admission of cases brought 
                                                          
1077Unlike Europe, structured harmonised continental economic integration in Africa is coming much later after sub-
regional economic integration.  In fact, the former hopes to build on the latter. 
1078Articles 6 and 28 of the AEC Treaty.  
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by individuals.1079 Although treaties of the sub-regional courts of the ECOWAS, EAC and 
COMESA expressly provide for direct access by individuals to the REC courts, direct access by 
individuals at the continental level, particularly of trade and investment dispute settlement 
mechanisms, is almost non-existent.1080 For example, the AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanisms, 
including arbitration, are strictly reserved for state parties to the protocol and leaves no room for 
access by individuals.1081 
 
The admission of cases filed by individuals is crucial in the effort to develop African 
community law.  There are at least two illustrations for this conclusion. 
 
Firstly, the European integration model has evolved enduring normative principles through 
the sheer volume of cases filed by individuals.1082 On the African continent, Frimpong observes 
that the limited but progressive jurisprudence that has come out of African regional courts has 
                                                          
1079 Article 272 of the Treaty of the CJEU expressly grants jurisdiction to the Court to admit and determine cases filed 
by individuals against EU institutions, member states and to award damages therefor.  The Court also has an arbitration 
mandate under Articles 263(4), 268 and 340(2). 
1080 Article 4 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05; Article 30 of the EAC Treaty and Article 26 of 
the COMESA Treaty. The 1992 SADC Treaty, Article 15(1) (2) provided for rights of individuals to bring action in 
the Court.  At the 3rd Summit of the Heads of state and Government in August 2010, SADC decided to “Review the 
role, functions and terms of references of the SADC Tribunal” in obvious response to the decisions in the Mike 
Campbell cases. See, RO Frimpong, “Enforcing Judgement of the SADC Tribunals in the Domestic Courts of Member 
States” (2011) Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook 2010 115-141, at 115 and 116.  See also 
chapter 4 of this thesis for a detailed discussion on the right of individuals to access continental economic disputes 
settlement mechanisms established under the aegis of the AU 
1081Article 20 (1) of the AfCFTA Agreement is express that the “A dispute Settlement Mechanism is hereby established 
and shall apply to the settlement of disputes arising between state parties” (emphasis added). Article 28 of the AfCFTA 
Protocol on the Rules and Procedures for the Settlement Disputes is similarly worded. 
1082 For example, the CJEU received 1683 cases in the year 2018; of which 834 were filed by individuals and 568 
regarded requests for preliminary rulings. See the Report of the Court of Justice (2018) Luxemburg, Office of 
Official Publications of the European Communities. 
<https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2019-04/_ra_2018_en.pdf> accessed on 13th May 2019. 
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largely been as a result of cases which have been brought by individuals.1083 He further notes that 
the regional courts which exclude admission of cases by individuals have remained moribund since 
African states do not traditionally sue each other, nor do they have a culture of pursuing their trade 
remedies through international disputes resolution fora.1084 
 
The proposed African single court’s trade and investment chamber can redress this problem 
by guaranteeing investors, both African and foreign, of a reliable and independent forum for 
dispute resolution, outside national courts which are largely perceived to lack impartiality and 
independence from the state  member apparatus.1085 
  ii) Developing African Capacity and Experience in International Arbitration 
As established in the preceding parts of this chapter, arbitration is the most preferred mode of 
setting investment disputes.1086 This is done either through sub-regional RECs or international 
centres established through private sector initiatives. In Africa both approaches are used. There are 
independent private sector centres and arbitration as part of regional courts’ mandate. 
 
As observed in the earlier part of this chapter, disputes involving African states account for 
at least 25% of state-investor disputes registered at the ICSID.1087 However, the participation of 
African arbitrators has remained very low, at around 2%.1088 One of the reasons advanced for this 
sad state of affairs is that African arbitrators lack the experience, exposure and competence to 
                                                          
1083 RO Frimpong, (n) 44, 78-79. See also, O Bore, “The dispute Settlement Mechanism under the African Continental 
Free Trade Area” (2018) <https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/13529-the-dispute-settlement-mechanism-under-the-
african-continental-free-trade-area.html> accessed on 11th May 2019. For a detailed discussion of the AfCFTA dispute 
settlement system, see chapter 3 of this thesis.   
1084 RO Frimpong, (n) 44, 62-63.  See also, G Erasmus, “The Final Trade Remedy Arrangement of the Tripartite Free 
Trade Area” (2017) <https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/11988-the-final-trade-remedy-arrangement-of-the-
tripartite-free-trade-area.html> accessed on 10th May 2019. 
1085A Cofelice, (n) 48, 34. See also, RO Frimpong, (n) 44, 65-66. 
1086 See Chapter 5.3.2 above for a detailed discussion of international arbitration in Africa 
1087ICSID 2019 Statistics, n 956. 
1088 ibid. 
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resolve complex investor-state disputes.1089 Oddly, even African state parties to disputes prefer 
appointing European arbitrators and counsel in disputes in which they are involved.1090   
 
The principal role of AfCFTA is to grow Intra African trade.1091 Currently intra-Africa 
trade stands at between 17-20% of the total volume of trade in Africa.1092 This may look 
insignificant and suggest that African states are mostly net importers of goods and services, mainly 
from Europe and Asia.  However, it is projected that the AfCFTA is bound to significantly change 
this. Intra-Africa trade is projected to rise by up to 52% under the AfCFTA.1093   
 
The growth of intra-African trade presents an invaluable opportunity for the Africa single 
court’s proposed trade and investment chamber to increase the participation of African Arbitrators 
in resolving intra-African disputes. Indeed, as Torgbor observes, time is ripe for Africans to sit as 
Arbitrators in disputes involving Africa and African States.1094  In other words African Arbitrators 
should be employed in resolving intra-African disputes that may arise out of the AfCFTA and 
AEC. 
 
This will sharpen the skills and competencies of African Arbitrators and arm them with the 
experience necessary to launch them into international arbitration circles. The African Arbitration 
Association (AAA) and other continental arbitration centres should align their objectives with 
those of the AfCFTA and the proposed ACJ&HR trade and investment chamber so as to offer a 
pool of dispute resolution experts for purposes of resolving African trade and investment disputes. 
This model can be cascaded to sub-regional courts. Furthermore, both the continental and sub-
regional investment approaches should be anchored on the Pan-African Investment Code with sub-
regional codes aligning to the continental investment blueprint while including features unique to 
                                                          
1089 Torgbor, (n) 936, 114. 
1090 Namachanja, (n) 951, 152. 
1091 Article 3 of the AfCFTA Agreement. 
1092 This compares to 59% and 69% for intra-Asian and Intra-European trade, respectively, 
<https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/qa_cfta_en_230418.pdf > accessed on 10th May 2019 
1093ibid. 
1094 Torgbor, (n) 936,114. 
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the sub-regions. This, should, however, take cognisance of the potential, and perhaps, the 
disruptive impacts of the upcoming AfCFTA Protocol on Investment.  
  iii) Enforcement of Decisions  
A continental trade and investment dispute settlement system should not only assure its users of 
the finality of its decisions, but also of the timeous enforcement of such decisions without 
interference by national courts. As observed in the earlier parts of this thesis, international dispute 
resolution is gravitating towards the use of formal courts over ad hoc or private systems of dispute 
resolution. 1095 One of the reasons for this shift is the guarantee of enforcement under treaty dispute 
settlement bodies against non-formal and ad hoc methods. 1096 Regional courts provide for 
enforcement mechanisms which member states subscribe to through conclusion of treaties and 
protocols. 1097 Some even go further to exclude the involvement of national courts in an effort to 
secure direct effect of judgments or decision of regional courts. 1098  
 
Commercial and investment arbitration are largely private processes that are based on party 
agreement. The outcomes of the processes are usually subject to enforcement processes provided 
in domestic courts. This makes private non-formal dispute mechanisms less attractive than regional 
courts and tribunals, whose decisions, enforcement and observance, are underwritten by states who 
sign protocols or conventions excluding national courts’ intervention. 
 
The creation of the AU single court’s trade and investment chamber can also be justified 
on the premise that it would ensure enforcement of its decisions through the enforcement 
                                                          
1095 See chapter 2.5.1 (d) of this thesis. 
1096 According to Frimpong, enforcement or acceptability of a court and its decisions is crucial to the international 
Court’s legitimacy or authority to adjudicate over disputes, RO Frimpong, (n) 44, 64. 
1097 For example, members of the AfCFTA are bound by the Agreement and the Enforcement mechanisms set out in 
Articles 25 and 27 of the protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes. 
1098 For example, the OHADA CCJA’s decision on an appeal from a national court, is final and binding upon members, 
and has a direct effect under Article 9 of the OHADA Treaty. The ECOWAS Court of Justice has an enforcement 
organ in each member state to ensure compliance with its decisions. See chapter 3 of this thesis for a discussion on 
the structure an enforcement processes under RECs in Africa. 
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mechanism set out under the Constitutive Act of AU.1099 These mechanisms are not available in 
private or non-formal dispute settlement methods.  It, therefore, helps that the mechanisms under 
the AfCFTA and AEC have the backing of the AU and its enforcement mechanisms. The AU 
single court will, therefore, offer investors the assurance that decisions of its trade and investment 
chamber, including arbitration panels will be enforced. 
 
The merger of the ACJ and ACH&PR was partly motivated by the need to establish a cost-
effective dispute settlement system. 1100 In essence, that the financing of a single court by the AU 
would be far much cheaper than the current situation where several dispute settlement bodies exist 
at the continental and sub-regional levels. To host dispute settlement efforts under one roof would 
no doubt further this objective. 
 
However, the mechanisms provided by both the AEC and AfCFTA, seem to restrict their 
application to state parties, leaving no room for disputes between individuals or between states and 
individuals. 1101 ISDS and private party arbitration is not provided for.  It may, however feature in 
                                                          
1099 For example, Article 23 of the Constitutive Act of the AU provides that the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government shall determine the appropriate sanctions to mete out against an errant member, and which may include: 
denial of, right to speak at meetings, voting rights, present candidates, transport and communication links with other 
members, and other measures of political and economic nature. 
1100 DU Plessis, “A Court not found” (2007)7(2) African Human Rights Law Journal 522-544, 523.  See also K 
Kindiki, “The Proposed Integration of the African Court of Justice and African Court of Human Rights: Legal 
Difficulties and Merits” (2007) 15 RADIC 138; also, F Viljoen and E Baimu, “Courts for Africa: Considering the co-
existence of the African Court on Human and People’s Rights and the African Court of Justice” (2004) 22 NQHR 241. 
1100 Besides its criminal law jurisdiction under Article 28A, Article 29 of the ACJ&HR Protocol limits the Jurisdiction 
of the Court and the Dispute Resolution Mechanism set out therein to state parties.  See the discussion in chapter 4.2.3 
of this thesis on the Jurisdiction of the Court. 
 
1101Article 28 of the AfCFTA protocol on Rules and procedures for settlement of disputes is expressly clear that the 
mechanisms provided therein are only available for inter-state party disputes. See the discussion in chapter 4.2.3 on 
the access by individuals to the dispute settlement mechanisms under both the ACJ&HR Protocol and the AfCFTA 
Protocol on Rules and Procedures for Settlement of Disputes. D Luke, (n) 2, [30], describes the AfCFTA dispute 
settlement mechanism as an inter-governmental trade governance system deliberately modelled along the WTO 
dispute administration approach. 
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the final Protocol. As observed in the preceding parts of this thesis, the AfCFTA dispute settlement 
system is modelled upon the WTO dispute settlement model.  The WTO model and the AfCFTA 
are state-centred. The African single court will have to expand its scope to include private parties 
if it is to address intra-African trade disputes involving traders who traverse African markets across 
national borders. This will also harmonise its approach with courts of RECs in Africa such as 
COMESA, ECOWAS and EAC, which already recognise and admit claims by individuals. 
 
The enforcement of the decisions of RECs and AU institutions has not always been easy 
and has often been met with resistance, particularly from member states of the integration 
organisations.1102 One can, therefore, argue, with some force of merit, that there is no guarantee 
that there will be a change in the attitude of African States towards the enforcement of decisions 
of the proposed trade and investment chamber of the ACJ&HR. 
 
However, there are at least two reasons to be optimistic that the trade and investment 
chamber of the ACJ&HR may fare differently and perhaps attract different results. Firstly, trade 
and investment disputes are remarkably different from decisions made by international or regional 
courts in the areas of, say, human rights, governance, territorial boundary delimitation disputes, or 
political questions, such as the validity of presidential elections. An analysis of the decisions of 
REC courts whose observance or enforcement has largely been resisted by African states aptly 
demonstrates this point.1103 The main reason underlying the resistance of these kind of decisions 
by some African states is that states often feel that such decisions tend to undermine their 
unfettered exercise of political and sovereign authority. In most of these cases, it is states who are 
                                                          
1102 For a detailed discussion on the difficulties and resistance by African states of determinations made by REC courts 
in the SADC, EAC and ECOWAS; see chapter 3.4 of this thesis. 
1103 For example, the Mike Campbell cases at the SADC tribunal involved the state sanctioned seizure of land by the 
Zimbabwean government pursuant to the state’s policy of land redistribution. The EACJ in the Anyang’ Nyong’o Case 
dealt with the propriety of the appointment of members representing Kenya in the EALA. The same court’s decision 
in the case of East African Civil Society Organisation Forum V the Attorney General of Burundi, addressed matters 
relating to the legal propriety of the Presidential elections in Burundi. All these decisions are discussed in depth in 
Chapter 3.4 of this thesis. The common thread running through all these decisions is that the losing state parties 
declined to give effect to the decisions of the courts and even resisted enforcement proceedings. For a discussion on 
the refusal to enforce decisions of regional courts in Africa, see generally, Alter, Gathii, and Helfer, (n) 59, 293-328. 
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accused and held liable for the perpetration of the violations of human rights, democracy and treaty 
rights. Regional courts’ decisions are, therefore, often, seen as an affront or attack on the 
disaffected member state’s government of the day. 
 
However, trade and investment dispute resolution present a different preposition all together. 
Decisions of international courts with regard to trade and investments disputes settle purely 
commercial disputes without imputing political or governance culpability or deficiencies upon 
states. Parties’ interests in trade and investment disputes are largely monetary and not necessarily 
political. The motivation to frustrate commercial decisions of courts is, therefore, much lower than 
decisions in political and human rights cases. This preposition has empirical backing. A study 
conducted by the Queen Mary University of London in 2008 concluded that in both institutional 
and ad hoc arbitrations, a compliance rate of 75% was recorded, with an 88% satisfaction by its 
users. 1104 
 
Secondly, the deliberate choice of the WTO model of dispute resolution by the drafters of 
the AfCFTA Protocol on the Rules and Procedures on Settlement of Disputes offers a useful 
opportunity for understanding how to navigate enforcement challenges that its AfCFTA DSB and 
Appeal Body may face. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is only available for disputes 
between state parties.1105 It is an exclusively state-state dispute settlement mechanism. Empirical 
evidence shows that a majority of WTO DSU panels’ decisions are complied with without resort 
to enforcement proceedings.1106 The WTO DSU provides that if a member fails to comply with a 
                                                          
1104 Queen Mary University of London, School of International Arbitration, (2008) International Arbitration Study 
<http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/IAstudy_2008.pdf>  accessed on 8th June 2019, 2. 
1105 Article XXII and XXIII of the now superseded GATT 1947; and Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement (Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes).  
1106The enforcement mechanisms available for WTO decisions are set out in Articles 21, 22 and 26 of Annex 2 of the 
WTO Agreement. These include: a surveillance of implementation of recommendations and rulings; compensation 
and suspension of concessions by other member states; and any other measures proposed by the aggrieved member 
provided that it does not offend the WTO agreements and/or Annexes. Cameron and Gray remark that the WTO 
System is highly successful, judging by the frequency of its use.  In the first eight years of its use, 200 cases were 
registered. By 2018, 573 new cases had been registered. See J Cameron and K Gray, “Principles of International Law 
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final ruling in a dispute, the successful party may retaliate by suspending trade concessions that 
owe by the offending member.1107 However, this option is hardly resorted to since compliance is 
the norm rather than the exception.1108 Although the WTO has been criticised for offering a weak 
and unpredictable mechanism, particularly in asymmetrical disputes between large and small 
economies, this problem is not of immediate concern for African economic integration, since most 
African states are in the same general economic league of developing nations.1109 
 
Thirdly, even the current ICSID ISDS system, despite the scathing criticism levelled 
against it, enjoys a fairly high non-coercive compliance rate.1110 The ICSID Convention offers at 
least four advantages in terms of compliance and enforcement of awards issued by its tribunals. 
One, a state party to the ICSID award has an obligation to comply with the award.1111Two, all state 
                                                          
in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body” (2001) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 248, 250. See also, 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispustats_e.htm> aaccessed on 23rd September 2019. 
1107 WTO 2018 Report <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/14_anrep18_disputesettlement_e.pdf> 
accessed on 6th June 2019. 
1108 In the WTO 2018 Report, its Director General is quoted as describing the WTO dispute settlement system as 
“unquestionably one of the –if not the-most active international adjudicatory systems in the world. And it still 
operates faster than any other.” (2019) 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/14_anrep18_disputesettlement_e.pdf accessed on 6th June 2019, 129. 
See also, Cameron and Gray, (n) 1106, 250. 
1109 ML Movsesian, “Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group Analysis” (2003) 32(1) Hofstra Law Review 
3. See also, JH Jackson, “Emerging Problems of the WTO Constitution: Dispute Settlement and Decision making in 
the Jurisprudence of the WTO” (1999) in P Rultley and others (ed), Liberalisation and Protection in the World Trading 
System 25, 31. Jackson argues that “lack of in-house legal expertise in small countries make them to be at a substantial 
disadvantage against large economies like the United States or the European Community.”  
1110 For example, of the 706 decisions rendered by ICSID tribunals since its establishment in 1972, only 17 annulment 
applications have been allowed, representing a paltry 2.4 %. Only 121 applications for annulment have been registered. 
It is worthy of note that ICSID administers 70 % of all known investor-state disputes. See, 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/2018ICSIDAnnualReport.ENG.pdf> accessed on 7th June 
2019. 
1111 Article 53 of the ICSID Convention. See also, generally, ST Tonova, “Compliance and Enforcement of Awards: 
Is there a Practical Difference between ICSID and non- ICSID Awards?” (2012) 5 in Investment Treaty Arbitration 
and International Law <https://arbitrationlaw.com/library/compliance-and-enforcement-awards-there-practical-
difference-between-icsid-and-ad-hoc> accessed on 30th September 2019. 
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parties to the Convention have a treaty obligation to recognise an ICSID award as binding and to 
enforce the pecuniary obligations arising out of the award as a final judgment of the state’s 
court.1112 Three, the ICSID Convention establishes a delocalised self-contained mechanism for 
review of its awards thereby eliminating any review by national courts.1113 Four, in the event that 
there is need for recovery of monetary awards, the members of the ICSID Convention agree to the 
attachment and sale of their commercial assets (assets not covered by the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity) situated in any other ICSID member state.1114 
 
The African continental economic regionalism adopts international arbitration and the 
WTO DSU model in its dispute settlement architecture. An adoption of these mechanisms, with 
largely successful compliance and enforcement records, will also be useful in giving effect to the 
continent’s aspirations with regards to continental trade and investment dispute resolution.  
 
Even as Africa draws valuable lessons from the ICSID and WTO DSU, it must still be 
noted that those systems are still imperfect. A perfect system can never be achieved but the existing 
ones can always be improved. For example, it has been suggested that enforcement of decisions 
rendered by regional and international adjudicatory organs should be strengthened by developing 
a system that authorises collective retaliation against offending members, or one that grants direct 
                                                          
1112 Article 54 of the ICSID Convention. 
1113Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the ICSID Convention provides for the procedure for Revision and Annulment of an 
ICSID award, through an Ad hoc Committee. The Ad hoc Committee in MINE v Guinea, decision on annulment of 
22nd December 1989, 4 ICSID Reports pp 84 at 84 and 88 interpreted Article 53 of the ICSID Convention to the effect 
that the award shall be binding upon all parties “and shall not be subject to any other remedy except to those provided 
by this convention “and “that the convention excludes any attack on the award in national courts”.  
1114 Under Article 55 of the ICSID Convention, a state Party’s immunity from execution remains unfettered by the 
ICSID Convention’s provisions on enforcement. This means that that only the state’s property serving commercial 
purposes in any ICSID member state is subject to execution in enforcement of an ICSID award. For a discussion on 
the differences between sovereign and commercial property of a state see the decisions in SOABI v Senegal, Award 
of 25th February 1988, 2 ICSID Reports, 190; Benvenuti &Bonfant v Congo, Award of 21st July 1987 1 ICSID Reports, 
373. 
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effect to the decisions of international tribunals domestically.1115 These proposals may also be 
adopted for the proposed ACJ&HR Trade and Investment Chamber. 
5.7. Towards a Multilateral Trade and Investment Court System 
5.7.1 The Rationale 
In adopting a formal multilateral investment court mechanism, the African continent will not 
necessarily be breaking new ground. As already discussed in the preceding chapters, trade and 
investment dispute resolution is gravitating towards the use of formal international courts.1116 This 
is in reaction to the challenges that ad hoc and institutional investment and commercial arbitration 
face. These problems include:1117 
 
(i) the exorbitant costs associated with the system,  
(ii) its lack of efficiency; lack of impartiality of the arbitrators, which is largely attributable to 
the manner in which the arbitrators are appointed; 
(iii) the lack of diversity in the appointment of arbitrators, with dominance by European 
lawyers; and 
(iv) inconsistencies in the decisions of tribunals, making the process unpredictable and, 
therefore, unreliable; and laborious enforcement mechanisms. 
 
The EU, against which African economic integration is often benchmarked, has proposed the 
establishment of a permanent multilateral investment court complete with an appellate 
mechanism.1118 According to the EU, the establishment of the court is the only reform that can 
                                                          
1115J Pauwelyn, “Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:  Rules are Rules- - Towards a More Collective 
Approach” (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 335, 343-345. See also, Tonova, (n) 1111, 4. 
1116 See the discussion in Chapter 2.5.1.4 of this thesis. In the Chapter, the research identifies enforcement through 
direct effect of decisions and transparency as the key reasons for the preference of formal systems of dispute resolution. 
The contexts of the EU, MERCOSUR, OHADA and other bodies are used. 
1117 For a detailed discussion of these and other challenges and problems of international commercial and investment 
arbitration, see Chapter 2.5.2 (b) (ii) of this thesis. 
1118 The EU has presented two papers to the UN Working Group under the UNCITRAL tasked with examining the 
reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). The first EU paper sets out the EU’s proposal of establishing a 
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effectively respond to all the concerns identified in the process. EU Commissioner for Trade, 
Cecilia Malmstrom, instructively underscored the EU’s position in the following terms: 
 
States all over the world have identified problems with the current system. The EU believes 
that the systemic reforms however can address these concerns, with the creation of a 
permanent body to resolve disputes – a multilateral investment court.1119 
 
The idea is to have a two-tier court system with a permanent tribunal of first instance and an 
appellate tribunal.1120 The EU proposals are contained in two papers. The EU’s first paper provides 
that the establishment of the investment would:1121 
 
(i) enhance the predictability and consistency of decisions and ensure their correctness, 
(ii) eliminate the ethical concerns of the current system, and  
(iii) effectively address the problems of excessive costs and duration. 
 
The EU second paper makes proposals for an effective work plan and text proposals to be 
considered by all countries and stakeholders.1122 The CJEU recently endorsed the EU 
Commission’s proposal by issuing an opinion confirming the compatibility of the proposed 
investment court with EU treaties.1123 Support for the investment court has intensified, particularly 
following the CJEU’s decision that the investor-state arbitration agreements, in intra-EU bilateral 
                                                          
permanent multilateral investment court with an appellate mechanism and full time adjudicators. The EU position 
papers <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1972> accessed on 8th June 2019. 
1119 <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1943> accessed on 7th June 2019. 
1120 EU Paper 1 to the UNCITRAL Working Group III, 18th January 2019, Parts 3.2 and 3.3, [13,14 and 15] 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/january/tradoc_157631.pdf> accessed on 7th June 2019. 
1121 <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/january/tradoc_157632.pdf> accessed on 7th June 2019. 
1122ibid. 
1123 CJEU Opinion 1/17 Opinion of the Advocate General delivered on 29th January 2019 given pursuant to a 
Request by the Kingdom of Belgium under Article 218(11) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) or the Treaty of Rome. 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=210244&text=&dir=&doclang=EN&part=1&occ=first&
mode=DOC&pageIndex=0&cid=13279134> accessed on 8th June 2019. 
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investment agreements are incompatible with the principle of autonomy of EU law and are, 
therefore, void.1124 
 
The EU has already included the proposed investment court in its recent trade and investment 
agreements with Canada, Mexico, Singapore, Vietnam and the Netherlands, with the Model 
Investment Agreement 2018 acting as a clear demonstration of its determination to implement a 
shift from ad hoc and institutional arbitration, to the formal multilateral investment court 
system.1125  
 
UNCTAD is also moving towards the same direction as the EU, in terms of trade and 
investment dispute resolution. UNCTAD has identified as an inherent weakness of the existing 
ISDS system, including ICSID, the fact that, under most BITs and MITs, only investors have an 
                                                          
1124 In its judgement in Slovak Republic v Achmea B.V (Case C-284/16), the CJEU ruled that the arbitration clause 
contained in Article 8 of the 1991 Netherlands-Slovakia BIT has an adverse effect on the autonomy of EU law and is 
therefore incompatible with EU law. This decision is regarded as a landmark with ripple effects on the 196 intra-
European BITs concluded in Europe. The decision is available at <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?num=C-
284/16> For the effect of the decision see, generally, C Fouchard and M Krestin, “The Judgement of the CJEU” (2018) 
in Slovak Republic v Achmea- A Loud Clap of the Thunder on Intra-EU BIT Sky! 
<http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/03/07/the-judgment-of-the-cjeu-in-slovak-republic-v-achmea/>; 
D Dragiev, “2018 in Review: The Achmea Decision and its Reverberations in the World of Arbitration” (2019) 
<http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/01/16/2018-in-review-the-achmea-decision-and-its-
reverberations-in-the-world-of-arbitration/> accessed on 8th June 2019. 
1125Article 3.12 of the EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement (IPA), available at 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0090_EN.html?redirect>; Article 5 (1) of the 
Netherlands Model Investment Agreement  2018, available at <https://www.bilaterals.org/?netherlands-model-
investment>; Article 5 (1) of the EU-Viet Nam Partnership and Cooperation Framework Agreement 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/vietnam/documents/eu_vietnam/pca.pdf>; Section X of the EU-Mexico 
Trade Agreement, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-mexico-trade-agreement/> ; and Chapter 
29 of the Canada-European Union Trade Agreement (CETA), available at <https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-
focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/>. Note that the CJEU opinion referred to in note 266 above was sought with 
respect to the effect of the decision in Slovak Republic v Achmea on the CETA. See also, generally, T Birengel, 
“European Union: A Shift from Arbitration to Multilateral Investment Court System at EU” (2019) 
<http://www.mondaq.com/turkey/x/791418/Arbitration+Dispute+Resolution/A+Shift+From+Arbitration+To+Multil
ateral+Investment+Court+System+At+EU> accessed on 8th June 2019. 
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express right to bring claims against states and not vice versa.1126 In other words, this primary 
state-investor dispute mechanism that has existed for over six decades as a one-way street. This is 
despite the fact that actions of foreign investors, such as the degradation of the environment, or 
delays in completing public utility projects, may result in the host state incurring substantial 
restoration costs and pecuniary losses.1127  
 
The investment court system, will avail opportunity to the host state to mount claims 
against foreign investors, just as foreign investors do against host states.1128 African states are 
already leading the way in this respect. Both the Morocco-Nigeria BIT and the SADC FIP accord 
state that parties have a clear and unequivocal right to bring and maintain treaty claims against 
foreign investors.1129 The right of participation, either as substantive parties, amicus or interested 
                                                          
1126UNCTAD World Investment Report 2017 at p.10. Available at 
<https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf> accessed on 7th June 2019. The right of a state to bring 
an action against an investor is what Laborde calls “the reverse paradigm of Investment Arbitration Disputes”. See, G 
Laborde, “The Case for Host State Claims in Investment Arbitration” (2010) 1(1) Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement 97-122, 97-102. Such cases have been few and far in between because of the uncertainty as to whether this 
right exists in the first place. These cases constitute less than 1% of the ICSID cases with conflicting and inconsistent 
jurisdictional interpretations. 
1127G Laborde, ibid, 100, observes that “A review of the entire case docket of the ICSID quickly evinces, nonetheless, 
that the idea of equal access entertained by the drafters of the ICSID Convention has failed to come to fruition”. Very 
few cases have been brought by States at the ICSID. These are: Gabon v Société Secrete SA ICSID case no. ARB/76/1 
where the proceedings were settled; Tanzania Electric Supply Limited v Independent Power Tanzania Limited ICSID 
Case NO. ARB/98/8; and Government of the Province of East Kalimantan v PT Kaltim Prima Coal and others ICSID 
Case NO. ARB/07/3. The consistent issue in all these cases is the challenge on the tribunal’s jurisdiction to entertain 
the State’s claims under the Convention, with the Respondent investors invariably arguing that states had no right to 
be Claimants under the ICSID Convention and that such right was exclusively reserved for foreign investors. 
1128 Birengel, (n) 1125. 
1129 Articles 20 and 24 of the 2016 Morocco-Nigeria BIT has been hailed as a “remarkable attempt made by two 
developing countries to bring investment treaties in line with the recent evolution in international law”, particularly 
with respect to sustainable development, protection of the environment, ethical transnational business practices, 
inclusion of private sector and civil society participation, and rights of states to bring actions against foreign investors. 
The SADC FIP excludes resort to international arbitration as the preferred ISDS mechanism, instead requiring 
reference and exhaustion of local remedies before resort to the SADC Tribunal. See, T Gazzini, “Nigeria and Morocco 
Move towards a ‘New Generation’ of Bilateral Investment Treaties” (2017) EJIL 2. See also, generally a discussion 
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parties should also extend further to local communities affected by the subject matter of the 
dispute. These include civil societies, expert or professional bodies, trade unions and non-
governmental organisations, who currently have limited standing or audience before an ISDS 
arbitral tribunals.1130 Opening up the court to its non-traditional actors will also greatly enhance 
the accountability and transparency of the African trade and investment dispute settlement system, 
particularly where public resources are concerned. 
 
The UNCITRAL Working Group III, charged with the responsibility of identifying 
emerging issues in the ISDS system and recommending possible reforms to the system, has 
identified several challenges faced by the system as a reason for its non-optimal 
performance.1131The group cited the key problems of the system to include:1132  
 
(i) Divergent interpretation of substantive standards, 
(ii) Divergent interpretation relating to jurisdiction, admissibility, and procedural 
inconsistency, 
(iii) Lack of coherency or consistency in the decisions of tribunals, 
(iv) Lack of a framework to address multiple proceedings, 
(v) Limitation in the current system to address inconsistency and incorrectness of arbitral 
decisions, 
                                                          
on the Morocco-Nigeria BIT by C Nyombi and T Mortimer and N Rmsundar, “The Morocco- Nigeria BIT: Towards 
a New Generation of Intra- Africa BITs” (2018) 29(2) International Company and Commercial Law Review 69-80. 
See Articles25 and 26 of the SADC FIP. For a discussion on the dispute resolution mechanisms under the SADC FIP, 
see generally, Ngobeni and Fagbayibo, (n) 975.  
1130 The 2006 ICSID Arbitration Rules 32, 34 and 37. See also the decision in Vivendi Universal S.A v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus 
Curie (May 19, 2005). 
1131 UNCITRAL Draft Report of the Working Group III (on Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) identifies the 
following Part B-D, [25-132] 6-19. See, 
<https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/draft_report_of_wg_iii_for_the_website.pdf> accessed on 8th June 
2019. 
1132 ibid.  
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(vi) Lack or apparent lack of independence and impartiality of arbitrators and decision   
makers, 
(vii) Lack of clear or standardised qualification of decision makers,  
(viii) Lack of diversity of decision makers, 
(ix)      Lengthy duration of ISDS proceedings, 
(x)       Prohibitive costs associated with the system, 
(xi)      Lack of accountability especially in matters involving public funds, 
(xii) Problems related to selection and impartiality of arbitrators, and 
(xiii) Concerns regarding third- party funding. 
 
The group is currently considering proposals for reform of the ISDS system, including 
through a formal multilateral court system.1133  
 
As global reforms to the ISDS system take shape, economic integration, including of 
dispute settlement systems, at the continental and sub-regional levels will be crucial. These will 
form building blocks for the proposed multilateral trade and investment court, while addressing 
intra-African trade and investment disputes. The continental mechanism may also offer a first 
instance court for the proposed multilateral court. The details of proposed structure and 
jurisdictional competence of the court shall be offered in the next chapter of this thesis. 
 
The supranational AU single court’s trade and investment chamber (‘the Chamber’) will 
eliminate the problems of the ISDS system identified above in the following ways. Firstly, the 
appellate process will ensure that the decisions of the apex (appeals) chamber, underlines 
consistency. This would be done through the application of the doctrine of precedent and the 
principle of supremacy, of the decisions of the ACJ&HR’s court over all sub-regional and national 
courts in African economic integration matters. This would essentially establish the principle of 
supremacy of African continental law over sub-regional and national trade and investment laws.  
 
                                                          
1133 ibid. These problems are a mirror reflection of the problems of the ISDS system as identified by the EU, notes 
1076-1079 above, and discussed in detail in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
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A requirement that all domestic and regional courts should refer questions on the 
interpretation and application of African economic law to the Chamber for a preliminary ruling, 
will also greatly enhance the growth, consistency, predictability and uniformity or unity of African 
community law. A requirement for the consolidation of all related claims will eliminate the current 
problem of forum shopping where investors often commence in a multiplicity of actions, both in 
international and domestic fora, in the hope of succeeding in some, if not all, cases. This will also 
ensure that there is neither the possibility of conflicting decisions rendered by judicial bodies on 
the same subject matter, nor a party having to defend the same claim before different adjudicative 
fora. It will also greatly save on costs and the time taken in dispute settlement. 
 
Secondly, the proposed Chamber of the Court will also address the ethical issue of parties 
shopping for their preferred arbitrators, a feature that is common-place in investor-state dispute 
settlement. It will also give equal opportunity to all qualified Africans to serve as dispute resolvers 
in disputes involving Africans and African parties, emanating from the continent. It is proposed to 
set up two sections of the Chamber, one for trade and another for investment disputes. Since trade 
disputes are largely inter-state, it is proposed that the trade section of the Chamber should have 
representation of state-member appointed judges, whose recruitment will be competitive and merit 
based. The investment disputes section should be manned by highly qualified and experienced 
international arbitrators who will also be competitively recruited. Citizens of member states of the 
AU will all have an equal chance to serve on its panel of judges, for trade disputes; and as 
arbitrators in investment disputes. Detailed proposals on the qualifications, manner of 
appointment, tenure and jurisdiction of the judges and arbitrators to serve in the two sections will 
be set out in the next chapter of this thesis. In essence, the model of the Chamber should take the 
jurisdictional set up of sub-regional courts such as the COMESA Court of Justice, ECOWAS and 
the EAC, all of which provide both the traditional judicial dispute settlement system and also 
incorporate investment arbitration in their architecture. 
 
Thirdly, the direct effect of the decisions of the Chamber in all member states to the 
ACJ&HR Protocol will enhance the effectiveness of enforcement of trade and investment 
decisions. This will be most useful in investment arbitration since successful parties will not have 
to contend with the uncertainty that comes with choice of law problems. Parties will also 
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effectively avoid domestic laws in seats of arbitration or countries of enforcement. This measure 
will also significantly cut down on the time spent in litigating in national courts over enforcement 
of international judgments and awards. The CJEU and OHADA models will form the basis for the 
structure that the requirement of direct effect should take. 
 
5.7.2 Why not an Entirely New Continental Trade and Investment Court? 
There have been various suggestions for the setting up of a pan-African Investment court and an 
African commercial court.1134 Romantic as the idea of establishing a bespoke pan-African 
investment or commercial court may seem, it does not appear, at the moment, to be the right vehicle 
to carry forward the envisaged reforms in the ISDS system. This is primarily for two reasons. 
Firstly, economic integration encompasses two elements which are trade and investment. It 
follows, therefore, that a court which covers only one of these two elements does not fully address 
the issues that arise in the entire economic regionalism spectrum. 
 
Secondly, the current circumstances of the AU do not seem to favour the establishment of 
a new permanent court. The AU is currently facing severe financial constraints, so much so that it 
has had its budget cut by 12 % in 2018.1135 Indeed, the merger of the ACJ and the ACH&PR was 
partly predicated on the need to consolidate the AU organs for a more cost effective management 
of its shrinking resources.1136 It would, therefore, not only be an ill-timed but financially 
burdensome preposition to create yet another AU organ, or even court.  
 
                                                          
1134 For example, Nyombi suggests the establishment of a Pan African Investment Court, while Onyema suggests the 
establishment of an African Commercial Court. They see these as possible solutions to the problems that have led to 
the dissatisfaction with the current multilateral ISDS (ICSID) system, and commercial arbitration. See, Chrispas 
Nyombi, A Case for a Regional Investment Court in Africa” (2018) 43(1) North Carolina Journal of International 
law, 67-96. E Onyema, “Reimaging the Framework for resolving Intra-African Commercial Disputes in the Context 
of the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement” (2010) World Trade Review 1-25. 
1135 See, <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180706/financial-reforms-african-union-lead-massive-cuts-unions-
budgets> accessed on 8th June 2019. See also, K Pharatlhatlhe and J Vanheukelom, (n) 395, [1-2]. 
1136 This is expressly acknowledged under Article 25 (2) of the ACJ&HR Protocol. 
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Furthermore, creation of a new international court is a dicey diplomatic undertaking with 
no guarantees as to the time it is likely for a protocol or treaty to garner the requisite ratifications 
for it to come into force, if at all. If experience is anything to go by, treaties establishing courts 
under the AU take several years, if not decades, to achieve the numbers required to come into 
force. It is much easier to plug into the existing AU single court by establishing a trade and 
investment chamber without the rigours and attendant uncertainty of negotiating a new protocol 
or treaty.  
 
The improvement in Africa’s economic fortunes will invariably enhance intra–African 
investment. It is estimated that upon full implementation of the AfCFTA, intra-Africa trade will 
rise from 15% to account for 25% of the trade volumes in Africa by 2040.1137 An effective trade 
and investment dispute settlement system for intra-African trade and investments is, therefore, 
inevitably important. There is already substantial activity in the African economic regionalism 
space to justify the establishment of the court. As at the time of writing, 42 disputes involving 
African investors have been registered at the ICSID, 37 of which are against African states.1138 
The continental dispute settlement is, therefore, empirically also viable.  
5.8. Summary 
The problem of fragmentation or proliferation of international law seems to have been 
compounded by the proliferation of international courts, regional and sub-regional arbitration 
centres and numerous investment codes and protocols. While the problem is not unique to Africa, 
the fault lines caused by fragmentation seem to be particularly deep in the sub-regional RECs in 
Africa. This chapter has identified and highlighted the causes of this fragmentation, the features 
through which it manifests itself and its consequences to the body of international law. The chapter 
has also interrogated the possible role of the AU single court in stemming the effects of this 
fragmentation through a harmonised continental overarching mechanism.  
 
                                                          
1137UNECA Report 2018, n 20.  See also, the IMF Report, H Fofack, “A Competitive Africa- Economic Integration 
Could Make the Continent a Global Payer” (2018) Finance and Development 48-51, at 51 recons that Africa has the 
potential of being a global player if the AfCFTA Agreement is implemented. 
1138 ICSID Caseload Statistics 2019, note 956 above.  
235 
 
The chapter has also identified and highlighted the role of international investment 
arbitration centres in Africa. These play a vital role in the private sector, government or REC 
promoted sectors, as the necessary building blocks for a harmonised, devolved or cascaded 
continental trade and investment dispute resolution mechanism. Similarly, this chapter has also 
identified the PAIC as an important centrifugal force for harnessing sub-regional synergies 
towards the proposed uniform African investment code under the AfCFTA. 
 
The next chapter will draw conclusions from the discourse undertaken in this thesis and proffer 
recommendations. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1. Introduction 
The integration of markets and trade policies is a cumbersome process. It has to be undertaken 
with the acknowledgement of the diversity in socio-politico-legal and cultural backgrounds of 
member states. In reference to building strong supranational institutions, Fagbayibo notes that “it 
demands cautious and calculated steps, tactful negotiations, constant assurances and compromises, 
and the skilful management of national egoisms.”1139 
 
This thesis set out to determine the possible role of the ACJ&HR in resolving trade and 
investment disputes in an integrated African economy.  Its central focus was intra-African trade 
under both the AEC and AfCFTA integration arrangements. It evaluated the possibility of 
establishing a continental trade and investment dispute settlement mechanism to attend to the 
evolving continental economic integration. The role of RECs as building blocks for a devolved 
continental dispute settlement system was also interrogated. 
 
This thesis consists of four substantive chapters and this chapter summarises the 
conclusions drawn from each chapter and then proffers recommendations. 
6.2. Summary of Findings and Conclusions  
It was observed that the primary objectives of integration are twofold: economic and political. 
However, other objectives have since also emerged, but with less prominence and include social, 
cultural, technical, environmental and human rights objectives. Fundamentally, therefore, 
integration of economies is a quest for the member nations’ general economic welfare and, 
hopefully, in the ultimate, global welfare. 
 
While there are several theories of integration propounded, three principal approaches to 
integration have been preferred in Africa: intergovernmentalism, functionalism and 
                                                          
1139 B Fagbayibo, (n) 114, 500. 
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supranationalism. Intergovernmentalism is preferred in Africa because of its philosophical 
underpinnings, particularly since states retain their central role in integration.  
 
It was noted that most African integration efforts are mostly intergovernmental and state-
centric. Although Africa’s economic integration also exhibits functionalist and neo-functionalist 
approaches to integration, it is intergovernmentalism that finds favour among African states. This 
is partly because intergovernmentalism seems to assure states of retention of their sovereign 
authority with little, if any, of its authority ceded to the integration organs. It is also partly 
embraced because of the intergovernmental origins of Africa’s continental integration under the 
now defunct OAU. The OAU was essentially an intergovernmentalist approach to continental 
integration. Its successor, the AU, has followed the same approach, albeit with attempts at 
establishing supranational organs such as the ACJ&HR. 
 
Overall, it was observed that trade and investment dispute settlement in Africa take two 
forms which is the judicial (adjudicative) and the diplomatic (non-judicial). Adjudicative methods 
offer legally binding outcomes, while diplomatic ones rely on the goodwill of parties for their 
observance.  
 
Two procedural approaches are preferred in international dispute settlement: the use of 
permanent bodies, and ad hoc tribunals. It was also observed that non-formal methods employed 
in disputes resolution in Africa include: negotiation, mediation and conciliation. Formal dispute 
settlement methods commonly used in Africa include international courts and arbitral tribunals.  
International courts and tribunals in Africa are mostly supranational bodies, although they are often 
set up under intergovernmental organisations.1140 
 
The weaknesses of the current formal adjudicative processes in Africa were identified as 
being twofold. These include the lack of supremacy of their decisions over national courts and the 
reliance on voluntary compliance with their decisions. Despite these weaknesses, settlement of 
                                                          
1140 The EACJ, the SADC Tribunal, the ECOWAS Community Court and the COMESA Court of Justice are 
examples of efforts at establishing supranational courts under integration organisations that are intergovernmental in 
nature. 
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trade and investment disputes in Africa still favours the use of adjudicative processes for three 
broad reasons. These reasons include the self-executing or direct effect of its decisions, especially 
with respect to international arbitration; domestic recognition and enforcement of international 
tribunals’ decisions; and the perceived transparency of the processes of international tribunals 
which contribute to the predictability of norms. 
  
The research established that political and economic factors affect the choice of an 
intentional dispute settlement systems. These include the functions of the organisation, the level 
of economic integration, the number of member states and the similarities in economic and social 
levels. The more nascent integration efforts, such as PTAs and FTAs, tend to opt for non-formal 
and non-binding dispute settlement procedures. The process of choice of an appropriate dispute 
resolution mechanism is incremental. The agreements are less complex and the preferred dispute 
settlement mechanisms are often ad hoc in bilateral relations, where only two states are involved.  
 
The post-colonial history of efforts in the integration of the African continent occurred in 
different socio-economic, geo-political and domestic political contexts and dynamics. However, 
the golden thread running through the entire period was the need for either economic integration 
or cooperation through the establishment of continental and sub-regional intergovernmental 
economic blocs.    
 
In 2001, the Constitutive Act of the AU created the AU to replace the OAU.  A new push 
towards continental economic integration took root. The RECs deepened their integration with 
many achieving Customs Union, Common Markets and Monetary Unions.1141 At this stage a need 
for strong supranational institutions arose to give effect to the objectives of the integration units. 
 
In the upshot, this research advances that for the continental economic integration of Africa 
to succeed, it is imperative that it is supported by a legal system that underpins an efficient and 
effective dispute settlement system. In essence, it is argued that the economic integration of the 
                                                          
1141 The EAC progressed into a Customs Union and Common Market, it also concluded a Monetary Union Protocol. 
ECOWAS also concluded a Common Market and Customs Union Protocol and Monetary Union. COMESA 
transformed from a PTA to a Common Market. 
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continent must be underpinned by an African continental legal system anchored in an African 
community law; and a continental dispute settlement system whose centrepiece is the ACJ&HR, 
the AU single court. This thesis, therefore, proposes the deepening and underwriting of the 
continental economic integration of Africa through a robust supranational and devolved trade and 
investment dispute resolution system anchored on the ACJ&HR. 
6.3. Recommendations 
The two principal objectives on which Africa’s continental economic integration is anchored are: 
harmonisation of policies and regulation; and devolution through the sub-regional RECs.1142 The 
role of the AU single court in Africa’s economic integration, as perceived in this research, is to 
provide a supranational continental dispute resolution mechanism for intra-Africa trade and 
investment. In advancing this objective, RECs and sub-regional courts form the building blocks 
for the desired continental integration.  
 
It is on the foregoing premises that the following seven recommendations are made. 
6.3.1 Institutional Superstructure of the Proposed Trade and Investment Chamber 
of the ACJ&HR as an Overarching Mechanism 
The two types of disputes identified in the continental economic integration require different 
approaches. Trade disputes largely fall within the realm of public law, and mostly involve states. 
Commercial and investment disputes are matters of private law and involve private parties. It is, 
therefore, proposed that a trade and investments chamber of the AU single court be created, with 
two sections: one for the resolution of trade disputes; and another to cater for investment and 
commercial disputes. To give effect to this proposal, an amendment to Article 19 of the Statute of 
the ACJ&HR will be necessary to provide for this additional chamber of the Court. 
 
To achieve the desired harmony, and in line with the AU policy of using sub-regional RECs 
as building blocks for continental integration (as underscored in the AEC Treaty), it is 
recommended that a devolved structure of the court’s trade and investment chamber be created. 
                                                          
1142 Article 6 of the AEC Treaty and Article 3 of the AfCFTA Agreement. See also the discussion in Chapter 3 of 
this thesis.  
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This will require that the judicial organs of the eight RECs in Africa serve as the devolved units 
of the ACJ&HR, with specific trade and investment disputes resolution mandates. This 
recommendation intends to not only ensure access to trade and investment justice throughout the 
expanse of the continent but to also make good use of the REC structures (including buildings), 
personnel as well as jurisprudence that have been built and developed over decades. 
6.3.2 Overarching Jurisdiction of the Court: Supremacy, Direct Effect and Use of 
the Preliminary Ruling Procedure 
(i) Supremacy 
The current normative architecture and jurisdictional competencies of the Court lean heavily 
towards dealing with human rights and international criminal law cases.1143 The design of the 
ACJ&HR’s jurisdiction and competence, with respect to trade and investment dispute resolution, 
are not clothed with the requisite supremacy, or with precedence over national and sub-regional 
judicial organs. The principle of supremacy of the continental court is imperative in ensuring 
predictability of norms, thus ensuring efficiency of the system. This would guarantee a consistent 
interpretation and application of common continental trade and investment laws and regulations. 
 
To achieve decisional and normative supranationalism, it is critical that the AU single 
court’s decisions have direct effect in the domestic courts of its member states.  It is also imperative 
that the Court have exclusive apex jurisdiction on matters of African Economic Community law. 
This can be achieved through the creation of an appellate jurisdiction for the Court in intra-African 
trade and investment disputes.  
 
It is, therefore, further recommended that the REC Courts act as courts of first instance, 
with the ACJ&HR, serving as an appellate review mechanism. This recommendation is meant to 
ensure that there is consistency, coherency and uniformity in the interpretation and application of 
African continental trade and investment law. It will also help to develop a recognisable body of 
law that constitutes African Economic Community trade and investment law. 
                                                          
1143 Article 28 of the ACJ&HR Statute. The jurisdiction of the court is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.3.1 and 3.32 
of this thesis. 
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To give effect to this recommendation, there is a need to amend the treaties establishing 
regional courts in Africa so as to expressly provide for the hierarchical structure of the African 
Court system, with the ACJ&HR at the apex while the regional courts serve as the courts of first 
instance. This recommendation is also in furtherance of the step-wise integration approach 
articulated in Article 6 of the AEC Treaty. Furthermore, this recommendation is in line with Article 
3(l) of the AU Constitutive Act, which enjoins the AU to harmonise the policies and norms of the 
RECs under a continental umbrella.   
 
To effectively achieve and advance its overriding status on matters relating to the African 
Economic Community law, it is recommended that decisions of the ACJ&HR’s Trade and 
Investment Chamber be regarded as supreme over national courts and laws (including national 
constitutions); and sub-regional laws, organs and judicial organs.  
(ii) Direct effect 
It is also recommended that the decisions of the chamber have direct effect at both national and 
sub-regional levels without the intervention of the regional or national courts, or authorities. To 
this end, it is recommended that the OHADA approach be adopted, whereby member states are 
under obligation to enforce decisions of the OHADA CCJA, without any requirement to adopt 
proceedings under national laws. 
(iii) The Use of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure 
To achieve supremacy, consistency and coherence in African community law, it is recommended 
that national and regional courts request for a preliminary ruling from the ACJ&HR where the 
following matters are in issue: 
 
 the interpretation of continental Trade and Investment treaties, protocols, codes, 
regulations or guidelines, 
 the validity or interpretation of the Acts of the African Economic Community 
Institutions; or 
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 the interpretation of the statutes of bodies created by the African Economic 
Community. 
 
It is further recommended that this procedure be available to national and regional courts before 
they pronounce their final judgment on a matter.  It is proposed that this procedure be modelled 
along the lines of Article 234 of the Treaty, establishing the European Community, in terms of 
scope of matters to be referred.1144 The EAC and COMESA models can also be adopted.1145  
(iv)  Advisory Opinions 
It is recommended that Article 53, of Statute of the ACJ&HR, be amended to confer specific 
jurisdiction to the Court and particularly its trade and investment chamber. This is to give advisory 
opinions on matters of African trade and investment law to AU organs such as the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government; the PAP; the Executive Council; the Peace and Security Council; 
AU financial institutions; and member states as may require such advisory opinions. 
 
To give effect to this recommendation, it will be necessary that Article 28 of the Statute of 
the Court be amended to specifically provide for the supremacy, direct effect, preliminary ruling 
and advisory jurisdiction of the Court. 
                                                          
1144 Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community provides that: 
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: 
a) the interpretation of this Treaty; 
b) the validity and interpretation of acts of institutions of the community and the ECB; 
c) the interpretation of Statutes of bodies established by an act of the council, where those statutes so 
provide. 
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a member state, that court or tribunal may, 
if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it give judgment, request the Court of 
Justice to give a ruling thereon. 
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a member state against 
whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, the court or tribunal shall bring the matter 
before the Court of Justice. 
1145The Preliminary ruling/ reference procedure and its application under the Article 29 of the EAC Treaty, Article 25 
of the COMESA Treaty, Article 14 of the UEMOA Treaty, Article 16 of the SADC Tribunal Protocol and Article 10 
of the Community court of the ECOWAS are discussed in chapter 4.2.2.3.2 of this thesis. 
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It is appreciated that African states will not easily give up the exercise of their sovereignty 
to a supranational continental judicial organ. This may explain the slow pace of ratifying protocols 
establishing continental courts. However, continental and sub-regional hegemons, which control 
substantial trade on the continent and stand to benefit most from free trade, can influence this 
aspect of the integration process. By adopting the supremacy of the continental trade and 
investment chamber of the court and requiring, through reciprocity, for its intra-African trading 
partners to follow suit, the court may find less resistance to its acceptance. Further, a cost-benefit 
analysis of deepening free trade may help persuade reluctant converts to adopt the supremacy of 
the court. All countries wish for economic prosperity, growth of trade volumes (from 17% to 52 
%) and a resultant rise in GDP by up to four times, as a result of efficient cross border trade, may 
help put the proposition into a persuasive perspective. 
6.3.3 Appointment and Qualifications of Judges and Arbitrators of the Trade and 
Investment Chambers of the ACJ&HR 
The appointment of judges of the Court by member states from amongst national court judges 
negates the perception of independence of the court from the appointing member states.  Foreign 
investors are generally apprehensive of domestic courts, largely due to the perception of state 
control. To carry over the same judges to the AU single court, through the current appointment 
procedure that requires the secondment of national court judges to the court, will transfer the same 
perceptions and fears to the continental court.1146 Therefore, it is proposed that a process of 
competitive recruitment, remuneration and retention of the members of the court be implemented. 
This ensures equity in representation and assures the judges of security of tenure and emphasises 
on the professional qualifications in international trade and investment law. This also ensures 
competence and high moral standing. These qualities will underwrite the integrity, meritocracy 
and independence of the court. 
 
It is recommended that Article 3 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR be amended to increase the 
number of Judges from sixteen to at least 22 judges with at least six judges being allocated to the 
                                                          
1146 The current appointment mechanism under Article 6 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR enjoins states to nominate 
Judges to the court. The practice at both regional and continental courts has been for states to second serving judges 
of national courts to the regional or continental courts. 
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trade Section of the Court.  In addition to the qualifications set out in Article 7 of the Court’s 
Statute, it is recommended that the judges to serve in the trade section of the Court be persons 
trained in international trade law. Rather than see the different legal philosophies, cultures and 
languages on the African continent as being an impediment to a unified legal system, this variety 
in legal and cultural backgrounds should offer a mosaic of different perspectives that will enrich 
and ultimately, cultivate a robust sui generis African continental economic law. 
 
It is further recommended that the persons serve in the investment disputes section of the 
Court’s chamber and should possess qualifications in international arbitration. Furthermore, it is 
also proposed that the Judges and arbitrators serving in the trade and investment sections, 
respectively, should be recruited through a competitive process and not be appointed by member 
states to the protocol. The process should involve a public call for applications to all Africans in 
possession of the required qualifications. Thereafter, shortlisted applicants should be invited to 
participate in interviews conducted by a panel of peer reviewers using an objective evaluation 
criteria and transparent procedures. This will enhance the independence of the judges and 
arbitrators since they will not owe their appointment to any political facilitators, but will instead 
have been appointed purely on merit.  
 
This recommendation is also aimed at enhancing the independence of the Court in general 
and insulate it from the control of state parties besides ensuring that only persons who possess the 
highest competence and qualifications are appointed to these positions. Through this move, it is 
also anticipated that the court’s independence will be underwritten and the jurisprudence 
emanating from the court will be of the highest quality. 
 
6.3.4 Financing the Expanded ACJ&HR 
The research concluded that financial constraints of the AU have a direct relation with the 
independence of the court.  Inadequate funding of African regional and sub-regional courts, and 
the AU itself, may also impact negatively on the operations and, ultimately, the effectiveness of 
the trade and investments chamber of the ACJ&HR.  
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There are at least four models of funding the expanded court explored. Firstly, state parties 
can fund the expanded court through their subscriptions to the AU. This is the ordinary way 
through which regional organisations raise resources. The second model involves payment of court 
fees by court users from state member countries and surcharging for citizens of non-member states. 
This approach has as the adverse potential of portending an increase in the cost for doing business 
and creating a barrier to access to justice for small traders who form the majority of African 
entrepreneurs. 
 
The third proposal is attributed to reforms initiated by the immediate former AU Chairman, 
President Paul Kagame of Rwanda.1147 The model, aimed at a sustainable financing of the AU and 
reducing its dependency on the EU and Asian support, involved the collection of a 0.2% levy on 
all imports into  all AU member states from non-member states to fund the AU operations, projects 
and its activities.1148 Since most African states are net importers of goods, mainly from Europe and 
Asia, the intention is to indirectly pass the cost of funding the AU to the countries exporting into 
Africa. This model is yet to find traction with most members yet to implement it.1149 However 
recent statistics indicate that more African countries are willing and have started implementing the 
levy.1150 
 
                                                          
1147At the 27th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Governments in 2016, Rwanda’s President 
Paul Kagame was entrusted with leading the institutional reform process in the AU. A raft of 19 measures aimed at 
streamlining the operations of the AU Commission were proposed, including a levy of 0.2% on all imports into Africa. 
This fund was meant to be collected by member states for purposes of financing AU activities and weaning it off 
donor funding. See, Turianskyi, and Gruzd note 398 above, at p.1-4. 
1148 This is one of the core 19 measures articulated in the Report by the then AU Chairman, Rwanda President Paul 
Kagame. See, note 394 above. 
1149 Although 21 countries have agreed to implementing this levy, only 12 are so far doing so, and another 5 have 
committed to start. Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Cote d’ Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sudan are already implementing the Levy. Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mauritania and 
Senegal have committed to implement the levy. but are yet to start. See, AU (2018) “Revised Report on the 
Implementation of the Kigali Decision on Financing of the African Union”. Available at 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34871-file-report-20institutional20reform20of20the20au-2.pdf.  Accessed on 
3rd August 2019. 
1150 ibid. 
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There is a fourth model that is connected to the third. It involves regional economic 
hegemons that stand to benefit most from the free trade arrangements entered into at both the 
continental and sub-regional levels. Countries such as South Africa in the south, Nigeria in the 
west, Kenya in the east, and Egypt in the north form the regional economic hegemons in Africa.1151 
This is primarily because these regional economic powerhouses exert influence in their respective 
economic blocs through investments, macro-economic stability and general economic strength. 
These regional hegemons can play a critical role in ensuring the success of continental integration 
as a whole.1152 Indeed, countries such as Egypt and South Africa have already indicated their 
willingness to collect, through other means, the levy necessary to finance the operations of the AU 
organs.1153 Countries that are willing to pay beyond the prescribed 0.2 % levy should by all means 
be encouraged to do so.  
 
A combination of the four models for financing the court will suffice. Each approach 
addresses different aspects and unique circumstances. Reasonable court fees paid by users of the 
court will serve two primary purposes; to deter frivolous claimants, and to ensure that cost is not 
a deterrent to accessing justice. It will also mitigate the financial hardships which may occur due 
to the chronic delays and defaults by African states in meeting their subscription obligations to 
regional organs.  
 
In the upshot, however, the architecture of the chamber as proposed does not materially 
change the structure of the court as it is currently set up. It merely proposes to expand the court by 
creating a trade, commercial and investments disputes chamber. It also proposes to devolve the 
court through the existing RECs. As a result, the court will still be financed as a part of the AU 
single court and the sub-regional REC courts. The financing proposals made in this thesis aim to 
avoid dependency on donor funding, reduce reliance on member states’ contributions, ensure self-
sustainability of the court, and to promote access to the court.   
 
                                                          
1151 For a discussion on the political and economic influence of Regional hegemons in Africa, see Fagbayibo B. note 
32 above, at p. 54-56. 
1152 ibid, 55-56. 
1153Y Turianskyi and S Gruzd, (n) 399 17.  
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6.3.5 Access by Individuals 
Individuals, natural or juristic, can only access the ACJ&HR in human rights and international 
crimes cases. Article 28 of the Statute of the ACJ&HR and Article 6 of the AfCFTA Protocol on 
Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes, also make the resolution of disputes under 
the two instruments of an inter-state affair. As a result, they exclude individuals from accessing 
the court on their own right. 
 
The foregoing provisions limit the jurisdictional competence of the dispute settlement 
mechanisms by excluding, all together, investor-state disputes and commercial disputes between 
private parties. The irony here is that individuals are the motors which drive trade and investment. 
It, therefore, undermines the essence of the entire system when disputes arising from transactions 
between individuals are excluded from the primary dispute settlement mechanisms that are created 
to promote cross-border trade. 
 
The ACJ&HR and AfCFTA dispute resolution systems only attends to (public law) inter-
state disputes without addressing the private party disputes at the micro level. Interestingly, the 
current regime also seems oblivious to the fact that states can also be private legal persons while 
acting in a commercial capacity through state entities and corporations. 
 
The architecture of the current system may be sufficient to deal with public law inter-state 
disputes. However, access to the processes used for resolution of investment and commercial 
disputes at the micro-level, where individuals form the central actors, require reform.  
 
Access to justice, for both natural and juristic persons, is crucial to effective economic 
integration of the continent. Access to justice is a concept accepted in international law as being a 
universal, inalienable and inviolable right.1154 It refers to both judicial and administrative remedies 
and procedures available to persons aggrieved or likely to be aggrieved by a matter. Access by 
                                                          
1154 Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (UDHR) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf > accessed on 5th August 2019. 
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individuals to the ACJ&HR, particularly its commercial and investments section, is crucial for the 
attainment of continental trade and investment justice.  
 
Although accruing largely in the area of human rights, the significant contribution to the 
development of progressive jurisprudence by the continental and sub-regional courts in Africa is 
largely attributable to cases filed by individuals, NGOs and civil society groups. The role of public 
spirited pressure groups in trade and investment policy formulation and execution is significant in 
this era of sustainable development goals, environmental protection, human rights and ethics in 
transnational trade.  NGOs and civil society groups act as vanguards or guarantors of these 
principle, particularly against multinational corporations with financial muscle and political 
influence.  It is, therefore, recommended that NGOs and civil society groups be accorded access 
to the Court in public interest litigation and matters that concern common community interests. 
 
To give effect to this proposal, it is recommended that Article 28A of the Court’s Statute 
be amended to specifically confer rights of access to the court’s trade and investment chamber, by 
individuals, both natural and juristic. The chamber’s jurisdiction to entertain trade and investment 
disputes should be expanded to include investor-state, state-state, and disputes between private 
disputants, inter se.  In public interest matters (which involve matters such as investment of public 
funds and environmental issues), civil society groups, NGOs, bodies with observer status at the 
AU, as well as members of the academia (as amicus curie), should similarly be granted rights of 
audience and access to the Court. 
 
This expanded access to the court by various actors is likely to make the Court more 
vibrant, forward looking, develop a more expansive and incisive jurisprudence and, in the ultimate, 
espouse a versatile trade and investment regime that is unique to the social-cultural-economic and 
political mosaic of Africa. 
  6.3.6 Enforcement of Decisions 
Enforcement of international courts’ decisions is a perennial problem that emanates from a lack of 
coercive powers by international organisations to enforce their decisions. International courts, 
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therefore, largely depend on domestic courts’ enforcement mechanisms to give effect to their 
decisions even where treaties for recognition and enforcement exist. 
 
In strengthening the enforcement mechanisms of the proposed chamber’s decisions, three 
approaches have been considered and recommended. The first is to adopt the approach taken by 
the CJEU. Article 260 of the CJEU Treaty confers jurisdiction upon the Court to sanction a state 
member that fails to comply with the Court’s Judgment by meting out fines and other punitive 
orders including declarations of breach under Article 253 and 259. Such jurisdiction is absent from 
the Protocol and Statute of the ACJ&HR. It is recommended that the Protocol and Statute be 
amended to grant the court similar jurisdiction.  
 
The second approach is where the judgement is enforceable as a decision of the highest 
domestic courts without the rigours of adoption through national law processes. This approach is 
preferred by investor friendly states with common business laws, such as those in the OHADA 
region. It is also the approach taken through treaty enforcement interventions such as the New 
York Convention and ICSID. Other effective approaches have also evolved. The ECOWAS Court 
of Justice has an enforcement organ in each state that can follow the implementation of the decision 
of the Court.  
 
A hybrid of the foregoing three approaches will suffice. A unit established in every member 
state for monitoring implementation of the court’s decisions, similar to the one used by ECOWAS 
is proposed. The direct effect of decisions of a supranational court/arbitral tribunal without 
domestic recognition procedures has been largely successful in the OHADA region. It has 
therefore been a testament to the ability by Africans to embrace supranational regulation and 
dispute resolution, particularly in commercial matters.  
 
6.3.7 Harmonisation of Continental and Sub-Regional Investment Arbitration 
through the AU Single Court  
In an effort to reign in the proliferation of investment codes and international arbitration on the 
continent, it is proposed that the Chamber is conferred with commercial and investment arbitration 
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jurisdiction. The PAIC presents a viable remedy to the problem of fragmentation of investment 
codes in Africa. The ACJ&HR should be the preferred mode of settlement of investment disputes 
under PAIC. This will not only address the problem of proliferation of investment codes in Africa, 
but also harmonise continental investment policies and regulation. 
 
However, for it to be effective, the PAIC dispute settlement system should allow not only 
for state-state but also investor – state dispute resolution. This should be for both African and 
foreign investors. To give access to its dispute settlement system, the PAIC should merge and 
harmonise the sub-regional codes and devolve its tenets to RECs and national levels. 
 
A commercial and investments disputes section of the ACJ&HR Trade and Investment 
Chamber specifically entrusted with the role of intra-Africa investment arbitration will ameliorate 
the problems identified as arising out of the proliferation of commercial and investment arbitration 
in Africa. Firstly, it will lead to the harmonisation and development of an African community 
investment law. Secondly, it will also develop the capacity and experience of African Arbitrators 
in international arbitration, as well as in readiness for international assignments. Thirdly, it will 
also offer, through the ACJ&HR, a recognition and enforcement mechanism for arbitral awards 
and therefore, avoid or limit interaction with domestic courts which are perceived to be state 
influenced. This will give comfort to the intra-African and foreign investors, of the transparency 
and integrity of the dispute settlement system. To this end, it will be imperative that the arbitrators 
on the ACJ&HR roster be recruited competitively, on merit, without the option of states 
nominating members to the panel. 
 
In the spirit of harmonisation of African Investment laws, codes and protocols, and in line 
with the Preamble and Article 3 (c) of the AEC Treaty, it is proposed that all the sub-regional 
investment protocols be aligned with the PAIC so as to ensure harmony in African investment law. 
In terms of dispute resolution, arbitration under the ACJ&HR and/or sub regional courts should be 
specifically included in the PAIC, as the preferred or prescribed method for resolution of all intra-
African investment disputes. 
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6.4. Contribution to Practise 
The conclusion of the 1991 AEC Treaty formally set in motion the creation of the Africa Economic 
Community. This was to be achieved by 2030. Even before the ACJ created under Article 28 of 
the Treaty was established, significant events that would reshape the route to the continental 
economic integration occurred. Firstly, there was the decision, in 2008, to amalgamate the ACJ 
and the ACH&PR into the ACJ&HR, as the AU single court. Secondly, the promulgation of the 
Constitutive Act of the AU in 2001, stressed the importance of continental economic integration.  
 
Despite the evolution of the AU and its ideas on continental trade and investment, the theme 
that remains constant throughout the various instruments on continental integration is the 
harmonisation of trade and investment regulation; and the use of sub-regional RECs as the building 
blocks of continental integration. It, therefore, has become necessary to re-evaluate the dispute 
resolution systems available in supporting and promoting intra-African trade and Investment. 
 
There have been suggestions on the modelling of an appropriate investment dispute 
resolution regime for the continent, including suggestions for a Pan African Investment Court and 
a commercial court. However, none of the proposals have attended to the most important aspects 
of finding the basis of an effective trade and investment disputes settlement system in Africa. 
Firstly, the system should acknowledge the twin principles of harmonisation of the continental AU 
adjudicative system, as well as devolution through sub-regional courts. The system must, 
therefore, be knitted into the AU superstructure, while acknowledging the rich jurisprudence and 
infrastructure built by the sub-regional courts, with some being for over 50 years. In essence, the 
system must build a truly continental community law that is predictable and uniformly applied 
across the continent; and avoid further fragmentation of the continent. The proposals made in this 
thesis speak to all these imperatives. 
 
While there is no gainsaying, the critical role that a reliable, independent, efficient and 
acceptable continental dispute resolution plays in strengthening an integration effort, access to the 
system and enforcement of its decisions will determine its success. The proposals advanced in this 
thesis seek to ensure that the decisions that emanate from the proposed trade and investment 
chamber of the court are easily and promptly enforced. 
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The AU has set 2030 as the year in which it will decide the readiness of the continent for 
the creation of a single government and the form it should take. This date coincides with that set 
for the complete and successful implementation of the AEC Treaty. If successfully implemented, 
the integrated continental court should offer a useful tool for evaluating the readiness of the 
continent, in the creation of the single government and the appropriate form it should take. 
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